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ABSTRACT
This thesis employs the Aristotelian concept of equity in 
acknowledging differences between individuals, which continue despite 
apparent increases in social uniformity. Differences affecting 
education are considered in the light of the Warnock Report 1 Special 
Educational Needs’, subsequent constructions of educational policy on 
integration, and polarisation of opinion between those holding the 
Report to be too radical, and potentially damaging to the education 
system, and those holding it not radical enough.
Part One, ’Introduction’, places the Report in an historical context, 
and in the context of contemporary thought. The Report is not 
revolutionary, but represents a stage in the evolution of educational 
theory and practice.
Part Two, ’The Handicapped Person in Society’, studies related 
concepts, differentiation and categorisation, with reference to 
relativistic notions of normality and deviance. Particular attention 
is given to the relativistic theory that ’handicap’ is socially 
conditioned and hence avoidable, which is criticised and replaced by 
the thesis that serious handicaps, whilst possibly affected by social 
conditioning, are not socially created, but objectively real. The 
concept of a person is examined, and compared to that of an adult.
Part Three, 'The Handicapped Person in Education’, examines the 
philosophical debate over the contested concept of education, and then 
focusses on special education, leading to a review of the special 
methods and contents used with severely handicapped children, and of 
the Report’s title 'Special Educational Needs'. Part Three closes 
by exploring the philosophies of integration and comprehensivisation.
Part Four, 'Conclusion', links analysis of the principal philosophical 
issues raised by this study with the putative end of Special Education 
following the Warnock Report. This contains little that is 
revolutionary, yet some interpretations, made for non-educational 
reasons, are held to be potentially damaging to the education of 
handicapped people. Such interpretations largely arise from the 
ambiguities of the Report's use of emotive concepts.
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PART I 
INTRODUCTION
Chapter 1 
Aims and Methods
7
"We hold that education has certain long-term goals, that it has 
a general point or purpose, which can be definitely, though 
generally, stated. The goals are twofold, different from each 
other, but by no means incompatible. They are, first, to 
enlarge a child’s knowledge, experience, and imaginative 
understanding, and thus his awareness of moral values and 
capacity for enjoyment; and secondly, to enable him to enter 
the world after formal education is over as an active 
participant in society and a responsible contributor to it, 
capable of achieving as much independence as possible. The 
educational needs of every child are determined in relation to 
these goals. We are fully aware that for some children the 
first of these goals can be approached only by minute, though 
for them highly significant steps, while the second may never 
be achieved. But this does not entail that for these children 
the goals are different. The purpose of education for all 
children is the same; the goals are the same. But the help 
that individual children need in progressing towards them will 
be different. Whereas for some the road they have to travel 
towards the goals is smooth and easy, for others it is fraught 
with obstacles. For some the obstacles are so daunting that, 
even with the greatest possible help, they will not get very 
far. Nevertheless, for them too, progress will be possible, 
and their educational needs will be fulfilled, as they 
gradually overcome one obstacle after another on the way." 
(Warnock, H.M.,1978 : Special Educational Needs : Report of the 
Committee of Enquiry into the Education of Handicapped Children 
and Young People, Cmnd.7212, H.M.S.O., London, s. 1.4, p. 5)
"Our concept of special education is thus broader than the 
traditional one of education by special methods appropriate for 
particular categories of children. It extends beyond the idea 
of education provided in special schools, special classes or 
units for children with particular types of disability, and 
embraces the notion of any form of additional help, wherever it 
is provided and whenever it is provided, from birth to 
maturity, to overcome educational difficulty. It also embodies 
the idea that, although the difficulties which some children
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may dictate WHAT they have to be taught and the disabilities of 
some HOW they have to be taught, the point of their education 
is the same."
(ibid., s . 1.10,p . 6)
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The aim of this thesis is to give a philosophical analysis of the 1978 
Warnock Report on Special Education (1), thereby integrating it with 
current educational and social thought. Additionally, the attempt is 
made to put these current ideas on the nature of proper educational 
differences into a historical framework. This review of the past 
demonstrates how opinion of the proper educational treatment for 
handicapped children has developed to the present position. It also 
shows how the concept of handicap, rather than poverty, stupidity, or 
moral fault, has developed.
The whole thesis is placed within an Aristotelian framework of equity 
(2), a concept which indicates the way differences between people can 
be relevant in certain situations. Handicapped people can be regarded 
as a special group, comparable to women, or racial minorities. Kant 
is acknowledged as the second major philosophical influence, since an 
integral concern developed in the thesis is the importance of all 
individuals being treated as ends rather than means (3).
The salient points of the Warnock Report on which this thesis focusses 
are
a) there should not be a formal distinction made between 
handicapped and non-handicapped children;
b) formal distinctions between different groups of children 
previously called handicapped are not only useless, but 
educationally and socially damaging;
c) a completely new and much wider view of handicap can be 
expressed in terms of special educational needs;
d) therefore, a certain view of education, which is very 
different from many conventional views, is appropriate.
The conflict that arises from differing interpretations of these four 
points, and from inner inconsistencies of the Report itself, is 
assessed.
In Part One of the thesis, Chapter 2, The Background, follows the 
present chapter and analyses the historical and contemporary scene. 
Since the 1960s, there has been a movement on both sides of the 
Atlantic towards ’equal opportunities’ for social minorities. These 
minorities vary from country to country, but include, inter alia, 
blacks, women, the unemployed, the poor, and the elderly.
’Affirmative Action’ and ’Positive Discrimination’ are terms
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representing this ethos, which holds that extra help in terms of money 
or employment opportunities should be made specially available to 
certain groups. International Year of Disabled People, in 1981, which 
was also the year of the Education Act which encapsulated the Warnock 
Report (4), was an example of this development. The whole tenor of 
both official and unofficial statements during the year was that 
handicapped or disabled people should be regarded as part of the 
community, as fellow citizens of equal value to everyone else.
This theme is linked with the similar educational argument that all 
children, whatever their intellectual or physical capacities, should 
be accepted as fellow pupils in their local school, rather than being 
segregated in special schools.
In the historical section of Chapter 2, proof is offered that the 
Report is not the new and revolutionary document that it was often 
hailed to be. On the contrary, it was an obvious stage in the long 
term trend. It is best seen as a culmination and distillation of 
ideas. The history is approached from two directions. Initially, the 
Report’s own assessment of historical trends is discussed. Warnock’s 
contention is that whilst, from very early in the development of the 
state education system, theory and governmental policy on special 
education have advocated integration, with most handicapped children 
being educated in the mainstream, the actual practice has been one of 
segregation (5). Secondly, the Warnock Report is shown to have close 
links with the Plowden Report (6), from which it can be seen to have 
developed.
The second Part of the thesis, entitled ’The Handicapped Person in 
Society’ examines closely the wording of sections of the Report. Two 
quotations, of paramount importance for any criticism of the Report, 
are assessed interms of contemporary sociology and anthropology. The 
relativistic view that handicap is socially conditioned, and is thus a 
matter of subjective, even irrational, decision by any particular 
society is often stated. The main purpose of this section is to 
refute this idea, and to replace it with the firm conviction that 
whereas some minor handicaps may be socially made, and hence in 
principle avoidable, serious conditions are objectively real for all.
Both Chapters 3 and 4 are concerned with the likelihood of stigma
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affecting the handicapped person. Chapter 3 examines this topic 
through ’The Description of a Person'. This assesses the method used 
by Warnock to lessen stigma, which is to widen the concept of Special 
Educational Need to such an extent that it includes almost anyone.
The intention seems to be that the smaller group of severely
handicapped children will not be distinguishable within the larger 
group. In this thesis it is suggested that the smaller group may 
continue to present such serious difficulties to their educators that 
a new concept could be needed, namely ’children with special, special 
needs’. This, in turn, could produce its own stigma.
Chapter 3 therefore opens the debate on differentiation by examining 
differences within the group of children described as having special 
educational needs. Stigma is approached through categorization. It 
is shown that it is important to be recognised as the sort of person 
one really is, and not to be mistaken for something else or someone 
else. Thus while some allowance should be made for blindness, a blind
person need not also be treated as if deaf or mentally handicapped. A
deaf person would not wish to be appointed as an orchestral conductor 
or a piano tuner, but would object if refused employment where 
deafness is irrelevant. Warnock’s insistence on recording, rather 
than categorization, which ignores this, is unlikely to lessen stigma. 
Indeed the new groupings of need that Warnock suggests to replace 
statutory categorization are shown to be very little different from 
the pre-1978 arrangements. However, the wider concept of special 
needs should improve the provision for those children with multiple 
handicaps who do not fit into the categories established in 1944.
Chapter 4 examines ’The Value of a Person’ as a further discussion of 
stigma. The concept of normality held by relativistic sociologists is 
assessed. It is concluded that there is a norm for society in late 
twentieth-century Britain, against which an individual's educational 
progress and abilities can be measured. Whilst all may be of equal 
value in moral terms, not all are the same. The paradox of the 
Warnock Report is demonstrated : to avoid stigma it is necessary to 
prove that all pupils are the same, yet their differences must be 
emphasised to assure fulfillment of their special educational needs.
’The Concept of a Person’, Chapter 5, puts questions of entitlement to 
both special education and extra financial support into a Kantian
12
context by reference to personal worth and need. A review of the 
philosopher’s concept of a person leads to the conclusion that it is 
the concepts of an adult and of a human being that are used in most 
current arguments. The consequences of this in terms of rights are 
explored.
Part Three relates the previous analysis of the acceptance of 
handicapped people in society to the narrower concern of the proper 
place and provision for handicapped pupils in the education system, 
from nursery school to university and beyond. These Parts are 
obviously related in that the education system can hardly be 
considered in isolation from society. Though not the social system, 
education is a. social system, as child relates to child, teacher to 
teacher and child, and all with parents, friends and neighbours. The 
Part opens with the statement by Gribble that special education may 
not be education, and ends with the idea that it may not be special.
Chapter 6 opens Part Three by reviewing the contested concept of 
education as it has been raised in recent years in the philosophy of 
education. This discussion is inevitably coloured by the dominance of 
the ’Peters school’. The difficulty in discussing the teaching or 
schooling of the handicapped, and particularly of the mentally 
handicapped, is that Peters’ definition seems to eliminate the 
possibility of calling such intervention education (7). This 
demonstrates the impossibility of fixing a meaning for such an emotive 
concept. A distinction between education and schooling is used to 
show the differing roles of teachers and parents. The number of 
external influences on all children, especially television, is 
emphasised. Thus the chapter investigates the need for, and 
approaches to, the reconciliation of the philosophy of the Peters 
school and the reality of the educational system. This is achieved 
through the adoption of the concept of an educational activity. This 
is an activity which is not necessarily academic, but which expands 
either an individual’s ability, or his understanding, or indeed, both. 
A further distinction, between educational and non-educational is 
made. By approaching the problem in this way, rather than by asking 
the philosopher's traditional question ’What is education ?', it can 
be shown that the activities dismissed by Gribble do have an 
educational value.
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Chapters 7 and 8 consider the special contents found in, and the 
special methods used in, special education, since it is the nature of 
these contents and methods and their difference from those of the 
mainstream which may permit this area to be denied the title of 
education. Using the concept of educational activity established in 
Chapter 6, Chapter 7 develops the theme of the previous chapter, 
explaining the special content of the education needed by certain 
groups of severely handicapped pupils, those with ’special, special 
needs’. These contents are related to those of mainstream education 
in that they are extensions of them. The need for a severely disabled 
child is the specific and planned teaching of skills, such as speech 
or language, which other children will pick up incidentally. A 
profoundly deaf child, for example, needs, initially, to be taught
every word. His hearing peer will have an automatically widening
/
vocabulary.
Chapter 8 continues from the previous two chapters by discussing the 
special methods used for these special contents. Because of some of 
the methods used, the special education of the severely mentally 
handicapped, for example, often looks very different from mainstream 
teaching. However, there are links and similarities in both practice 
and purpose which are sufficient for the special methods to be termed 
education. On a wider theoretical front, methods such as the 
behaviour modification techniques which have developed from the theory 
of B F Skinner and the experience of many teachers, are assessed. The 
initial premise that these cannot be called education is replaced by 
the conclusion that they can be, if the methods are properly 
conducted. Once more, a Kantian distinction is drawn between using 
people as ends rather than means.
In Chapter 9 it is argued that Warnock’s central tenet on education, 
the concept of special needs, although introduced to lessen formal 
distinctions between children, can actually be used to support even 
greater distinctions. The Warnock Committee were specifically 
instructed to ignore the topic of academically gifted children, except 
in cases where such pupils were also maladjusted (8). It is argued 
here that the education of this group should also be placed in the 
context of special needs. For, once the idea of special needs is 
introduced, special groups other than the conventionally handicapped 
can logically be included. Special educational needs is thus explored
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to clarify the distinction between educational and non-educational 
needs. Musical talent, and the ability to perform successfully in 
sport or ballet are used as examples, since they are subjects of 
current interest. The belief that women and girls have special needs 
for separate provision in schooling, is placed in the same context. 
Allied to this is an analysis of the concept of needs per se. It is 
shown to be a word with such highly emotive associations that the 
practical meaning may be absent in some cases.
In Chapter 10, the history of selection is reviewed to show how, in 
recent years, this has become the history of integration. This topic, 
which is ostensibly about the education of different groups of 
non-handicapped children is here considered in terms of the education 
of children with special educational needs in the light of Warnock's 
statement that it is only since 1965, and the subsequent 1976 
Education Act, that true attempts at integration have been made (9). 
The comprehensive school, with the allied concept of a core curriculum 
for all children is discussed. It is demonstrated that the 
integration of children with 'special, special needs' will probably 
alter the nature of any particular school, and have implications for 
the whole education system.
The implications for mainstream philosophy are elaborated in Chapter 
11, which begins with a demonstration of the interrelationships of the 
philosophy of special education with philosophy itself, and with 
other, allied, subjects. Distinguishing between exploratory and 
culminative sections in the thesis, the chapter traces the various 
philosophical themes encountered in discussion of special education 
and in particular in this thesis. It is shown that a study of the 
educational, social, and moral position of handicapped people can 
provide useful examples for traditional philosophical arguments.
Three broad groups of disabilities are delineated. These are 
intellectual handicaps, physical and sensory handicaps, and 
socio-economic handicaps. Each of these broad groups is shown to 
illuminate a different issue in contemporary philosophy. Thus 
intellectual handicap is linked to 'human rights' and 'animal rights', 
physical and sensory handicap to 'equality' and 'compensation', and 
socio-economic handicap to 'relativism' and 'deficit theories'. 
Consideration of deficit theory, particularly as exemplified by those 
learning English as a second language, demonstrates the tension
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between integration and cultural integrity, a tension which is at the 
heart of post-Warnock arguments about special education.
Indeed, it is possible that special education no longer exists, and 
this proposition is examined in Chapter 12. Since all children are 
different, all education must be individual and ’special' once the 
concept of 'needs' is granted. That could mean that either all 
education is special, or none is. Because of the educationally 
relevant differences between children, educational segregation may 
assure higher and more appropriate educational success, without 
necessarily leading to social segregation and stigma. A separate 
provision could even enhance academic progress and thus improve an 
individual's potential for integration as an adult. It may look as if 
some kind of 'Good Life' is achieved when there are no segregated 
schools. The utopia is less desirable if there are then children in 
the mainstream for whom there is no adequate provision, or who impede 
the progress of others. Warnock frequently acknowledges this. It is 
the interpretations of the Report which ignore it.
Thus it is shown how changes have taken place between the Warnock 
Report and its current implementation through the various consultative 
and legislative documents. Two specific changes are outlined as 
examples.
The use of the various emotive concepts essential to educational 
discourse are shown to leave the Warnock Report open to a number of 
conflicting interpretations. In discussion of these, this thesis 
emphasises the need to adopt the concept of equity, as fairness, 
rather than that of numerical equality, showing that all cannot be the 
same.
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2.1 Contemporary Backcloth.
The International Year of Disabled People, 1981, was also the year of 
the Education Act implementing the Warnock proposals. Both Act and 
Year can be seen as social phenomena in a tradition of concern with 
equal opportunities for all, and the desire to normalize life for 
previously stigmatized minorities. Since the 1960's, there has been a 
steady growth in the use of terms such as 'mainstreaming' (in the 
U.S.A.), 'integration', 'positive discrimination', and 'affirmative 
action'. A positive effect has been the extended provision of work 
and educational opportunities, and for a few people, for example 
through 'group homes' for former mental hospital patients, better 
living conditions.
Related to the general trend are attempts to provide community rather 
than institutional care for people who are mentally ill, elderly, or 
chronically sick and disabled. There have also been demands for 
foster parents, rather than 'homes' for children separated from their 
natural parents. Sometimes this has succeded, in that care has been 
provided in the community and by the community. In other instances, 
community care has meant no care at all.
Paralleling the change in social concern, the ethos of the state 
education system has evolved from the position of the 1944 Act, when 
differences in 'age, ability and aptitude' were considered relevant 
for varied types of school placement to the present position where the 
comprehensive school is expected to cater for every child in its 
catchment area; the few special schools being reserved for pupils with 
extreme educational or social difficulties.
The case for this extreme comprehensive system, and that for the 
educational integration of handicapped children, has been presented on 
social and political grounds. Indeed, it may be that some groups of 
children may perform less well intellectually in a co-educational 
comprehensive school than in an academically selective or single sex 
school. Similarly, it is possible that severely handicapped children 
will receive an education in the units of ordinary schools, which is 
the placement generally offered on the closure of a special school,
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ideals of uniformity put forward in the guise of equal opportunity are 
now being discussed with reference to the education of the 16-19 age 
group. Here there is a wide variety of provision, from unemployment 
to a life long career, from the Youth Training Scheme to university. 
The arguments formerly marshalled by the proponents and opponents of 
the 11-plus have faced the educationalists and politicians considering 
the 16-plus examinations. Not only have the merits and demerits of 
preserving the distinction between Ordinary or Advanced level and the 
Certificate of Secondary Education received attention, but also the 
value of introducing a school leaver's certificate of competence has 
been questioned. Such a certificate may be regarded as either a 
qualification for all, or no true qualification at all, since every 
pupil will have it.
As school based education has changed, so has adult education. There 
has been the liberalising effect of the adult literacy campaign. The 
expansion of the Open University, and the increasing willingness of 
conventional higher education toaccept mature students without formal 
academic qualifications, has begun to further popular acceptance of 
education continuing beyond adolescence, possibly as a life-long 
process. However, for the handicapped, and in particular the mentally 
handicapped, the opportunities are slower to develop. Many such young 
people are just reaching their optimum educational potential at the 
point when they leave school. Some manage to go to 'bridging' 
courses, but others move to training centres, where education ceases 
and is replaced by a menial job.
The rationale behind demands for equal opportunities is that every 
person should be considered part of the local and national community. 
All minorities are accepted as of equal social value. There is some 
confusion over whether such acceptance implies the disappearance of 
the minority, or that the difference is accepted, valued, and not 
stigmatized. Certainly, one may wish to preserve cultural 
differences. The play 'Children of a lesser god' (1) shows that a 
handicap can become a matter of pride in one's independence and 
individuality. It may be hoped that handicapped people can be 
accepted as adults and friends with an active contribution to make to 
society, rather than as dependent patients or pupils. Handicapped 
children may similarly be regarded as equal members of the school
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community, even though they receive different teaching.
The Warnock Report must be viewed in its context, following on the 
past, reflecting the present, and hoping to influence the future. It 
is not a revolutionary document suggesting great change, and indeed it 
has been criticised for changing only the terminology and leaving the 
situation untouched (2). What is new, and problematical, in the 
Report, is the attempt to widen the concept of a handicapped child to 
the concept of the child with special educational needs.
Consequently, the arguments on integration must be altered. Almost 
any child may have special needs, which removes any meaning from the 
term, and confuses the issue.
The Warnock Report aims to achieve three ends :
1) to lessen the stigma for children with severe difficulties;
2) to advise on the educational and employment opportunities for 
such children;
 3) to improve the education of— other children for whom the school
has, as yet, not been a success.
The Report admits that the need for different placement for those 
children with what are, in this thesis, called ’special, special 
needs' will continue. Yet the Report is not clear as to which type of 
special need is being discussed at any one point.
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2.2 Historical Background
Much popular reaction to the Warnock Report has assumed that its 
recommendations are revolutionary. Few are, beyond the suggestion 
that the remedial service be discontinued. Most of the 
recommendations represent what has come to be seen as good practice in 
education; the Report merely advocates their wider adoption.
The Report does, however, represent the culmination of various strands 
of historical development. The first and most obvious is the history 
of the education of handicapped children within the state system. The 
Report was intended by its authors to be a high point in this 
development, and a whole chapter is devoted to tracing the historical 
growth of the special educational system. The second and third 
strands, although alluded to in the Report, must be understood as an 
important ground of a changing ethos, not only in education, but also 
in society and political thought.
The second strand is the appearance of the idea of special groups 
within the mainstream education system which need special help. This 
links Warnock with the Plowden Report on primary schools. Plowden 
looked at whole schools and residential areas, whereas Warnock 
concentrates on individuals, yet they share a belief in educational 
handicap as a wider concept than purely conventional physical, sensory 
or intellectual disabilities.
The third strand, concerning the proper nature of secondary schooling, 
illustrated by the growth in selection for different forms of 
education, is elaborated in this thesis in the discussion on the 
comprehensive school in Chapter 10. It can be said here that this 
history can be traced from the 1901 Education Act, which brought 
secondary schooling within the sphere of state interest, through the 
selection of children on the basis of the recommendations of the 1944 
Act and the earlier Haddow Report, to the current theory that there 
should be a truly comprehensive school which provides for all children 
in a catchment area, be they handicapped or not.
The Warnock Report can be seen in this historical context by recalling
23
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education since 1870. Although this section of the thesis 
concentrates on developments up to the submission of the Report in 
1978, more recent developments must also be reviewed. The Education 
Act of 1981, which implemented the Report, was not fully operative 
until April 1983, and the situation is changing continuously.
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2.2.1 A History of Special Education since 1870.
"Mental disability was for many children no substantial handicap 
in coping with the simple demands of every day life in a 
largely uneducated and relatively uncomplicated world...after 
1870 (when) large numbers of children of below average or poor 
intellectual ability entered public elementary schooling. Many 
of them made scarcely any progress, and their presence hindered 
normal teaching." (3)
The history of special education since the Forster Act represents a 
developing elaboration of provision aimed at giving a suitable 
education to the children described above, and additionally to those 
others whom improving health care has kept alive despite serious 
disability. Time has uncovered a great variety of conditions 
initially subsumed in ’below average intelligence or poor intellectual 
ability’, and also different educational methods for their 
compensation. The current concern of the special educators, and of 
their pupils’ parents, is the adequate maintenance of educational 
standards, while absorbing the social advantages of integration. That 
there may be social advantages to integration needs to be balanced 
against the possible educational disadvantages. Ironically, the call 
for integration is occurring concurrently with the desire of some 
parents to acquire special provision for further groups of children 
who were not previously recognised as special, for example ’gifted’ or 
'dyslexic', and the desire of some schools to shed some especially 
disruptive pupils into 'sin bins'.
The situation is complicated by the fact that while larger numbers of 
handicapped children are able to live at home because of improved 
support systems, more children with complex handicaps have appeared 
to fill their places. In the past, these children would either not 
have survived the first few months of life, or would have been 
considered ineducable. Furthermore, the current drop in school aged 
children has naturally affected the Special Schools, and many have 
closed, transferring their pupils to units within ordinary schools. 
Whether this has been encouraged on educational grounds as a result of 
the Warnock Report, or whether the reasons are purely economic, is not
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always clear.
Warnock comments on the historical situation that despite the early 
placement of some handicapped children, particularly the blind and 
deaf, in ordinary schools, special education has developed as a 
seperate system, linked only in theory to the mainstream (4). Warnock 
believes that even at a very early stage in this history, official 
statements indicated an intention that as many children as possible 
should be integratred, and explains why this did not happen (5).
Particular criticism is levelled at the wording of the 1944 Act (6), 
although some allowance is made for the economic conditions prevailing 
at the end of the Second World War. The real beginning of integration 
is held to occur with the establishment of comprehensive schools (8), 
was consolidated by the 1976 Act, and finally made compulsory by the 
1981 Act. Warnock does not acknowledge the contribution of many 
individuals and their writings to the theoretical basis of this 
development.
Viewed simplistically, the early history of special education might be 
represented as in Figure 1. (It must be noted that the term special 
education is used anachronistically here, as it was not employed 
officially until 1944).
Ineducable-
All children. Handicapped
Mainstream-
Figure 1. Special Education prior to 1889.
Even before the 1870 Act, there had been many individual efforts to 
help both deaf and blind children, but it was not until 1889 that the
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first official pronouncements were made, in the Report of the Royal 
Commission on the Blind, Deaf and Others (mainly the mentally 
handicapped) (8). Since that time, special education has developed 
many forms of programmes for many different pupils. Early 
developments followed the Reports of the Royal Commissions on Delicate 
and Defective Children (1896) (9) and into the Care and Control of the 
Feeble Minded (1908) (10), producing the pattern illustrated in Figure 
2.
Ineducable
Handicapped.
•Blind
Defective
1896 1908— -Feeble Minded1889*
•Delicate.
■Deaf
Mainstream-
Figure 2. Special Education 1889 to 1944.
From the Act of 1921 which established them in law, these categories 
remained the only official handicaps until the 1944 Act. However, 
other forms of handicap were being recognised, and in 1944, it was 
found necessary to increase the number of recognised handicaps to 
eleven, although this total was reduced by one nine years later. One 
of Warnock*s chief aims was to reclassify these handicapping 
conditions in much broader terms, thus replacing categorisation, 
particularly because of the difficulties in interpreting the existing 
statutory wording for the many children with a combination of 
handicaps or for those newly isolated conditions which did not fit 
into the existing system.
The powers given to Local Authorities in 1902 to provide for 
handicapped children were made duties by the 1914 Act. Four years 
later the definition of the categories was extended, while the 
separation of ineducable and ineducable children had been defined in
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1913 by the Mental Deficiency Act. By this Act,
"Only those who were judged by the authorities to be incapable 
of being taught in special schools were to pass into the care 
of the local mental deficiency committee." (11)
As this led eventually to a large population of children in mental 
deficiency hospitals, from whence many never emerged, Warnock may be a 
little unjustified in stating
"...the statutory foundation of special education provision 
which had been laid in the last decade of the nineteenth 
century, though consolidated in the Education Act of 1921, 
continued in broadly the same form until 1944." (12)
The 1929 Report of the Mental Deficiency Committee is quoted by 
Warnock as an example of an early advocation of integration.
"We do not however contemplate that these (special) schools 
would exist with a different legal sanction, under a different 
system of nomenclature and under different administrative 
provisions. If the majority of children for whom these 
schools...are intended are, ex hypothesi, to lead the lives of 
ordinary citizens, with no shadow of a 'certificate* and all 
that that implies to handicap their careers, the schools must 
be brought into closer relation with the Public Elementary 
School System and presented to parents not as something both 
distinct and humiliating, but as a helpful variation of the 
ordinary school." (13)
This was in contradiction to the 1921 Act, which in Part V
"...provided for handicapped children to be educated in special 
schools and special classes..." (13)
that is, as a separate category of provision.
Although maladjustment was early recognised as an educational problem, 
the child guidance clinics established after 1927 to help schools with 
pupils' behavioural problems were considered part of the medical
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service. The term was not used as a category for which schooling 
needed to be provided until the 1944 Act.
Of the Reports presaging the 1944 Act, Warnock considers that the 
Green Paper ’Education after the War’ which suggested that most 
mentally defective and delicate children should be in ordinary schools 
(15), and the White Paper ’Educational Reconstruction' which promised 
’substantial modification’ of the 1921 Act (16), laid the foundations 
for reform. Warnock suggests that the 1944 Act itself was important 
for two contrasting reasons. Firstly, it officially brought the 
education of the handicapped into the mainstream. Secondly, it 
extended
"...the range of children’s special needs for which the 
authorities would be obliged to make specific provision either 
in special schools or in ordinary schools." (17)
The practical result was that most such children were provided for in 
isolated special schools. Handicapped pupils were described as those 
’who suffer from any disability of mind or body', and this was 
incorporated in the overall plan of the Act that all children should 
have different education commensurate with their 'age, ability, and 
aptitude'. ’Ineducable’ children were unaffected by the changes. The 
new category of 'educationally sub-normal' was so named as a reminder, 
repeated by Warnock, that it is only on specifically academic 
educational grounds that many can be considered different. For these 
people, an independent life after school was assumed. Educationally 
sub-normal, a term coined to avoid the stigma attached to ’mentally 
deficient’, has since attracted its own stigma. The other categories 
of handicap listed in the 1945 Regulations were blind, partially 
sighted, deaf, partially deaf, delicate, diabetic, epileptic, 
maladjusted, physically handicapped, and those with a speech defect. 
From 1953, diabetics were included with the delicate, while the 
partially deaf were renamed partially hearing in 1954 to indicate ’a 
more positive approach to the use of residual hearing’ (18). This 
period of development is illustrated in Figure 3 (p.30).
Warnock’s chief criticism of the 1944 Act was that by hardening the 
categories, it prevented the development of proper education both for 
those whose type of disability had not been recognised by 1944, for
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Ineducable
Educationally Sub-normal
Blind B1ind------------
Partially Sighted
Defective Deaf----------------------- --------------
Partially Deaf 1954— Partially Hearing
Feeble minded->— 1944— « Delicate 1953
Deaf
Delicate
/
Diabetic^'^
Epileptic-------------
Maladjusted-----------
Physically handicapped
*
#Those with a speech defect
Mainstream------------------------------------------------------------ >
Figure 3. Special Education 1944-1970.
example the autistic, and for those whose combination of handicaps 
made no school wholly appropriate. This was because the special 
schools were established for the specified categories. A school for 
the deaf could not cope with a deaf child who was also spastic or 
educationally sub-normal.
Portley House School for the Deaf, now closed, at Caterham in Surrey, 
illustrates another of Warnock's criticisms; that the demands of the 
Act together with demographic and economic conditions forced 
'separatism' on the Local Education Authorities (19). Like many other 
special schools, Portley House was founded after the 1939-1945 war, in 
fulfillment of the County Council's duties. Since the number of 
children sufficiently deaf to warrant such placement was small, the 
school was required to serve an extensive catchment area, resulting in 
a need for many children to board. Furthermore, the only readily 
available low cost accommodation at the time of the school's 
establishment was a large house in its own grounds on the edge of a 
town, a position which necessarily produced isolation from the 
mainstream until 'ordinary' primary schools were relocated on adjacent 
sites in the 1970s and a measure of integration occurred.
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Warnock's third criticism of the 1944 Act was that it divided 
handicapped pupils into those less seriously handicapped, to receive 
their education in ordinary schools, and those with 'serious 
disabilities', to be educated in special schools (20). Despite this, 
the Warnock Report preserves this distinction under a different 
terminology, although it recommends that the distinction be made on 
educational grounds rather than of the severity of the handicap per se 
(21). The distinction is now between the children with special needs, 
who can continue in the ordinary school, and those who need to be 
recorded. The overall indictment made against the 1944 Act by Warnock 
is that it emphasised provision and treatment rather than needs.
In 'The first ten years' (22), Warnock elaborates the changes made in 
the immediate post-war years. These required a rapid expansion in the 
numbers of teachers and of places in special education, as first the 
losses of the war were made good, and then the increase in the birth 
rate was catered for. However,
"...if special provision for most categories of handicaps 
appeared to be nearing sufficiency in amount (as distinct from 
quality), the needs of EDUCATIONALLY SUB-NORMAL pupils remained 
obstinately unsatisfied in spite of continuous expansion since 
1945" (23).
The Report is here stressing the number of children in ordinary 
schools awaiting special placement and not receiving a satisfactory 
education.
The final part of the Report's historical section reviews events to 
'the present day' (i.e. 1977), charting among other matters, the 
gradual ending of the separation from education of the severely 
mentally handicapped. This was achieved by the Mental Health Act 
(1959), and the Education (Handicapped Children) Act (1970) (24). The 
former gave parents more rights, enforcing co-operation between health 
and education authorities. The latter, implemented in 1971, brought 
the teaching of children formerly called ineducable into the special 
education system. To mark this change, these 'mentally deficient' and 
'ineducable' children were renamed 'severely educationally 
sub-normal', and their training centres became special schools (Figure 
4) (p.32).
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Educationally Sub-normal
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Partially Sighted ----
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Partially Hearing—  —
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Physically handicapped—
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Figure 4. Special Education 1971 to 1980
Education
Since that time, the pattern seen by Warnock is the closing of the gap 
between special and ordinary education, to the point where they merge, 
in fact and theory, both streams needing to change direction as they 
converge (Figure 5).
Special Education
1981
Mainstream Education
 (1983) All Children
Figure 5. Special Education since 1981
The aim expressed by Warnock was already expressed in the 1976 Act. 
This was that
"...special education of all handicapped pupils (should) be
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given in county and voluntary schools, except where this is 
impractible, incompatible with the efficient instruction in the 
schools, or involved unreasonable public expenditure.” (25)
The Warnock Report attempts to come to terms with these exceptions in 
Chapter 7, and draws the conclusion that there will always be some 
children for whom special school placement will be necessary, despite 
the loss in terms of social isolation. Such isolation, it may be 
noted, is increased as the number of children so treated is reduced, 
and thus fewer, more centralised schools are required. The Report 
uses its concept of special educational need to emphasise the 
individual, and hence allows schooling to be fitted to the individual 
rather than the reverse.
"Our view of special education is much broader and more 
positive... It encompasses the whole range and variety of 
additional help, wherever it is provided and whether on a full 
or part-time basis." (26)
Following the generally favourable reception of the Warnock Report, 
most of its recommendations were incorporated in the 1981 Education 
Act. In the wake of this Act, which was fully operational from 1983, 
other bodies have tended to review their policies concerning the 
handicapped (27).
At the same time, the Report and the Act have been criticised. In 
particular, the time lapse between enactment and operation of the Act, 
and the varied response of Local Education Authorities because of 
open-ended and ambiguous statements in this period, have provoked 
dissatisfaction. Furthermore, research studies published by the 
Advisory Centre for Education and the Centre for Studies on 
Integration in Education, among others, have begun to question the 
nature and value of the resulting integration (28).
Warnock refused to be drawn on integration. Accepting that it was the 
stated purpose of the 1976 Act, the Report merely explores ways of 
achieving this. Many parents have interpreted the Report and 
subsequent legislation as a chance for their handicapped child to 
attend an ordinary school, even though the amount of functional unity 
may vary widely from case to case. The concern of some educators, on
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the other hand, has been that local authorities may regard the closure 
of special schools as a valuable financial economy, without realising 
the true costs, in financial terms, of even a limited integration.
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2.2.2 History of Special Groups in Mainstream Education.
The Warnock Report is linked with the Plowden Report on Primary 
Education, and with the Newsom Report on Secondary Education. All 
three emphasise the existence of special groups within the 'normal' 
school population, and press for additional resources for these 
groups. Here again there is a history of ideas to be followed; it is 
possible to demonstrate the trends in earlier Acts and Reports, 
particularly those concerned with Primary Schools, where an 
understanding of such problems emerges. Paradoxically, although the 
trend has been to isolate special groups needing different types of 
attention, this has led to integration, just as the history of 
selection has become the history of integration.
Primary education developed from the Elementary education that began 
in 1870. The early history of the elementary system is confused by 
religious dissentions, and state intervention occurred in 1870 to 
harmonise the different denominational provisions. The purpose of the 
education was limited; it was stated that schooling was provided so 
that a better educated populace would make a more efficient workforce, 
and also be able to make wiser decisions when the political franchise 
was extended. Financial limitations, leading to the system of payment 
by results, limited the teaching to drill, basic literacy, and 
numeracy. The 1904 Elementary Code (29) was an attempt to 'liberalise 
the Elementary School'. However, it was still providing a set pattern 
of education. Pupils had to fit into the scheme, and not have a 
scheme fitted to their individual needs.
Fisher's statement in Parliament in 1917 when introducing the 
Education Bill, shows the first understanding that there were children 
whose schooling was marred by their health.
"...the value of our educational system is impaired by the low 
physical conditions of a large number of our children, and how 
imperative is the necessity of raising the general standard of 
physical health among the children of the poor, if a great part 
of the money spent on our education system is not to be
wasted." (30)
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through the school medical service founded in 1907. The problem 
indicated by Fisher was regarded purely as one of health, which could 
be eradicated by adequate funding, rather than an educational one.
The Committee which reported on the primary school, in 1931, produced 
a document which can be compared with the Hadow Report, which itself 
influenced the course of secondary education up to, and even beyond, 
the 1944 Act. This Committee
"...did much to shape development of primary education in the 
years immediately before and after the Second World War." (31)
In addition to claiming that
"...the outlook of the primary school has been broadened and 
humanised..." (32)
in fulfillment of the then fashionable ideas on ’child-centred1 
education, the Committee’s Report also bemoaned the ’squalid 
environment' in which many pupils lived and worked. The changes 
advocated were necessarily practical ones of health and hygiene; the 
recommendation being that elementary schools should be as similar as 
possible to the ’open air’ schools for delicate children.
The 1944 Act widened the duties of the local authorities by requiring 
them to provide 'education', rather than 'elementary training', and 
thus prepare the way for the further development of the secondary 
sector. It also represented an important landmark in the history of 
the education of conventionally handicapped children, by bringing 
their education within the authorities’ duty to provide for primary 
and secondary schools. It is in the discussion of 'educationally 
sub-normal’ children that the recognition of the wider special group 
first occurs. The category of educationally sub-normal children 
consisted of children of limited ability and children handicapped by 
other conditions such as irregular attendance, ill health, lack of 
continuity in their education, or unsatisfactory school conditions.
These were thought to comprise 10% of the school population, with 1-2% 
needing special schools, and the remaining 8-9% being capable of
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attending ordinary schools (33). The 'problems' of such children here 
start to be regarded as educational, rather than medical. However, 
the distinction between 'more' and 'less' severely handicapped, as 
elaborated by the 1944 Act, does not start to approach the educational 
difficulties of the larger group in ordinary schools suffering from 
social problems.
This area was first investigated in the Report on Early Leaving (1954) 
(34), which studied the cases of those who left school early, having 
failed to live up to their early promise as assessed by their 
selection for a grammar school education. The special factor about 
these pupils was that they had come from poor homes. The Newsom 
Report (1963) elaborates on the educational problems for the secondary 
schools of children living in the 'slums'. The schools
"...require special consideration if they are to have a fair 
chance of making the best of their pupils." (35)
The Report is interesting in its stress of the need to approach the 
educational improvement of such children by means of 'other social 
agencies' than the school system.
"In the slums the need for reform is not confined to the 
schools." (36)
The Plowden Report (1967) followed logically as an overview of the 
similar plight of younger children in the schools that were by then 
described as serving 'deprived areas' (37). The Warnock Report is an 
obvious heir to the three earlier documents in that it covers the 
whole educational system, yet it is closest to Plowden in its 
practical and theoretical recommendations. Warnock and Newsom both 
had 'catchy' titles, 'Half our Future' and 'Special Educational 
Needs': Plowden did not, but it could aptly have been called 
'Educational Priorities'.
Whether Warnock will have the long-term practical impact of Plowden, 
which led to improved financial provision, has yet to be seen. 
Certainly, the Warnock Report is already influential from nursery
provision even up to Further Education, where Colleges are being
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required to provide ’Bridging Courses' for quite severely mentally 
handicapped school leavers.
Much of the connection between Plowden and Warnock is in ethos. Some 
of the pronouncements of the former, particularly in the section on 
the education of the handicapped child in the ordinary school, could 
have been printed and bound into the latter with no loss of coherence. 
Warnock specifically states that the detailed social factors involved 
in educational problems would not be discussed (38), presumably 
because they had been so forcibly set out in Plowden, and were 
accepted by most teachers and educational administrators. However the 
Warnock Report does enumerate the occasions when such social factors 
are relevant. Particularly emphasised in this respect are the 
educational problems for children with moderate learning difficulties 
(39), for those whose first language is not English (40), and in the 
discussion of the proper terms to be used to describe pupils who are 
’maladjusted1 (41).
In connection with this last topic, Warnock outlines ways in which a 
school may provoke its own disciplinary problems, leading to pupil 
maladjustment through inappropriate treatment. Critics have attacked 
the Report for not developing this topic, and for retaining a model of 
children failing in schools rather than schools failing pupils. This 
could be refuted by asserting that the emphasis in Warnock is on the 
case of individual need, rather than of set provision by the school.
The extent of Warnock's inheritance from Plowden can be seen in such 
phrases as 'special need calls for special help' (42), and the 
emphasis on positive discrimination to redress the balance of 
deprivation. The idea of positive discrimination is developed in 
Warnock to cover extra help for an even larger number of children than 
that envisaged by Plowden. It is thus with Warnock's wider concept of 
children with special educational needs, who for any reason do not 
give of their best and need extra or special help at some time in 
their school career, that the link with the 1967 Report comes.
Indeed, the 'Plowden' children of the 1960's and 1970's may well be 
the parents of the 'special needs' pupils in the 1980's and 1990's.
Warnock expresses dissatisfaction with the remedial system that had 
developed since Newsom and Plowden for inadequately compensating for
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lost educational opportunities. Very little is said about the 
educational content of schooling, in contrast to Plowden, but both 
Reports stress the role of education in reducing inequalities; both 
can be regarded as being as much about social engineering as about 
learning.
Plowden shares three further preoccupations with its own historical 
past, and with the Warnock Report that is its future. Firstly, it 
advocates a form of child-centred education that was first promoted in 
the 1920's as a revolt against the rigid elementary school tradition 
of training children in certain set and limited paths. Thus
"At the heart of the educational process is the child." (43)
and
"We wish to see a more positive approach and we have adopted the 
concept of Special Educational Need, seen not in terms of a 
particular disability which a child may be judged to have, but 
in relation to everything about him, his ability as well as his
disability - indeed all the factors which have a bearing on his
educational progress." (44)
Allied to this is the belief implicitly shared by the two Reports on 
the facts of child development. Indeed Plowden has been criticised 
for holding a 'growth metaphor' idea of child development, as if a 
child were a plant for which adequate soil provision is enough to x 
ensure a perfect flowering (45). Warnock's equivalent is special 
needs being left unfulfilled, preventing the adequate development of a 
child's intellectual and social persona. Both Reports use the concept 
of needs throughout, and of particular interest in this context is the
comment of the former on the education of gifted children :
"In any group, gifted children are bound to have particular 
needs." (46)
The consecutive placing of the two chapters on handicapped children 
and gifted children in Plowden is significant. By contrast, the 
consideration of gifted children was specifically excluded from the
Warnock committee's remit.
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Secondly, Warnock follows Plowden in stressing that handicap is a term 
that can cover wider numbers of children than had formerly been 
assessed as suitable for the special school. Plowden’s statement that 
social deprivation can amount to a handicap is more clearly shown by 
Warnock to extend the forms of educational need beyond conventional 
ideas of physical, sensory or intellectual disability. Warnock widens 
the role of special needs for two reasons. The first of these is the 
educational desire to improve the learning of all children whether or 
not handicapped, and the second is the social desire to end the stigma 
of differentiation between children, all of whom should eventually 
attend the same school even if they are in different streams or units 
within it.
Thirdly, Warnock follows Plowden in the emphasis placed on nursery 
education, with the importance of starting any compensatory programme 
very early in life.
"Education in the first five years of life is of critical 
importance." (47)
and
"Nursery education...is of immense value." (48) 
may be compared with
"There should be a large expansion of nursery education." (49)
Plowden's most obvious and specific link with the Warnock Report is, 
as has been said, the chapter entitled 'Handicapped children in 
ordinary schools'.
"If handicapped children, either as individuals or as a group, 
are looked upon as a nuisance, or with pity, they will not 
flourish. It follows that a school such as we have described 
... is not only right for the normal but right for the 
handicapped, for their fundamental educational needs are 
similar though there may be differences in the way they are
satisfied. The school must provide for and cherish all its 
members." (50)
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It may be noted in passing that the last sentence is reminiscent of 
the statements in Circular 10/65 quoted above. The chapter 
anticipates all the later criticisms of the special education system, 
and ends
"We recommend a study of the needs of the handicapped child."
(51)
This recommendation was fulfilled by the appointment of the Warnock 
committee.
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2.3 Philosophical Background.
Paralleling the changes in popular thought since the 1960's, there has 
been a similar liberalisation in academic philosophy in terms of a 
development from the rigidly intensive linguistic analysis inherited 
from Wittgenstein and Austin towards forms of 'Applied Philosophy'. 
Wittgenstein's approach has lost its dominating position in English 
philosophy, but analysis has found a place as a method of wide 
application. The question may occur whether academic philosophy has 
any proper comment to make on a specific professional area like 
special education.
Few 'special' teachers have the time to spare for formal ethical and 
analytical deliberation, whereas few philosophers have the practical 
knowledge. Yet there are close links of interest, through ethics, 
social philosophy, and philosophy of mind, in addition to the more 
obvious link through educational philosophy. Practical problems from 
the classroom give examples for philosophy; similarly, thinking 
philosophically can clarify ideas, both theoretical and practical. 
Moreover, many famous special educators, for example Van Uden, the 
Dutch teacher of the deaf, with his analysis of contemporary 
linguistics, have very strong philosophical presuppositions especially 
in terms of ethics and psychology.
Social philosophy should be seen as a blend of ethics and politics, as 
well as a comment on contemporary sociology. As such it holds a key 
position in this thesis, since the education of severely handicapped 
children raises questions on the relationships between groups of 
people. Thus, in this thesis, concepts from Aristotle, Kant, 
classical utilitarianism, and the new rationally-based ethics 
derivable from the work of John Rawls, are all applied to contemporary 
situations.
From Aristotle comes a preoccupation with justice as 'equity' and the 
need to treat people differently in order to achieve something like a 
fair outcome. Kant suggests the moral stance discussed in the chapter 
devoted to the 'Concept of a Person', where it is held that
individuals be taken as ends in themselves rather than as means to
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another's gratification. The implication for this in special 
education is outlined in the section on Skinner and conditioning. 
Behaviour modification is a wide-spread and successful method for 
teaching children with severe mental handicaps and those with extreme 
behaviour problems, yet it appears to ignore the possible autonomy of 
the subject.
Classical utilitarian arguments are broached in the section on 
entitlement to special treatment, which can be held to be either an 
advantage, or a disadvantage. It can be argued that more money spent 
on special education in an individual's childhood and youth can lead 
to more personal independence in adulthood, with a lesser financial 
dependence on the state. Such an approach can be contrasted with the 
ideas of Aspin on what will here be called 'altruism' (52) and Mary 
Warnock on compassion (53). This may be compared with the more recent 
work of John Rawls with his concept of a fair society based on 
rational decision and the principle of 'Maximin', whereby the only 
advantages allowed to the better-off are those which tend to improve 
the position of the least well-off (54). This latter philosophy is 
one of the few where the interdependence of social classes is 
acknowledged.
In 'philosophy of mind', attention is drawn to the concepts of 
thought, intelligence, mind, and persons. Faced by strong, healthy 
and able members of the community, there is no reason to contemplate
the concept of a person. Yet when faced by some very severely
disabled members of the subnormality hospital's population, or the 
tiny handicapped babies who are possible subjects for euthanasia, it 
becomes necessary to explore such concepts.
More specifically, old philosophical debates are re-opened in a new 
manner. Thus the differences between rationalism and empiricism, 
resumed by the work of Chomsky on the one hand and by Skinner as an 
extreme proponent of the other, are examined in Van Uden's work. 
Writing on the education of deaf children, Van Uden approaches 
linguistics through the difficulties of 'natural' language acquisition 
(54). He shows that too close an adherence to either type of
philosophical method can lead to a faulty educational model. Hence he
attempts to devise a via media. Many other psychologists have taken a
similar approach to language acquisition of both deaf and 'language
43
disordered' children, in order to clarify the understanding of the 
modes of language acquisition in children without such difficulties.
'Philosophy of Education' has only recently become concerned with 
special education as such, with, for example, the article by Aspin in 
'Educational Review' referred to above. Since the 1981 Act, with the 
attendant publicity given to the Warnock Report, however, there has 
been other relevant literature, particularly that written for the 
National Foundation for Educational Research by Hegarty and 
Pocklington (56). Much of this has concentrated on the advocacy of 
total integration, which appears publically as the most important 
aspect of the Warnock Report. As is shown below, even a superficial 
reading of the Report demonstrates that this interpretation is 
incorrect.
The exploration of concepts in special education provides material for 
philosophy in a wider sense. It is impossible to define special 
education in isolation from education itself, any more than it is 
possible to assess special needs when divorced from needs in general. 
An analysis is thus begun which leads to many other educational 
concepts. Special education, nursery education, adult education, and 
continuing education all fall into place as part of a continuum 
dealing with the acculturisation of the individual.
The particular method of implementing the Warnock Report that has been 
followed by most Local Education Authorities, that of closing special 
schools and advocating integration, has a probable future effect on 
the development of the comprehensive school. Decisions have to be 
made on the extent to which a school can afford to be comprehensive, 
and on the distinctions which may have to be made between people of 
very different intellectual ability and need.
Not all severely handicapped people are so from birth. The neonate 
with no functional brain is an extreme case of disability. The adult 
accident victim, a 'cabbage' attached to a life support machine, and 
the severely psychotic or schizophrenic adolescent who becomes 
mentally ill after a 'normal' childhood both present society with 
ethical and medical decisions. These are exacerbated by advances in 
medical science and by changes in the law. A foetus with a suspected 
'fault' can be aborted without legal penalty, but the position on
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euthanasia after birth is more complicated. Whereas people formerly 
died of serious accidents, they can now be kept alive bodily despite 
being formally 'brain-dead'. This new term reminds philosophers that 
there is no clearly defined concept for many terms such as life, 
death, rights, or persons. There are moral questions for practical 
behaviour, and terminological ones for theory. These topics are 
discussed below as part of an assessment of the possible value of 
persons as individuals in a Kantian sense.
Even in traditional terms, there are ethical considerations, as well 
as new topics, to pursue. Linguistic analysis undertakes the role of 
criticising the often misleading and naive language used by 
sociologists and psychologists, educationalists and politicians. This 
thesis is written within the context of developments in both 
philosophy and education. There is no attempt to develop a 
philosophy of special education. Philosophy for special education is 
proferred.
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3,1 'Stigma* introduced
One of the main aims of the Warnock Report is to eradicate the 
'stigma' attached to being described as a handicapped child. The 
Report thus develops the existing concept of 'children with special 
educational needs', and attempts to rename various disabilities to be 
more appropriate to the new general nomenclature. 'Categorization' of 
children and aspects of differentiation between between people are 
thus discussed in terms of the elimination of social differences, 
rather than in terms of assuring the appropriate educational provision.
In this chapter it is held that the term handicapped, although having 
some disadvantages in use, should be retained. This is not least 
because there are children who are not handicapped, but who have what 
the Warnock Report terms 'special educational need'. There are also 
children who are handicapped, but whose educational needs are not 
special in any sense, although they may have non-educational needs 
which are special.
It is emphasised that categories and labels, though not necessarily of 
a stautory nature, have both practical and theoretical roles to play 
beyond those envisaged by Warnock. Indeed, whilst there may not be
'two types of children', there may be very many different groups of
children. Medical science is constantly refining diagnoses, and 
clarifying the description of differences between syndromes. Such 
differences are often educationally relevant. The proper description 
of a person may be vital to teachers and parents. It is also 
necessary for an individual to know himself.
Thus the present chapter closes by assessing Warnock's attempt to 
banish stigma by renaming some disabilities in a way that could look 
euphemistic, and by so enlarging the group of people considered to 
have 'special educational need' that the severely handicapped person 
who could have been the subject of stigma disappears into the crowd. 
This leads to the approach assessed in the next chapter. This is a
sociological perspective, expressed in the work of Booth (1), which
considers an even wider group, namely everyone. In such a view,
simply to exist is to be normal, and stigma becomes wrong because it
50
is unnecessary. This view is not expounded by Warnock, but it can be 
taken as the background to some of the interpretations and criticisms 
of the Report.
There is a fear expressed by some teachers and parents that 
governmental acceptance of the Report may be a political manoeuvre, 
since it is possible to interpret the Report as advocating the total 
abolition of the special school system, particularly because of the 
importance of integration for social reasons. Many education 
authorities can be accused of adopting this interpretation in order to 
run down and then close their special schools as a budgetary saving. 
This interpretation is not, however, true to the spirit of the Report, 
which acknowledges that there will always be children for whom such 
extra special placement will be necessary, even if this implies 
boarding schools (2). Most analyses of the Report have concentrated 
on this topic of integration, ignoring the aspect which is more 
important in numerical terms, and is likely to effect the education of 
all pupils : this is the widening of the 'special needs' application.
That the interpretation leading to the abolition of special schools is 
possible indicates one of the many paradoxes in the Report. Another 
seemingly inevitable paradox is that whilst statutory categorisation 
of handicapped pupils is to cease, yet the replacement term 'children 
with special needs' is to be used to differentiate an even larger 
group of children. It could be asked whether it is wise to classify 
even more children as different from their peers if such 
differentiation is not a good thing. Might it not lead to stigma ? 
Warnock is, of course, trying to marry two quite different aims, 
namely that of improving educational provision and that of lessening 
social distinctions. The Report assumes that these form a single 
task, but the present thesis maintains the essential separation.
One method of achieving better educational provision within the 
mainstream could have been to improve the remedial schemes that are 
the heritage of the Plowden Report. More money for equipment; more 
staff with appropriate training; more periods timetabled for such work 
and general assessment of progress in the basic subjects of literacy 
and numeracy; all of these could have had the desired effect. Yet one 
of the recommendations of the Warnock Report is that remedial schemes
be abandoned, or incorporated into the wider special needs plan.
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3.2 Stigma, integration and segregation.
To Warnock it appears that the children with greater educational 
difficulties will disappear into the large group as far as those 
likely to stigmatize them are concerned, whilst remaining obvious to 
the teachers and educationalists monitoring their progress. It may be 
however, that stigma is harder to eradicate. Either a sub-group of 
people with 'special, special needs' could be discriminated against, 
or the whole group could be deprecated. Another possibility is that 
the sub-group with 'special, special needs' may be lost sight of by 
the teachers. The loss of special school facilities is liable to 
minimize rather than to enhance social and educational provision, with 
the result that the gap between the quality of individual attainments 
widens.
Warnock suggests that decisions about a child's need for special 
teaching should be an automatic, internal school-based procedure 
rather than a ritual of formal interviews where certification or 
labelling leads to the stigma of beingjdeclared a handicapped pupil 
(3). However, when examined, Warnock's scheme of recording for 
children with 'special, special needs', i.e. those for whom mainstream 
provision is not practicable, is very little different from the 
previous arrangements for categorization. Furthermore, it appears that 
recording will single out exactly the same small number of children as 
categorization.
"I noticed too that some people gained a different impression 
than I did from the reading of official pronouncements and 
reports. Thus plans for integration were said to be 'in line 
with Warnock'. Yet when I read the Warnock Report myself, I 
was unable to derive any clear implication for a shift in 
educational policy to a position where fewer handicapped 
children would be educated in segregated forms of provision." 
(4).
In opposition to the Warnock approach of dismissing stigma by refusing 
to describe handicaps exactly, it could be said that a better popular 
understanding of more closely detailed descriptions of handicapping
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conditions might be more likely to achieve the desired result. In 
other words, if people understood more about a particular child’s 
ability and disability, they would be more eager to accept him.
This chapter shows that it is incorrect labelling, rather than 
description or labelling per se, that results in distress for 
individuals. The handicapped person's desire is to be seen as 'the 
kind of person I am'. That is, to be recognized as deaf or blind 
rather than stupid, or as depressed rather than insane. The second 
desire behind the slogan 'the handicapped are people' is that disabled 
people above the age of 18 are adults, and should be treated as such, 
rather than as children. The implications of this are developed in 
Chapter 5.
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3.2.1 What is ’stigma1.
Stigma has been exhaustively discussed in the work of Goffman (5).
From a sociological position, he shows how many of the differences 
between people can lead to an individual feeling unworthy whilst other 
people stigmatize him. Stigma involves feelings of isolation, guilt, 
and unworthiness on one side, matched by avoidance, fear, and distaste 
on the other. To Goffman, all differences and all handicaps lead to 
stigma. The model of deviation from, the norm is given the title of 
’deviance'. Goffman uses concepts and results derived from the study 
of criminals since he considers that handicapped people are treated by 
their neighbours in the same way that released prisoners would be (6).
Signs of deviance for Goffman are both the obvious physical 
characteristics, for example the facial structure of a Down's syndrome 
child, and the labels given to individuals by teachers, doctors, and 
social workers. The point of stigma, Goffman believes, is that the 
feelings of fear by the able-bodied and of separateness by the 
disabled are linked. It resembles the relationship described by Buber 
as ’I-It’ (7). Rather than an understanding and acceptance of the 
other person with his own career and expectations, there is 
incomprehension.
Tracing the possible genesis of such sentiments is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. However, some pointers may be noted. There are proven 
medical links, which have been known for a long time, between syphilis 
and some forms of blindness and dementia. Such a reason for some 
forms of handicap is likely to have coloured opinion on all forms of 
disability. Insanity has always been frightening, whatever its cause, 
especially when it involves violence or incoherence. Thus attempts ar 
made to distinguish clearly between various forms of 'mental illness', 
and to differentiate between these and true dementia. Another 
historical clue is that in the past many conditions were thought to be 
contagious or infectious, the two conflated as 'catching'. Primitive 
hygiene and lack of medical knowledge made many conditions more 
serious than they are now. Religious prejudice has had a part in the 
genesis of stigma, with the idea that certain afflictions could be
sent as divine punishment. Even today, illnesses which should provoke
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sympathy rather than stigma can cause the latter. Thus the extreme 
fear of cancer evinced by many people seems to stem from the fear of 
it being transmitted to, or from, others, as much as from the illness 
itself.
It can be seen that the fear of handicapped people, which is the base 
of much stigma, comes largely from misunderstanding. Parents still 
fear that their child might 'catch something' from the child in a 
wheel-chair. It is, furthermore, not generally comprehended that most 
handicaps arise as a totally unexpected result of an apparently normal 
pregnancy, and there is asssuredly no basis for suggesting they are 
the 'moral fault' of the parents. Many handicaps are not even 
genetically transmitted, and hence will not pass to future 
generations, an important consideration for a prospective spouse or 
his family. The handicapped person is unlikely to be harmful in any 
way, and thus stigma is an irrational reaction.
The Warnock Report alerts its readers to the possibility of regarding 
a handicapped child simply as one of a body of pupils, so conditioned 
by disability as to be exactly like all others with the same 
condition. Warnock considers that individuals are adventitiously 
affected in a number of possible ways, rather than as essentially 
damaged in a set fashion. However, the device of hiding the 'special, 
special' population may not reach the core of the problem. Stigma 
arises in groups too large to possess the advantages of individual 
friendship and knowledge. Sometimes, the education of the public and 
the expectation of individuals will require more detailed explanatory 
labels rather than fewer.
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3,2.2 'Does he take sugar ?' - Incorrect descriptions.
As has been mentioned, the history of both medicine and special 
education has been the story of differentiation and diagnosis.
Various handicaps, with a variety of needs and potential have 
gradually been isolated. However confusions arise in popular thought, 
and these are the basis of stigma.
The major confusions arise between mental handicap and other
disabilities, and between insanity and other mental illness. Thus the 
spastic child with near normal or even superior intelligence may be, 
treated by others as mentally incapable. His speech and 
uncontrollable movements confuse those unfamiliar with the condition. 
The pre-lingually deaf person will suffer from a similar opinion 
expressed by those who cannot understand his speech. An episode of a 
television programme on lip-reading capitalized on this with the title
'Deaf not daft' (8). The term dyslexia is used to indicate an
allegedly specific type of perceptual problem which affects literacy 
skills only, and to differentiate from the global incapacity of the 
slow learner, which is due to a lack of intellectual ability. 
Similarly, attempts are made to show that some maladjusted children 
are actually highly intelligent or even gifted.
To clarify this, the title of a long-running radio programme can be 
used as an example. The title 'Does he take sugar?' (9) demonstrates 
a common misunderstanding of the handicap of visual impairment. A 
blind person can himself answer the question, as could most physically 
and mentally handicapped people. A deaf person would not hear the 
question, but could lip-read or understand sign language. The use of 
Blissymbols for those too severely handicapped to use sign language 
(10), and of Makaton for people who are severely speech impaired but 
have the manual dexterity to make simplified gestures (11), has 
enlarged the group of people who can be put in the position of 
answering for themselves the questions they fully understand.
In some ways it has always been an advantage to be labelled, provided 
the label was neither 'insane' nor 'subnormal'. This particular form 
of stigma, which is so much harder to eradicate, has necessitated the
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almost that the advocates of all other groups of handicapped people 
have been campaigning not to be called ’daft1. This increases the 
problem of acceptance for those who are not as intelligent as their 
neighbours. Historically, part of the problem may rest in memories of 
the work-house and the asylum. However, careful and selective 
teaching can start to lessen this form of stigma. For example, some 
Down's syndrome children have been taught to read and follow the early 
part of the primary school curriculum. Social and educational 
progress has also been achieved using methods of behaviour 
modification. Similarly, until modern methods revealed the 
intelligence of many spastics, it was not realised that they had any 
capacity for learning. Thus many of the inhabitants of 'subnormality 
hospitals' have been wrongly placed. Many other mentally handicapped 
people are equally able to learn and could take a place in open 
society if given considerable practical and financial support.
Knowledge of the exact nature of a handicap enables judgement of the 
parameters of useful treatment. It is, for example, often difficult 
to judge whether a child be deaf or autistic (12). The presenting 
symptoms of non-communication and lack of reaction to sound, which 
bring the child to the attention of the general practitioner, are 
common to both. Autistic children have been placed in schools 
designated 'for the deaf', and yet it is useless and indeed harmful to 
subject the autistic child to the selectively high amplification that 
aids speech teaching for the profoundly deaf. Other methods used in 
speech training for the 'hearing impaired' are also of no help here. 
The discussion of personal needs must rest on a full understanding of 
the child's condition. Van Uden has even distinguished different 
types of speech impairment among deaf children, finding such 
differentiation useful since the children respond to different methods 
of instruction (13).
Parents also need some easily comprehensible name for their child's 
disability to come to terms with the situation, to make plans for the 
future, and to keep sensible estimates of their child's ability. 
Warnock acknowledges that contact with parents of similar children is 
usually found helpful (14). A number of Societies, devoted to the 
cause of welfare promotion for various handicaps, fulfil this 
function, and also carry out or fund specific research, publicity, and
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C U U L d . L X U i i a j .  p i u v a . o j . u i n
Teachers also may need to be labelled or recorded as experts in a 
special field. Although all teachers in training can now be given an 
introduction to 1 special needs1, even the most radical forms of 
integration deriving from the Warnock Report involve the use of some 
teachers with special qualifications, training and experience, either 
as visiting advisers, or based within static units to which children 
go for extra tuition (15).
Thus more specific labels can be a useful guide, and possibly can even 
lessen stigma if they lead to understanding rather than increase the 
intolerance born of ignorance. Warnock's two-fold task of assuring 
adequate educational provision for all and eradicating stigma can thus 
be considered, as demonstrated here, to be a double issue. More 
specific labelling, if linked to specific and intensive teaching 
programmes, may lead to greater academic attainments by individuals. 
This in turn might lead to greater acceptance in adult life, with less 
stigma.
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3.3 Warnock's new names for handicaps assessed.
Warnock's solution can be seen to leave matters very much as they have 
been since the 1944 Education Act, merely substituting different 
labels. The most important feature of this maintenance of the status 
quo is that, despite Warnock*s assertions, there will still be * two 
types of children', namely those with 'special needs', and those 
without. Among the 'special needs' group there are to be ten types of 
handicap. This is the same number as there has been since the diabetic 
category was combined with the delicate category in 1953. Warnock 
achieves this same number by combining two pairs of groups, whose 
members educationalists have been at pains to keep separate since the 
needs involved are so different. The two newly combined groups are 
'children with visual disabilities' and 'children with hearing 
disabilities'. The first was previously composed of 'blind' and 
'partially sighted'; the second of 'deaf' and 'partially hearing'.
The second term of each pair was so phrased to emphasize a positive 
approach towards the use of residual senses, and entailed the use of 
quite different educational programmes. To make up the number, two 
new terms are introduced. These are 'children with specific learning 
difficulties' and 'children with mild learning difficulties'. The 
former are those previously called dyslexic, who were often not 
recognised as handicapped by Local Education Authorities. The latter 
were previously either members of remedial classes, or children from 
the ordinary classes now held to be 'in need' because of lack of 
progress. This is likely to be the largest group among the 20% of 
children said to have special needs at some time in their school 
career. For many of them the needs will be permanently episodic 
because of health or domestic problems. For others the need will be 
temporary.
Of the other terms, 'physically handicapped children* and 'children 
with epilepsy' are virtually the same as they have been since 1944. 
Stress is now placed on the phrasing 'children with...' rather than, 
for example, 'epileptic', presumably to emphasise the fact that these 
are children first, which is more important for teachers and parents 
than the nature of the disability. The category of delicate and 
diabetic children has no parallel in the Warnock scheme, since better
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function normally, attending their local school. Presumably some of 
these children will be subsumed in other terms.
Another term, ’children with speech and language disorders’, widens 
the earlier category of 'children with speech defects' in a logical 
way. However the use of the term ’disorders’ is unexpected, as is the 
term 'disabilities', given the contemporary fear of pejorative terms 
leading to stigma. The same can be said of 'children with emotional 
and behavioural disorders', a term which also should be compared with 
Warnock's statements on the advisability of retaining the term 
'maladjusted' (16). Warnock advocates retention of this relativistic 
term, to stress that maladjustment is frequently nothing to do with 
the physical or mental state of the child himself, but caused by 
factors of the environment, such as unsuitable schooling, or cruel and 
irregular upbringing (17). The new description, like some of the 
others in both the new and the old systems, may not be intelligible to 
the general public or even the parents, and thus have little effect in 
reducing stigma.
The two new terras for the children previously categorised as 
'educationally subnormal' demonstrate the difficulty that arises in 
any attempt at describing people with intellectual handicaps. The new 
terms 'children with moderate learning difficulties* and 'children 
with severe learning difficulties' replace the 'moderate' and 'severe' 
sections of the former category 'subnormal', which has become a 
pejorative term. It was originally qualified by 'educational' to show 
that the category was an administrative term relevant to schooling, 
and not to be used descriptively outside the educational system. 
However, although the term was introduced as an improvement on 
'mentally handicapped' or 'ineducable', 'E.S.N.' has attracted its own 
stigma. The emphasis in popular thought has rested on 'subnormal' 
rather than 'educationally'. As in the change from describing 
countries as 'undeveloped' to describing them as 'developing', 
changing the label once more will not necessarily banish the stigma, 
especially as the new terminology is so similar to the old.
Warnock's hope is that in the very large group of children with 
'learning difficulties', which should actually encompass all the 
'special needs' children, the severely affected will not be publicly
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obvious. Most critics and interpreters have failed to notice that 
'special schooling1 and 'recording' is advocated as a necessity for 
the 2% that are severely affected, and this is very little different 
from the 'categorization' and 'placement' that is to be superceded. 
Warnock specifically acknowledges the need for official recognition of 
serious handicaps, to ensure that these children's needs are catered 
for through the different stages of their education, and particularly 
in a move from the area of one education authority to that of another. 
(18).
In contrast to Warnock's approach, another method is discussed in the 
next chapter. This is based on the perceived value of individuals.
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4.1 Introduction.
The concept of normality is logically central to any analysis of the 
nature and meaning of special education. Examination of terms such as 
’handicapped1, ’impaired’, or 'disabled’, and educational assessments 
such as 'partially hearing’, 'with impaired vision', or 'educationally 
subnormal', indicates an ambivalence in their presupposed antonyms 
'normality' and 'normal'. Yet there is a sociological position which 
seeks to prove that there is here a clue to the banishment of stigma. 
This position holds that all our descriptions and assessments of both 
handicap and normality are essentialy relative to a particular social 
milieu, and thus illegitimate (1). 'Handicapped people’ should not be 
stigmatized with that label when in other societies they are unlikely 
to be so described. The response propounded in this thesis is that 
the argument holds true for a few of the less serious handicaps, 
particularly those affecting literacy, which is a requirement of a 
certain type of society. For the serious handicaps, on the contrary, 
it is possible to demonstrate an objectively real condition obvious in 
any society. The thesis further poses the question, to which no 
satisfactory answer is found, why some differences are seen as 
advantageous in one society and disadvantageous in another. Stigma is 
shown to affect the public value of an individual, as he views 
himself, and as he is seen by others.
In this chapter, three models of handicap and normality are outlined 
to introduce the differences between the positions. The traditional 
medical model takes handicapping conditions as objectively real. The 
sociological model sees them as socially conditioned, that is socially 
created. The educational model, as evinced in the Warnock Report, 
attempts a via media. The intention here is to assess and reconcile 
the differentelements by an analysis of the term 'handicap' and other 
related concepts. This is followed by a section devoted to 
unravelling the complications of the term normality, which is shown to 
be an evaluative concept, sharing the logical complexities of other 
evaluative words like 'good', 'right', and 'beautiful'.
The position reached by the end of the chapter is that whilst some 
slight handicapping conditions may be socially conditioned, meaning
65
for example maladjustment, or because they are only made obvious in a 
certain type of society, which is the case of dyslexia, yet the more 
serious conditions cannot be argued away in this manner. There are 
statistical norms for a particular society. Other societies can be 
assessed either on their approximation to the level of care and 
encouragement towards handicapped people that are normal in this 
country, or on their approach to an ideal which would also be 
preferable in late twentieth-century Britain. The paradox of making 
handicap socially invisible whilst ensuring adequate special education 
still remains.
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4.2 What is handicap ? Normality and handicap - definitions.
As has been explained, the Warnock Committee sought to replace the 
term 'handicapped pupils' by the term 'children with special 
educational needs' for a variety of reasons. Firstly, the term 
'pupils' is to be replaced by the term 'children with...' to endow the 
phrase with humanity. The replacement is effected through the 
complete list of 'descriptions' which are to replace the 'categories' 
of the 1944 Education Act, for example in 'children with behavioural 
disorders' instead of 'maladjusted'. Secondly, the committee hoped 
that far more children could be given special help than under the 
existing legal concept of special education, which includes only the 
formally handicapped pupils. Thirdly, there was the hope that the 
education system could be rationalised to make it relevant to more 
pupils. Finally, there is the underlying rationale for all this; that 
is the hope of removing the stigma of being formally categorized as a 
handicapped pupil, and therefore as different.
Much of the impetus for renaming the categories has stemmed from the 
difficulty of describing educationally subnormal children. As was 
shown in the last chapter, this term, which was introduced to replace 
earlier descriptions held to be too pejorative, has attracted its own 
stigma. The label has caused distress to parents, and its effects on 
children last into adulthood. Although used originally to emphasise 
the educational rather than the comprehensive nature of the 
difficulty, the term has come to exceed this narrow definition. It is 
the 'subnormal' rather than the 'educationally' that is retained in 
the public mind. It may be, indeed, that the addition of the category 
ESN(S) at the time when the previously-named ineducable children were 
finally admitted to the school system, rather than lessening the 
stigma for these more severely handicapped children, actually 
increased the stigma for those with milder educational problems.
For those who have been assessed as subnormal because of cultural 
differences between the home conception of the school and that held by 
the school, or because of language difficulties, as is the case for 
many West Indian children, the label is inappropriate even in the 
strictly academic context. This, however, implies that the children
67
nave oeen assxgnea to une wrong canjguLy, lamci uncm uiau m e  
category name itself is incorrect.
Even for those with a slightly restricted intellectual capacity, the 
category is probably only relevant within the academic context itself, 
for many pupils learn very little at school, yet successfully find 
employment and raise families in adult life. In adulthood, the 
relevance of categories is limited to those who attempt to extend 
their education, for example, through evening classes. In such cases, 
it is necessary for the teacher to know which pupils have not 
previously succeeded under normal teaching methods, and which of those 
pupils have not succeeded because of lack of interest rather than lack 
of opportunity. Different teaching methods are needed both for those 
adults with intellectual disabilities, and for those for whom English 
is a second language. However, in the more general social context of 
employment, family, or friendship, a category such as educationally 
subnormal (M), or ’with mild learning difficulties’, is unlikely to be 
relevant. Other, more serious, educational handicaps like dyslexia 
similarly need not necessarily affect the person as an adult if he can 
find a method of replacing the need for literacy, for example by the 
use of tape recorders.
Despite the apparent relativistic tone of the approach thus far, it 
must be emphasised that for many children and adults, learning 
problems are so severe that they extend beyond the special educational 
needs of schooling to encompass their whole lives. For such people, 
the term special educational needs may put too much stress on 
schooling, and mask the wider social implications of disability. 
Although the Warnock Report noted the need to retain some special 
schools to cater for these pupils, this recommendation has largely 
been neglected in the interpretation of the Report by central and 
local government.
At first, the term handicapped appears inappropriate as a group name, 
since the population of special schools has never been homogenous. 
Unlike the pairs physically handicapped/able bodied, deaf/hearing, 
blind/sighted, handicapped has no proper antonym, although the term 
normal is often used as one.
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"...that a school such as we have described....is not only right 
for the normal but right for the handicapped,..." (2)
Although the word handicapped has been useful to indicate a large, if 
disparate, group of people, modern educational thought, which stresses 
the importance of each child progressing at his own pace along his own 
path, deprecates the overtones of the word for it suggests 
competition, where there are winners and losers. However, handicap 
remains a useful term in that it shows that people can be held back by
external forces, as in the case of the maladjusted child. This is
similar to the racehorse being handicapped by carrying extra weights 
to impede its speed.
Of two related sets of descriptive terms, one has been introduced in 
the previous chapter. This set is the terms 'deviance,' 'stigma', and
'disadvantage'. The second set is the terms 'impairment',
'disability', 'illness', and 'handicap'. This is an integral group 
with associated roles and although often used interchangeably in 
common speech, they can be distinguished. An impairment is an 
unwanted departure from the norm in some form or function of the body, 
mind, or behaviour. Thus birthmarks, extreme short stature, or a 
heart murmur are all impairments. An impairment becomes a disability 
when it cannot be remedied or when it effects other functions. Thus 
short sight is not, in general, a disability, since accurately 
prescribed glasses can compensate for the impairment. Birth marks, 
although not disabilities per se, may lead to psychological problems 
if the marks are very noticeable, and hence become disabling. A heart 
murmur may reflect serious and incapacitating heart disease, or it may 
occur in a child who functions normally with no disability.
An impairment or a disability can become a handicap in certain 
contexts. Thus short statured children are handicapped in a running 
race, but not in gymnastics where Ithey may indeed be at an advantage. , 
Short sighted child will similarly be handicapped in certain 
situations where they cannot wear their glasses. Loss of a hand or 
arm affects different individuals differently, depending on whether it 
was the one previously used for writing. Loss of a leg is more 
important for its effect on personal mobility and causes little 
educational loss. A facial disfigurement, for example a cleft palate, 
can be a disabling impairment which handicaps the development of 
speech.
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Baldness and albinoism are impairments, but not disabilities. JLiKe 
birthmarks, they can become a handicap in cases where the resultant 
embarassment leads to depression.
Thus it can be seen that some impairments are disabilities which lead 
to handicaps; others are not handicaps at all; yet others are not true 
disabilities, but still lead to handicapping conditions. A child with 
no legs is obviously disabled, yet the successful early fitting of 
artificial legs should enable him to function normally, with no need 
of educational handicap ensuing, unless frequent hospitalisation 
leading to irregular schooling should become necessary. A severely 
disabled spastic, whatever his intelligence level, has an impairment 
which will be a disability and a handicap in all aspects of his life. 
This is particularly an educational handicap. The problems of oral 
communication and writing present an educational need. Special 
teaching and the use of electronic aids can mitigate the handicap to 
allow the individual to work and live socially, although there remains 
a severe handicap in terms of lack of mobility and independence. By 
contrast, a gifted child has no impairment or disability. His 
intelligence or musical ability do, however, present a difference from 
other children. Such a child can become handicapped if boredom with 
an inappropriate curriculum leads to underachievement and hence to 
maladjustment.
Deafness is an obvious impairment of function, which is also a 
disabling handicap in most contexts. Even in a non-literate society, 
the profoundly deaf person is obvious from his speech and lack of 
communication. There is so much that deaf people cannot do that they 
have often been treated as idiots. There are very few occasions when 
deafness would be an advantage; perhaps it would be so for anyone 
working in a very noisy environment where everyone depended on signs 
or lipreading, for example in a foundry. It is not just the effect on 
language acquisition that is important. A deaf person is unable to 
gather general information from casual conversation. Thus the 
handicap is both social and educational. Hearing aids are unable to 
compensate in the way that glasses help the short-sighted, for aids 
generally distort the sounds as they amplify them to high levels. 
Speech is thus not always clarified, and it is often impossible to 
mask a constant tinnitus. Different kinds of deafness result from 
damage at different points of the hearing mechanism, at the ossicles,
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the cochlea, or the nerve patnways. nearing aias are not yet
sufficiently selective in their compensation for the varying nature of
the handicap.
Initially, it appears that the child who is called dyslexic or 
supposed to have specific difficulties with reading and writing has a 
relative handicap. The handicap seems to be created by the literate 
society around the child in which there is a constant need to decipher
the printed word. If so, it could not occur in non-literate
societies. However the condition involves less of a relativistic view 
when it is, as frequently, combined with extreme clumsiness and 
difficulty with the discrimination of left and right. In a developed 
society, people like this can find safe driving, cooking, dressing, 
and working difficult. In a third world context, where personal 
survival skills are even more important, the individual could be more 
severely handicapped than his 'western' counterpart.
Educational handicaps have been distinguished from what might be 
called life handicaps, yet the two are generally connected, in that 
educational failure affects the type of job, and social position, and 
hence the lifestyle, available to the adult. Conversely, the basic 
handicaps also affect educational progress.
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4.2.2 Illness - handicap and normality.
Although handicap, disability, and impairment have been distinguished 
in the previous section, it is also necessary, though sometimes 
difficult, to distinguish between these and illness. Disabled 
children are generally healthy, although certain illnesses may affect 
them unusually seriously when they do occur. All children are 
sometimes ill, but not all children are sometimes disabled. An 
illness can best be viewed as having a possible cure, in that either 
time or medical skill will end it. Thus there is a search for some 
cure for cancer. Spina bifida, on the other hand, is operable, but 
not cureable. The operation deals with the build-up of fluid in the 
brain, not with the actual spina bifida. A third category of 
condition is illustrated by Down’s Syndrome. In this instance, it may 
be possible to prevent the occurence of the syndrome by the use of 
mineral additives in the pregnant woman's diet. However, once the 
condition has developed there is no sense in talking of a cure, any 
more than there is a cure for an amputated arm.
An illness can result in a permanent handicap, as when a limb has to 
be amputated because of tuberculosis, or when joints are incapacitated 
by rheumatism or sickle-cell anaemia. Some illnesses lead to a 
temporary disablement and educational handicaps, for example, if a 
child cannot learn through free movement, or looses schooling from an 
extended stay in hospital.
It is further arguable whether some conditions are illnesses at all, 
or merely part of the normal expectation of life. For example, period 
pains and pre-menstrual tension are held by many doctors to be a 
normal accompaniment to a woman's cycle. To other medical 
practitioners, however, the condition appears avoidable and 
undesirable, and is thus to be treated rather than endured. There are 
wider considerations than mere comfort however. Severe pre-menstrual 
tension has successfully been used as an exculpating factor in a 
murder case. That the defendant was found temporarily insane is only 
an extension of the notion that hormonal imbalance, as after 
childbirth, can lead to suicidal and homicidal tendencies. If such 
acts are considered to be the result of illness, unwilled and hence
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not part ot the woman's moral career, sne is not to oe nexu 
responsible, any more than the schizophrenic person is held 
responsible for his deeds.
The term mental illness was introduced as a euphemism in an attempt to 
demonstrate that depressives and others were neither malingerers nor 
insane. It was intended that 'illness1 would invoke sympathy and 
understanding rather than stigma or disapproval. 'Bad nerves', or 
'nerve trouble' occurred for similar reasons. However, psychologists 
like Laing (4), and Szasz (5), are now attempting to remove the term 
mental illness from the vocabulary. They point to the greater 
likelihood of being diagnosed as schizophrenic in the United States 
than in Britain, and suggest that mental illness is not illness at 
all, but only a product of living conditions. Mental illness has 
acquired its own stigma. As a result, blame is now to be laid on the 
environment rather than on the individual, in the same way that 
'social deprivation', disadvantaged' and 'educational priority areas' 
have replaced 'poverty', 'poor', and 'slums'. Laing believes that 
schizophrenia is the result of poor family care of children and not of 
chemical imbalance, which is the alternative diagnosis.
Laing regards schizophrenia as a sane reaction to an insane world, an 
escape. Indeed, many cases of depressive illness may well be provoked 
by external circumstances which may thus be seen as the 'cause'. 
However, the notion of 'cause' poses difficulties in this application, 
for the person must be of the temperamental type which reacts to the 
particular circumstances, the Aristotelian form, the body being the 
material. Some people can withstand a considerable amount of stress, 
even emerging enriched from the experience, while others manage to 
manufacture their own crises from the most ordinary circumstances. 
Laing's ideas do not take sufficient account of this.
The terminology of illness is thus criticised for employing an 
incorrect model, leading to what Szasz holds to be excessive power in 
the hands of doctors. Sympathy is now evoked by the terminology of 
deprivation and the environment rather than by concern for the sick 
person. This may be, at least in part, because social deprivation and 
disadvantage can be remedied, and also because their existence removes 
the responsibility from the individual.
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to provide extra equipment, or more teachers with specific training in 
special schools for the handicapped. The remedy was extended to 
schools in educational priority areas in the post-Plowden era (14).
In adult education, the term disadvantaged has been used to indicate a 
range of classes where lower fees were charged or payment waived 
totally. These classes include lipreading, braille, and basic adult 
education (literacy and numeracy). The rationale for applying the 
’financial remedy* in this instance has always caused some confusion. 
Some students believe it to be a right, since their condition, for 
example illiteracy, is a handicap. The teaching is held to be a 
quasi-medical service, and therefore should be free, like other 
treatment under the National Health Service. Other students hold that 
the handicap affects their earning capacity. Therefore the student 
concerned is unable to afford the full fee, and the reduction is a 
form of hardship remission, due to them as it is due to students who 
are unemployed or single parents. The confusion extends to the local 
authorities providing the classes. Thus, for example, Surrey charges 
a reduced fee, and tends towards the second rationale, while Sutton 
provides for some free classes from social services funding, thereby 
tending towards the first rationale.
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4.3 Models of handicap and normality.
There are several contrasting attitudes to both knowledge and society, 
three of which will be considered in this section. The first is the 
medical model. This assumes that there is such a thing as objective 
or scientific knowledge, specifically in medicine. Thus a qualified 
doctor will know more about disease, illness, prevention, aetiology 
and cure than will his tribal counterpart, the priest, witch doctor or 
shaman. When a 'scientific* doctor does adopt folk medicine, or 
practices from other cultures such as acupuncture, it will be on 
'scientific' grounds. New drugs from traditional herbal remedies will 
be used after chemical and pharmacological analysis of their 
components, and trial examination of their effects on both animals and 
humans. Similarly, as acupuncture is scientifically investigated to 
discover whether the needles activate known neural pathways, it is 
drawn into western medicine. In this model, new ideas are 
incorporated into the existing framework of knowledge and technique in 
ways consistent with the idea of scientific control and experiment.
The second model is the sociological approach. This represents a form 
of cultural relativism, emphasising the belief that there are no 
objective grounds for knowledge, but only a variety of equally valid 
opinions held by members of different social groups. These opinions 
are in some way true for for them, but not necessarily so for others. 
Just as different social groups have their own moral codes, it is 
argued, so to do they also have their own forms of knowledge. These 
may conflict, but they are all valid. Individuals adopt a particular 
world view because it is that of their society, not because it is 
intrinsically superior, more efficient, or even correct.
Related to this model are certain attitudes to health, illness, 
handicap and disability. It is held that illness and handicap are 
social phenomena. The argument states that since what is considered 
illness in one society is not in another, it is not really illness at 
all. Some sociologists hold that all handicaps are socially 
conditioned, that is created by the social group into which the 
so-called disabled person is born. Normality is purely relative to a 
particular social group, and hence such appellations as partially
75
hearing are made on wholly subjective grounds.
The example can be used of the quasi-psychotic behaviour of some of 
the South Sea Islanders whose interaction was reported by Margaret 
Mead (7). Another example is the elevated social position of the 
epileptic shaman or visionary priest in North American Indian society. 
As such behaviour is considered normal in those societies, it should 
not be marked out as unusual or undesireable in Western Europe. For 
such a relativistic approach, western or 'scientific' observers can 
offer no 'knowledge' that is of possible assistance to another people 
if it is not part of, or assimilable to, their belief system. Western 
medicine has, for example, assimilated the use of halucinatory drugs, 
but not the methods used by the Azande (8). In contrast to objective 
attitudes, which could bring, as evidence to support the case, the 
world-wide eradication of smallpox, cultural relativism states that 
there can be no valid objective knowledge, as a matter of definition. 
Knowledge is only thought to be so : it is really opinion. In the 
medical model, it is acknowledged that it is only when ideas are 
assimilable that they are accepted, but also that some ideas about 
medicine are true, and some are false. Even in cases where there are 
several methods of curing an illness, all will have a common 
characteristic, whereas other methods will not result in a cure or may 
even be harmful, but a patient treated by them may still recover 
despite the intervention.
In terms of relativism, it is unclear whether the individual is denied 
the illness or handicap because his society does not recognise it, or 
whether it should be said that although he manifests all the symptoms 
as defined by a western trained doctor, his social grouop does not 
recognise this. Only the former can be truly termed relativism, while 
the latter shows a widely accepted, but debateable, opinion that some 
societies have more medical knowledge than others.
A proponent of the scientific approach could suggest that the 
discrepancies in belief resulted from ignorance of immunology, and 
that, furthermore, Western medicine has a norm of well fed and well 
cared for healthy babies, with a larger proportion surviving birth and 
then childhood than most developing countries. Therefore, judgements 
can be made against this norm.
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Here it will be maintained that there is such a norm for late 
twentieth century Britain, particularly in the educational context, 
where overall provision has to be made for the major part of the child 
population. Despite the so-called multi-cultural society, there are 
certain universal expectations. All prospective parents are aware of 
the ideal of the healthy child they wish to produce. To achieve this, 
pregnant women are advised to avoid alcohol, cigarettes, and other 
drugs, certain foods and certain medical procedures (e.g. x-rays). 
Health tests and genetic counselling are encouraged even before any 
attempts are made to conceive a child. Nobody wants to bear a 
handicapped child, however much such a child can be loved once born.
Moreover, there are certain forms of behaviour not accepted as normal 
in this society, because of the effect of the individual on those 
around him. The truth that some people are labelled eccentric and are 
left alone, while others are labelled mad or criminal and are 
incarcerated, does not blur an overall distinction. Borderlines are 
always difficult to demarcate, but that does not imply that there are 
no norms against which behaviour can be measured. The sociological 
model takes normality to mean every variation that survives. By 
existing, any child is normal. The subsequent analysis of normality 
in this thesis is intended to shed light on the meaning of such 
pronouncements. Warnock's model of handicap borrows from both 
approaches, and attempts to describe ’educational handicap'.
"...we called attention to the wide range of things which a 
child needs to know as part of his education. Besides his 
academic studies he must learn, for example, to accomodate 
himself to other people. He must also learn what will be 
expected of him as an adult. Any child whose disabilities or 
difficulties prevent him from learning these things may be 
regarded as educationally handicapped..." (9).
As an illustration of the distinction between such an educational 
model and the medical model, it is useful to explain the difference 
between deaf and partially hearing. The distinction is not based on 
hearing loss as measured on the child's audiogram per se. Rather, the 
child is assessed according to his personal functioning and the extent 
of his language development. Some 'partials' are much deafer, in 
medical terms, than profoundly deaf children. The distinction is made
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judged by his natural language development. The partially hearing 
child is one who can learn by oral methods supplemented by 
amplification, often in a mainstream school. The profoundly deaf 
child needs specific language teaching very different from that 
offered in mainstream classes. The same type of educational 
distinction can be made between the functionally blind, who need 
non-visual teaching methods, and the partially-sighted, who can use 
high powered visual aids. It is thus possible to be judged 
educationally blind.
Warnock named the Report ’Special educational needs’, and delineated 
very wide groups of handicap rather than specific ones. Both these 
actions were taken so that the options for any particular child were 
not circumscribed by his being put into a category, but were rather 
designed to suit the individual. The emphasis is on individual needs 
rather than the uniformity of a category as in traditional forms of 
treatment or provision. This is particularly intended to help the 
many multiply-handicapped children for whom there has been no proper 
placement under the system of single handicap schools.
It is intended, by this emphasis, that the child be viewed as a whole 
person, with needs based on both abilities and disabilities, rather 
than as identical with others in his category. It could be argued 
that assessments for placement in the past were based on perceived 
need, and indeed, for most children with a single handicap, the future 
experience will be very little different from the past. However, it 
must be acknowledged that there were children who were denied places 
in schools for the deaf, for example, because an additional handicap 
such as poor mobility complicated a child's progress in such a school, 
which also could not provide the regular physiotherapy, or extra care 
for toiletting because of insufficient numbers or training of staff.
In these cases, decisions on placement were apparently made according 
to the facilities a particular school could provide, rather than the 
needs of the pupil. Such decisions can look realistic or 
unimaginative depending on the circumstances of the case and the 
viewpoint of the critic.
Each of the three models of handicap has a useful contribution to make 
to the discussion. The sociological model indicates the possibility
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can be caused by aspects of the society in question. This may well be 
true for maladjusted children, or those with mild learning 
difficulties. The sociological model performs the function of 
alerting teachers to cultural and linguistic features of handicap.
The medical model acts as a reminder that despite sociological and 
educational jargon, there are certain serious conditions which will 
always cause difficulty. Medical research eradicates some handicaps, 
while also allowing more multiply handicapped children to survive. By 
differentiating certain conditions, for example autism from deafness, 
the medical model can indicate the proper teaching methods.
The educational model recognises the sociological and medical 
approaches, while seeking to optimise the potential of each 
individual. Thus it can be extended to cover educationally gifted 
children, for example, who can certainly be regarded as having special 
needs.
Each of the different models of handicap involves a different 
definition of normality. The sociological model defines the word to 
mean all that there is existing. The medical model draws sharp 
distinctions between normal and abnormal. The educational model 
derived from Warnock deprecates this distinction, yet still refers to 
children having special needs, which are distinct from those of their 
peers, and does not acknowledge, with the sociologist, that all 
childrens’ needs are special. These differences of definition stem, 
in part, from the ambiguity of the word normality, which seems to have 
scant meaning in common between its definitions (see pp.88 et seq.).
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4.3.1 Social relativism revisited.
As a further comment on the sociological model, and as an initial 
stage in the clarification of what can be meant by normality, it is 
useful to distinguish between actually being ill, or diseased, or 
handicapped, or injured, and being considered sick, or disabled, by 
one's social group. To preserve a status for knowledge in the face of 
the attack by relativism, it can be argued that it is generally 
possible to recognise that a person 'has something wrong' with them. 
This is a matter of informed observation of symptoms and causes. 
Whether a person is termed sick, and allowed a role which involves 
dependence and behaviour different from his fellows, will probably 
depend partly on the resources of food for the community. It will 
also depend on the community's need for his labour, upon the 
complexities of social interaction, and on the tasks needed for 
survival. However, the most important aspect of the decision whether 
or not an individual will be considered handicapped is the severity of 
the disability or illness, and this will be the severity as related to 
the local situation. Thus existence is much harsher in most primitive 
societies than in Western Europe. Common childhood ailments here 
become killer diseases in Africa, while handicaps like poor eyesight, 
which although causing the sufferer here some difficulty, can, in the 
third world, mean complete helplessness. A whole settlement area on 
the Volta, in West Africa, for example, has had to be abandoned 
because of endemic eye conditions leading to blindness and hence to 
the economic dependence of the sufferers on the healthy remainder of 
the community, a diminishing proportion (10).
By contrast, people with slight disabilities can be handicapped in one 
society in a way that would not occur in another. Thus a tribe where 
accuracy of shooting arrows was integral to an adult male's survival, 
because of the need to catch food, would regard impaired eyesight as a 
serious matter. Even slight astigmatism could seriously affect a 
man's aim, and hence his diet and health, as well as his possibilities 
for marriage and parenthood. For a European man, a variety of roles 
and jobs would be available, and the opportunity of obtaining glasses 
to correct the vision. Both societies have a norm for the adult male. 
In this instance, the European norm allows more variety, rather than
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less, but it is of scant comfort to an individual to be told that he 
would have no problem in another society. Moreover, whatever the 
relevant society's estimation of him is, any individual has a certain 
physical and intellectual ability which can be seen from outside, and 
within the limits of which he will grow. Social relativism is 
appropriate in some cases, but not all.
A general relativistic theory of knowledge presents a radical threat 
to all logical discussion, and denies the possibility of any objective 
analysis. It even undermines its own integral presuppositions. It is 
impossible for the relativist to claim that relativism be true. It is 
also impossible to decide that it is false, since the answer to this, 
as to all claims, is that it is relative to person, time and place.
The outcome of this is shown by Midgley :
"We are rightly angry with those who despise, oppress, or 
steamroll other cultures, and we think that doing these things 
is actually wrong, but this is itself a moral judgement. We 
are condemning oppression and so forth. We cannot condemn if 
we think that all our condemnations are just a trivial local 
quirk of our own culture, still less if we try to stop judging 
altogether." (11)
Relativism disallows moral judgements by making them nonsensical. The 
essence of moral discourse is that it assumes a form of universality 
by use of such words as right, ought, and good. Otherwise it cannot 
be dissociated from prudential or economic judgement. This is 
applicable to social relativism, since social groups differ in their 
moral assumptions. However, it is still possible to study different 
life styles and judge between them as to which is more desirable, or 
which is more appropriate to a given set of circumstances.
Preferences, and the logical reasons for them, can be admitted, but a 
completely attitudeless life is not possible, as has been shown by 
existentialism.
Even attempts to dismiss conventional morality imply a moral 
standpoint, albeit of a different nature to the conventional one.
The sociologists of the relativistic school write as though there were 
such a plethora of easily accessible social systems that somewhere or 
another all behaviour that we term ill, mad, wicked, or criminal, and
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all impairments that we term disability or handicap, would immediately 
be accepted as normal. Even if this were the case, which it does not 
seem to be, such a belief has no relevance for the family of a child 
with severe epilepsy, for a schizophrenic adolescent, or a young man 
limbless because of his mother's consumption of thalidomide during 
pregnancy. In practical terms, it would be impossible to transport 
each to the relevant society, while in moral terms it would also be 
undesirable, since the child's need is to fit within his own family. 
Furthermore, the epileptic might not be accepted as a shaman, and he 
might be stigmatized for being white, or from a different 'tribe'. 
Similarly, the schizophrenic might evince quite different behaviour 
when confronted by people whose own behaviour differs from that which 
he has been used to.
Changing attitudes, not geographical placement, must be what is to be 
sought, and in particular the overall change in attitude towards the 
handicapped of accepting the individual's right to a chosen life 
style, to sustenance, and to maturation. This will not result in the 
disappearance of handicap, but rather the minimization of its 
consequences in terms of stigma. Too close adherence to the tenet 
that social acceptance has priority should be avoided, for from this 
comes the idea that disability is socially conditioned. There are 
other priorities, however, since differences in need mean also 
differences in provision.
Social relativism's prime argument against stigma is that it is 
meaningless, since all are normal. However, the differences, and the 
stigma, do not disappear. There seem to be outsiders in all societies 
who are in some way stigmatized for being different. It might have to 
be accepted that there will always be some people who are sufficiently 
different from the rest of the society, whose presence causes 
ambivalent feelings, just as there will always be people who are 
'below average' in any comparison. Those who are different may also 
need different treatment for their own sake. Blind and paralysed 
people are obviously handicapped, and their handicap, in practical 
terms, needs greater parental care in childhood, and restricts the 
ability to take the adult role of working and caring for others. Many 
handicapped children who are educated in Western Europe would not have 
survived in a primitive society, some of which, like the Nuer, 
practise infant euthanasia (12), while others have to let children die
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because they lack the medical skill to prevent this.
Recent critical studies of the concepts of health, illness, and 
normality have approached their subject by way of mental illness, 
which has always seemed more problematical than physical ill-health. 
Szasz, for example, takes it as axiomatic what constitutes bodily 
health (13). In psychiatry, relativism has affected methods of 
treatment, as doctors like Laing have presented theses which have 
undermined the accepted views of normality and mental health. 
Schizophrenia is thus regarded by some not as an illness, but as a 
form of maladjustment arising from faulty upbringing. This is to 
replace the idea that it results from chemical imbalance in the brain. 
In treatment of schizophrenia, the latter belief recommends drug 
therapy, the former requires behavioural change. For Szasz and Laing, 
decisions on a person's sanity or madness are political acts rather 
than medical ones. The resultant argument is that everyone is to some 
extent mad or could be thought so, which is a form of relativism.
Here, normality is equated with health, but it is thus actually the 
idea of perfect health which is to be understood.
"The ultimate goal of analysis as Freud saw it, was to secure 
the best possible psychological equilibrium for the functioning 
of the ego." (14)
This may not be the same as physical or mental good health, or even as 
health which is normal in the statistical sense. There is a paradox 
about normality, that it can be normal not to be normal. This paradox 
starts to disappear when the different connotations of the word are 
disclosed. Thus, presuppositions of good, or normal, mental health 
can be distinguished from each other. Similarly, a particular life 
style may be shown to be preferred, given certain moral 
presuppositions, because it is more healthy.
It is possible for a Western trained doctor to assess the general 
health of a person not of his own culture or society. Taking the 
example of a still widespread disease, it would be odd to argue that 
although an American Indian had tuberculosis as shown by a sputum 
test, he did not suffer from the disease because his tribe did not 
recognize the illness. A moral dilemma would arise for the doctor who
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was also a social anthropologist. He would need to determine, when 
faced by the tubercular Indian, the priorities of his belief. His 
choice is between two principles of behaviour, either to attempt to 
cure illness whenever it is evident and amenable to treatment, or to 
avoid interfering in another peoples' life style. This resembles the 
dilemma faced by Turnbull during his residence with the Ik, an African 
tribe gradually dying from starvation. In this case he could only act 
as an observer of the situation, although at first Turnbull shared 
some of his food because he felt impelled to do so, being unable to 
eat while surrounded by starving people he knew as individuals. (15).
In the case of the tubercular Indian, there is the added complication 
that the rest of the family, and then the whole tribe could become 
infected by the 'non-existant' disease. Tuberculosis is initially 
painless, but becomes more serious with time. It is possible that at 
some later point in time, the tribe might come to acknowledge the 
illness, without understanding the exact nature of the condition. The 
difference in diagnosis might thus be no more than a difference in the 
stage at which the person is recognized as ill. It is possible, even 
in Western cultures, to be ill without knowing it. For example, many 
forms of cancer are not evident until the tumour has grown to an 
inoperable size. As in the case of the tubercular Indian, a western 
trained doctor faced by the epileptic shaman might also be in the 
dilemma of whether or not to give him drugs to ease his condition, for 
loss of the fits might mean loss of social position.
It is possible to recognise that other people are ill, injured, or 
diseased, however alien their life style, and whatever the opinion of 
their community. For example, many people in the past, thought by 
their contemporaries to have been poisoned, are now believed to have 
died from peritonitis. This condition was not then known, but can now 
be diagnosed from contemporary accounts of the symptoms. Similarly, 
the so-called Witches of Salem in eighteenth century Massachusetts may 
have experienced hallucinations brought on by eating contaminated 
grain. This, it is supposed, had been stored in damp conditions, 
leading to the formation of ergot, a fungus which produces 
hallucinations. Twentieth century chemistry can say that the 
neighbours who hounded the Witches to death, because they were 
possessed of the devil, were in the wrong.
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It is also possible to recognise that an animal is ill, even though 
there is no common language. A vetinary surgeon can diagnose, and 
treat successfully, the illnesses of various beasts, such as dogs, 
cows, guinea-pigs, fish, and birds. Mammals suffer arthritis, 
cancer, mange, and irritations caused by mites. Fish have fungus on 
their scales. None can express any opinion as to the exact nature of 
their discomfort, although sometimes the animal can show that it is in 
pain, either by overt behaviour, or simply by not eating. Whilst the 
historical examples above show cases of the wrong explanations of
for explanation.
The crux of this is biological similarity. Even very alien human 
societies are in most ways mutually comprehensible because of the 
physical resemblance. There are two opposing views on this expressed 
in the work of Wittgenstein. Firstly,
"If a lion could talk we could not understand him." (16)
This passage occurs after a reference to the problems of 
interpretation and linguistic translation and has influenced
relativism. It is suggested that the lion's life is so different from
that of a twentieth century Austrian that a mutually comprehensible 
language could not exist. There would be no method of expressing the
concepts of one to the other.
A second passage contradicts this :
"...and now look at the wriggling fly, and at once all these
Even the fly resembles man in terms of suffering pain, and man can 
understand this, pity the fly, and even squash it to prevent further 
suffering. If this is an intelligible action, and we are sensible to 
stop boys pulling the wings off a fly, how much more intelligible to 
man should be a lion that is old, hungry, and cancerous. As a mammal, 
the lion is subject to illness, injury, and deprivation in a way known 
to man. The Manus, the North American Indian, or the Esquimaux then 
look even more familiar and intelligible.
show that there is sometimes no need
difficulties vanish, and pain seems able to get a foothold 
here..." (17)
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A real problem would only occur if attempts were made to define health 
and normality for intelligent beings which were very different to man 
in anatomy, physiology, or biochemistry. Human norms are of injury 
and death, recovery and life. The parameters of social intercourse 
would be modified in the face of beings who could infinitely use spare 
parts to remedy injury, manage self-reduplication like a starfish, or 
split like an amoeba. Indeed the very meaning of self would need 
redefinition, just as it does when discussing the human case of 
cloning. The waging of war, and the keeping of peace, would present 
difficulties, since the concept of harm would not apply. To be able 
to harm another, common ground must exist. Such a common ground is 
present with even those human tribes whose life style seems most 
different from that of Western Europe. All men eat, need water, 
suffer pain, and die.
Consequently, it is possible to make the imaginative step to 
understand why the Esquimaux have numerous names for different types 
of snow. Anyone living and travelling in such terrain would need such 
concepts. One can 'put oneself in their shoes'. Presumably, the 
Esquimau could understand, at least in principle, why Western 
technology has the need for a variety of names for metal alloys. Each 
has a different strength and application, just as the different types 
of snow have their own implications for a safe passage, or for value 
in the construction of an igloo.
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4.4 Towards a solution : Normality - the three senses.
What are the facets of normal and normality that lead commentators 
towards cultural relativism ? The answer is their ambiguity, which 
these words share with all evaluative words. 'Education1, 'musical1, 
'artistic', 'right', and 'good', from cultural and aesthetic as well 
as moral contexts, can be shown to play at least two roles. Their 
main use is in an evaluative sense, with a constantly changing 
descriptive content, which is often virtually non-existent. Such 
emotive terms can be used freely in argument, to mislead, and to 
persuade. Thus approval can be gained for what is termed normal in an 
evaluative sense while the tenor of the actual details is not 
elaborated. This is a similar use to that frequently experienced with 
political concepts, for example, justice.
The complexity of the present issue is deepened by the use of the word 
normal in the phrases 'its quite normal’, or 'normal development', and 
in the compounds 'abnormal', or 'subnormal'. The word has, we find, 
three main roles. First is the basic meaning of normal in the 
statistical sense. This meaning of usual, or 'found in most cases', 
is logically prior. Dependant on this is the purely evaluative sense, 
which means something like ideal or proper. Third is a mixed sense, 
which keeps the evaluative nuance, but masquerades as descriptive. 
These will be called normalitys (statistical), normalitye 
(evaluative), and normality111 (mixed).
Normalitys.
To find the normals height of seven year old girls, in any society, 
it would be necessary to undertake an empirical study. No moral 
presuppositions, apart from those common to all research, for example 
honesty in presenting the results, are needed. The children in the 
survey population would be measured, and the results tabulated. The
mode, or most frequently occurring value, could then be found. This
mode would be the normals height.
This statistical sense of normal defines the norm as the most usual.
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Thus a statistical curve of intelligence as judged by the conventional 
Intelligence Quotient test will show that most children of the same 
age and experience score approximately the same, with a few members of 
the population scoring very low or very high. The central, and 
largest group on the distribution curve are the population with 
normals intelligence.
It is normalitys which varies from culture to culture, and even from 
class to class within a culture with a stratified society, and also 
from one geographical area to another. Thus health visitors may find 
different norms in the middle class and working class districts of a 
town in Britain, while the normals height of army recruits from the 
Scottish Highlands is several inches more than for that of those from 
the South Wales Valleys. On a wider scale, climate and the 
availability of food affect normals health, activity, and disease.
In most developing countries, it is quite normals for children to 
suffer intestinal parasites, rare in Western Europe. Normals child 
development, in terms of behaviour, language, and understanding, 
varies from society to society, as will be found by anyone attempting 
to repeat Piaget’s experiments, on the conservation of number, or 
assessing children in terms of the normss established for American 
children by Gesell (18).
Granted this, relativism appears feasible, yet this is not a necessary 
conclusion, since while it can be said that for one society, a certain 
form of behaviour is normals, this behaviour might not be normals 
for humans in general. In this case, the particular society's 
behaviour is not normals, but different. The same argument holds 
for illness, disease, and handicap. The global view, which has been 
gained through the knowledge of a number of different cultures, can 
judge that certain things are unusual, or even abnormals. For 
example, a trait such as the shaman's epilepsy is not considered 
normals even in his own society. There he is differentiated in a 
special way, which elevates his social position. Neither is he 
normals, at least as far as his being epileptic is concerned, when 
compared to the members of other societies. It is interesting to 
consider why some forms of difference, when compared to other 
societies, lead to a socially favourable position, while others do 
not.
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A typically relativistic argument is introduced by Alexander
"Examples can be found, in the very scanty anthropological work 
on this question. One anthropologist reports that in some 
South American tribes, a certain skin disease was so common 
that the few men who did not suffer from it were regarded as 
pathological to the degree of being excluded from 
marriage..." (19).
Unlike the position in the tubercular Indian argument, in this 
instance, nearly all the tribe has the skin disease. They recognise 
the condition, and yet it is not seen as harmful. Presumably it is 
neither painful nor incapacitating, for if it were, acceptance might 
not be so likely. Adopting the global frame of reference, it can be 
stated that as most people in the world do not have the disease in 
question, it is neither normals nor necessary. There would, 
however, be a moral dilemma for a doctor in deciding whether or not to 
offer medication. Any tribesman who was cured would be put into an
invidious position vis h. vis the rest of the tribe, for whom the
concept is not one of normalitys, but of normality111.
Attempted attitudinal changes in such a case are only acceptable to
the person who has decided that intervention in other cultures is 
morally permissable, or, as for a Victorian missionary, morally 
required. An effective change of opinion may even be virtually 
impossible, as the proponents of birth control have found in areas 
where children represent either the outward sign of their fathers' 
masculinity, or the future means of support for ageing parents. The 
argument that other people do not suffer from skin disease might not 
convince Alexander’s tribe, since for many such primitive tribes, 
anyone outside their own close group is considered so different as to 
be effectively non-human, and the absence of the skin disease would 
confirm this view.
Another formulation of the relativist's argument is offered by 
MacClachlan :
"A single disease, to exist in a cultural group, as such, must 
come within the purview of contemporary diagnostics. Otherwise 
it can exist only as a part of the general malaise known as
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’feeling bad’, or, alternatively may even be considered a 
desirable departure from normality.” (20)
The word in (my emphasis), is, for MacClachlan's conclusion, not the 
correct word. Disease can exist in_ a culture without any recognition 
of its existence, or even of a ’general malaise'. MacClachlan means 
’to exist for a culture’, a more complex notion, but one for which his 
claim is unquestionably correct.
Normal©
Various options are open to those who are dissatisfied with the 
statistical concept of normality. To be normals, it could be said, 
is not enough. To be normals is to be inferior to those who are 
special, even if the society does not discriminate against those 
people. Paradoxically, it can be normals to be abnormale , that is 
it can be normals to be ill. The paradox is dissolved by the 
differentiation of the two forms of normal, as shown here. The idea 
of normale health comes not from that which is, but from that which 
might be, or perhaps which should be. The normals health of a 
society can be established, and then perhaps improved. Statistical 
norms do not of themselves involve stigmatisation, but they are the 
basis for the evaluative uses for normal, which can lead to some
differences being deprecated, and thence stigmatized.
The proper use of an evaluative term presupposes a form of commitment 
to some ethos. Thus to say that something is normal, in an evaluative 
sense, is to express approval, within a certain moral system. 
Relativists would argue that it is normal to be a cannibal in certain 
tribes, and hence unobjectionable. This needs to be clarified as 
follows : it is normals to be a cannibal in these societies, and
therefore it is normale, that is to say, unobjectionable.
Normalm
The third use of the word, normalm j[s demonstrated in the title of a 
book by Valentine : The normal child and his abnormalities (21). This 
should be construed as 'the normal®- child and some of his
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abnormalities111'. This title shows how normal111 can mean proper, 
that which is approved of, as an extension of the idea that what is 
most usual is right. Valentine’s normal child is statistically like 
his peers in that he exhibits many abnormal traits of which his 
parents disapprove. The title also demonstrates the difficulty of 
extricating the factual, or statistical, meanings from the evaluative 
ones.
The abnormalities, or undesirable forms of behaviour, can be shown, 
objectively, to be normals in developmental terms over a longer 
time-scale. Thus Valentine can quote features of abnormal, even 
neurotic, behaviour in the childhoods of people who subsequently 
become what he defines as paradigms of normal adulthood, for example, 
W.A.A.F. officers, teachers, and medical students (22). This begs the 
question whether such people are actually normal in any of the three 
senses. That is, would Valentine’s normal adults represent a common 
adult type (normals), or would their behaviour have been evaluated 
as desirable by other people at the time the book was written 
(normale). Valentine makes a point out of the same difference, 
between desired and desirable, that misled Mill in the formation of 
his utilitarian principle (23).
Normal111, normale, and normals
Alexander's argument can be resolved in the same way as Valentine's. 
However it is not immediately clear whether the definition wanted is 
what is to be normals in any society, what is thought to be 
normal111, or what is to be recommended as normale. If medication 
be accepted by the tribe with the skin disease, the result would be 
that over time, fewer people would evince the symptoms, which would 
thus cease to be normals. Yet it might be that conservative opinion 
would continue to consider the condition normal111. Consequently, if 
the society held only those members having the disease to be 
normal111, it might continue to penalise the deviants, whether those 
deviants were different from their own choice or not, and whether the 
deviants were normals or not.
Furthermore, it is not clear whether the normalm} that is proper, is 
what is actually desired, or what is morally desirable; whether it is
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that which is approved of, or that which ought to be approved. The 
likelihood of misunderstanding, on which the unscrupulous can 
capitalise, is evident. The evaluative uses of normal tacitly assume 
a consensus of understanding the statistical use. Valentine parodies 
this misuse of words in his title, yet he proceeds to make the same 
mistake by suggesting which adults are normal. Many people might 
consider such individuals to be far from normale. They are 
certainly not normals, as they represent only a small proportion of 
the total population. Yet they may be called normal111 if the speaker 
so desires.
The conflation of statistical and evaluative ignores the fact that 
people differ in a variety of ways from the norms Qf their society. 
Some differences are valued, some are stigmatized. A priest might not 
be a normals man, since he might be more spiritual, or is required 
to be celibate, while a doctor may be more compassionate or skilled at 
healing than the norms. However, except in peculiar circumstances, 
like Revolutionary France, or Pol Pot's Khmer Republic, priests and 
doctors are considered normal111. A blind man is not normals in 
respect of his lack of sight, since this is unusual. However, he is 
normals in respect of his hearing, and his desire for employment and 
social intercourse. Should he be considered normals ?
The Aristotelian principle of equity, that is treating like people 
alike, and different people differently in respect of their particular 
difference, is perhaps appropriate. If some differences are relevant 
to varying behaviour patterns, some are not. Many societies recognise 
approximately the same groups of people as being different, although 
not all societies may have names or categories as specific as we do. 
Just as while most societies suffer the same types of ills, although 
the severity may vary, and the terms of description may vary, 'being 
ill' does not. Where societies do differ is in considering some 
groups of different people as worthy of respect, and others worthy of 
stigma. Not all differences are treated in the same way by all 
societies.
The response to the relativist argument of the normality of 
cannibalism is that such behaviour is not n o r m a l sj since most 
societies do not condone it. It is not possible either to allow that 
it is normale} since this use of the word as a wholly moral term
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presupposes a universality of judgement not available to the 
relativist. Purely evaluative terms must be universalisable to be 
used at all, for it is the strength of moral discourse that it is 
self-explanatory and consistent. There is no need to ask 'why not do 
that which is wrong ?'. Either decisions are universalisable, or the 
use of evaluative terms must cease. Even if cannibalism can be held 
normal111 in a primitive society, it cannot be in ours, and the 
relativist cannot pre-empt the use of normals.
Justice can be used by comparison here, as it works in a similar 
manner when another society is being described. It is possible to say 
that 'this society's justice is not really justice; they think it is, 
but we can see that it is not'. The observer can claim a higher order 
sense of justice as of any evaluative term. He can do the same with 
normals, and normale. But if normal111 is used, it is rather a 
personal comment on the value of certain life styles.
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4.4.1 Normality and special education.
The discussion of different meanings of normality can be integrated 
into the analysis of special education by showing which normality is 
being used at any given point. In most discussion of the physical and 
sensory handicaps, the concept is normalitys. That is, such people 
have a statistical difference from their fellows. Most people have 
hearing and eyesight within a certain range, most people can walk, are 
continent, and can use their arms. This is a norms which is valid 
throughout the world, and not just in twentieth-century Europe.
Many specifically educational handicaps do, however, seem to be 
man-made. Not man-made in the sense that thalidomide damage is the 
result of human error, but in the sense that they are conceptually 
defined by a certain social system. Of these, dyslexia is a prime 
example. The child with a specific learning disability will be 
noticed as such, and hence categorized, only in a literate society. 
Moreover, it could be that the dyslexic will only exist as such if he 
happens to be born in a society where spoken and written language have 
an extreme mismatch. There should be fewer problems in a language 
like Chinese, where the plethora of characters ensures less likelihood 
of confusion than in English, where for example, 'gh’ has at least two 
sounds, or in Gaelic with its complicated system of mutation. In a 
society where there was no written language, dyslexia would seem 
impossible, although an individual with a poor oral memory would 
suffer in a culture where long sagas needed memorization. The 
dyslexic would be normals in a non-literate society, as he would be 
like all his peers in being unable to read or write. Equally, in a 
literate society with logical and consistent spelling rules, he might 
well be normals also, in that his spelling could be as good as 
anyone else's.
It is possible to show that there might be an objective rather than a 
relativist basis for dyslexia. An anthropological survey might 
discover awkward people unable to fire arrows straight, or blow pipes 
correctly. Clumsiness, inability to choose a leading hand, problems 
with focussing, all of which are symptoms of dyslexia, could lead the 
anthropologist to postulate a cross-cultural basis, and some
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underlying brain malfunction which is manifested in different ways in 
different societies, depending on the practical demands made on the 
individual. Hence, it could be that there is, in this sense, 
something 'wrong*. If this is the case, the person is abnormals 
in this aspect of his functioning.
The maladjusted also fit the relativist argument. Certain forms of
child behaviour which are commonly termed maladjusted in this society
at present, may be quite acceptable in other societies or in this 
society at other periods of history. These behavioural forms are 
normals for such societies, although not for this one. It should be 
possible to discover whether these forms are the global norms. If 
they are, then it is this society which is abnormals.
However, many children are maladjusted because of paternal cruelty. 
They have tried to adjust to an impossible situation : perhaps the 
term should be 'maladministered1. In such situations, responses 
differ. One child, well-behaved at school, may run away from home 
because of conflict with parents; another child, unexceptionable at 
home, may behave in ways unacceptable to a particular school regime. 
This evidence supports the relativist case that given changed 
circumstances, the child will not behave differently from his fellows 
This would make the child normals, and his behaviour normals, as a
reaction to the abnormals circumstances.
Other types of handicap or special need fit the relativist pattern 
less easily, thus illustrating the fallacy of generalising from one 
handicap, that is maladjustment, to others. Thus the autistic child 
has a behaviour problem which would be obvious in any society. The 
severe difficulties in communication and formation of relationships of 
the autistic child need only to be compared with mild cases of 
maladjustment and educational subnormality to demonstrate the dangers 
of such generalisation. The autistic child is nowhere normals, and 
it would also be odd to call him normale, or normal111.
It must be remembered that many autistic, and severely mentally 
handicapped, children now survive who would formerly have died soon 
after birth. Thus despite educational advances, many teaching 
problems are now more acute than previously. The notion that past, or 
more primitive, societies must be kinder to their deviants does not
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bear examination. An English lunatic asylum held John Clare, who was 
not seen as normale or normal111, although his depression now looks 
normals in relation to his circumstances. In some societies, 
handicapped babies are exposed, or simply die without treatment. They 
are not normals, and are not considered normale or normal111.
Some people are abnormals in their society. The dyslexic cannot 
read easily, the blind cannot see, nor the deaf hear. These people 
are not normals in these respects, and it would be wrong to make 
certain normal*11 demands on them, such as asking a profoundly deaf 
man to sing in a choir, or a blind man to paint the wall. However, 
because there are aspects of statistical normality which they share 
with others, the extent to which they are to be called normale 
or normal111 becomes a moral question.
Adopting the principle of equity, it can be shown that there are 
considerable differences between people, and that it is as wrong to 
treat all the same as it is to discriminate on the wrong grounds. 
Regional accents or ethnic origin may be relevant differences to a 
casting director when choosing actors, but are not so in most 
occupations. Discrimination means firstly an informed and justified 
choice, to which the negative aspects are secondary.
It must be admitted that what is taken as a relevant difference can 
vary. A philosophically inclined Nazi, for example, could have 
claimed to follow Aristotle, since being a Jew, a gipsy, a handicapped 
person, or a homosexual, was seen as a relevant difference in the 
'Final Solution'. These may be relevant differences for some
contexts, but not for the kind of treatment given by the Nazis. The
aspects by which such people differed from normalitys were taken as 
having such overriding importance that they were classed as non-human. 
Such an approach has to be repudiated. The acknowledgement that all 
are human persons condemns this approach, and also allows people to be
called normale or normal111, even though they are, by certain
criteria, not normals.
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5.1 Concept of a person - Introduction.
The concept of a person, a traditional topic in philosophy of mind, 
has assumed an integral position in twentieth century analytical 
thought as developments in computing and robotics have led to a 
reassessment of the nature of intelligence, thought, and the self (1). 
The developments in medicine and surgery, of cloning, spare-part 
surgery, and abortion, have brought a resurgence of interest in 
ethics. This is currently extended by the evaluation of research on 
the early development of the human embryo, involving artificial 
conception and development in a test tube (2). All these topics seem 
to demand a re-evaluation of what it means to be a person or an 
individual. This has resulted in the coining of terms such as 
'potential persons' for embryos, 'former persons' for accident victims 
on life-support machines, and 'non-persons' for those born without 
mental capability.
There are two main areas where such arguments assume importance when 
assessing the possible status of handicapped people, who may often be 
seen as, and treated as, something inferior to others, perhaps as 
'near persons'. Firstly the challenge has to be met that a major 
traditional definition of 'a person', if taken at face value, implies 
that many severely mentally handicapped people are not persons. This 
point has been made by Singer- (3), in his arguments for animal rights, 
to prove that many people are not persons, whereas many non-people, 
i.e. animals, are persons. This argument affects both the status 
allowed and the treatment given to handicapped people, as well as to 
animals. By introducing the concept of the human being as special, 
rather than people/persons, the argument avoided.
Secondly, there is discussion on the likelihood and advisability of a 
handicapped person being allowed the status of adulthood when he 
reaches the appropriate chronological age. Many handicapped people 
complain that they are treated as children throughout their life. 
Adulthood is considered, in the main, to confer rights and freedoms : 
the obligations of adulthood are recognised less frequently.
With these two areas in mind, the first section of the Chapter
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evaluates the relationship between the concepts of persons and 
rationality in philosophical terms. The ethical problems involved in 
abortion, euthanasia, and other pertinent surgical interventions, are 
alluded to. In the second section, the idea of adulthood is expanded 
to show that, despite apparent differences, it is the same concept as 
citizenship. The concept is then used to show the possible role and 
status of both the handicapped child in school, and the handicapped 
adult in the wider community.
In conclusion, the three concepts of a person, a human, and an adult 
are used to evaluate the various, conflicting, arguments for 
differential treatment of handicapped people. The preferential claims 
of rights, in the sense of human rights, is compared to two other 
types of justifications, utilitarianism, and the need for compassion, 
altruism and charity. The advantages and disadvantages of each 
approach are assessed. It is shown that each has a part to play in 
contemporary thought, and, furthermore, that certain aspects of each 
may be reconciled.
The tenor of the conclusion reached in the chapter is that the concept 
of a human being is more important than that of a person. It is 
obvious that all conceived by human parents are also human, whether or 
not they should be clssified as persons. As humans, they demand a 
certain respect and status.
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5.1.1 Philosophical approaches to fa person’ and ’rationality’.
There have been many philosophical attempts to define the concept of a 
person, and attempts have continued to be made even since Wittgenstein 
issued his warning about looking for characteristic properties, 
essences, or necessary applications of a word,
"...its meaning lies in its use..." (4)
Most recent writing in the philosophy of mind has followed one of two 
approaches. That deriving from Descartes has given rise to a 
continuing speculation about the possible forms and manner of the 
relationship between mind and body (5). A trend resulting from this 
approach has been to attempt the reconciliation of the two, regarding 
persons as being special since they are both acting and thinking 
beings. This argument is evident in the work of Strawson, who 
analyses certain predicates as applicable to persons only, while 
others are applicable to all physical bodies.
"What we have to acknowledge....is the primitiveness of the 
concept of a person. What I mean by a concept of a person is 
the concept of a type of entity such that both predicates 
ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing 
corporeal characteristics, a physical situation etc. are 
equally applicable to a single individual of that single 
type." (6)
A second approach, deriving from Hume's attempt to eliminate the 
mind/body problem, has concentrated on what it means to describe an 
individual as the same person continuing through bodily and 
psychological change, with questions of memory, survival, personal 
identity, and hence personal moral responsibility, being paramount.
The two approaches are merged by contemporary discussion of the 
relationship between intelligence and human personality in the two 
aspects of our relationship with animals and our relationship or 
possible relationship with complicated machines which may be 
'intelligent' (7).
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Because of the history of the philosophy of mind, the important 
contemporary approach to ’intelligence* is linked to traditional 
arguments about ’rationality’. Wittgenstein's strictures on not 
looking for essences derives specifically from his criticism of 
Aristotle’s search for functions.
"Have the carpenter then, and the tanner, certain functions or 
activities, and has man none ? Is he born without a function ? 
Or as eye, hand, foot, and in general each of the parts, 
evidently has a function, may one lay it down that man 
similarly has a function apart from all these ? What then can 
this be ? ... Now if the function of man is an activity of soul 
which follows or implies a rational principle..." (8)
This has been paraphrased as 'man is a rational animal’. The 
reasoning abilities are held to be sufficient to separate man from the 
animals, with which man might be confused by the use of such 
descriptors as ’long-lived', 'self-movement’, or 'tool-using'. 
Furthermore, any attempt to define rationality and hence 'being a 
person’ in terms of evaluating, inferring, and communicating ideas, 
runs into the question whether man is the the only rational animal in 
any of these senses. Many of the higher animals have an ability to 
reason, and to work out quite abstract problems in ways far more 
intelligent than the conditioning which is available for rats or 
pigeons and which has been applied to humans by Skinner and his 
followers (9).
Dolphins have the ability to communicate with each other and teach 
each other simple concepts. Singer bases some of his argument for 
animal liberation on the extreme intelligence and complex social life 
of pigs (10). Singer holds that we are guilty of the crime of 
speciesism, which is comparable to racism, when we treat only other 
humans as people. This goes far beyond veganism, the refusal to use 
animal products, to discuss the detailed rights of animals as persons, 
to be treated far beyond the boundaries of our convenience.
Dr.Johnson criticised bear-baiting for the effect it had on the human 
spectator. Singer would be concerned with the individual worth of the 
bear, which he would equate with any human. Singer regards not all 
humans as persons, and not all persons as humans. Thus research on 
animal psychology and behaviour can be used to show that rationality,
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being, and that the meaning of 'the rational being' may not be 
concomitant with the meaning of 'the person'. Language, another 
possible candidate for a special function of man is discussed in 
Chapter 7. Suffice it to say here that there are animals with well 
developed forms of communications. Chimpanzees have ostensibly learnt 
American Sign Language, but the conclusions to be drawn from this are 
both varied and variable.
In discussing the differences between objects, species, and persons, 
there are various distinctions to be made. The first is between a 
sentient being, and a non-sentient object. That is of being alive or 
being incapable of life. A living thing grows, changes, reproduces, 
and develops. A non-living thing only decays, and can only be altered 
by the actions of other bodies around it, for example by erosion or 
oxidation, or by the interference of a living thing, particularly by 
human interference. The next distinction is between those living 
things which can feel pain, and those which can not. Here man is in a 
similar category to the rest of the animal kingdom. Plants are living 
things, but do not feel pain as we understand it. We should probably 
behave differently in our gardens if it were true, that plants give 
out electrical impulses comparable to our pains, when pruned or 
otherwise cut or mutilated. We should certainly behave differently if 
they displayed obvious signs of pain, moving or making a noise. 
Commonly, some very severely handicapped people are thought of as 
'vegetables', in that they are incapable of self-movement. This is 
not an appropriate term, however, if they feel pain.
These ideas of difference and individuation can be represented 
diagrammatically (Figure 6a)(p.108). Preserving the term rational for 
man suggests the final distinction shown in Figure 6b, while by 
contrast, Singer's work suggests an alternative final stage shown in 
Figure 6c, for he conflates persons with rationality.
This raises several difficulties, the first of which is the meaning of 
rationality or intelligence. One might ask how rational or 
intelligent does a being have to be before being counted as a person. 
Perhaps the ability to perform calculations in formal logic or 
mathematics should be the criterion, or the possession of basic 
reasoning powers, or the conducting of one's life in a 'more or less'
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Figure 6a.
alive not alive
(beings) (objects)
feeling pain not feeling pain
(animals) (plants)
Figure 6b.
feeling pain 
(animals)
rational
(man)
not rational 
(others)
Figure 6c.
feeling pain
(animals)
persons 
(most humans, pigs, 
dolphins, etc.)
non-persons 
(some humans, 
worms, etc.)
Figure 6. Differentiation and individuation
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logical and sensible manner. By any of these definitions, many adults 
are irrational for much of the time, frequently acting on impulse or 
whim, while most children, all babies, and some mentally handicapped 
adults are also disqualified by such definitions, as Singer claims. 
Although these definitions do not allow these classes to be called 
persons, they obviously are such.
Even if babies and children are allowed as potentially rational, and 
hence potentially people, confusion results. For what if the child 
should later suffer some form of brain damage, so that the potential 
is never fulfilled ? This is not the same as, for example, a glass 
bottle being broken, that is fulfilling its potential to break, since 
the broken glass can be melted down for re-use. The child’s potential 
is of a kind that must be realised to be said to exist. Childhood is, 
by definition, only a stage in a person’s life.
A more radical criticism would be presented by the consideration of 
different criteria of rationality, as suggested by anthropological 
literature (11). There are the different ways of reasoning envisaged 
by Aristotle, the many-valued logics of the west which challenge his 
true/false dichotomy, and the different types of proof in Africa, 
which while dismissable as irrational, can be shown to have their own 
internal logic (12).
One answer to Singer is that speciesism is necessary, a logical 
approach to individual differences. Speciesism is not like sexism or 
racism in being wrongly discriminatory or irrational. Rather, it 
marks an essential difference, namely that some beings are human and 
some are not, and is therefore highly rational. This is irrespective 
of their intelligence or language skills. This means, for example, 
that a human baby has a greater moral value than an adult pig, or a 
baby calf. We react differently to a horse with a broken leg and a 
child with a broken leg. A dog with cancer is destroyed, but an adult 
helped to live with his illness, and then face death through the 
’hospice' movement. When an anacephalic baby is dying in hospital, it 
is given care and attention, not just to placate the parents, but 
because it is a human child.
It might appear that there is a moral choice here. This is to take 
all and only those born of women, and decide which to treat as
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persons. The real decision is, however, forced upon us. All are 
humans just from their human conception. The moral choice is how to 
treat those so conceived, and what status to allow them. It is a 
central point of the 1984 Warnock Report that the human foetus is 
special (13). Is it better to help each individual survive, even if 
severely handicapped, or should some be allowed to die ? All are 
humans, however handicapped, although it must be recognised that not 
all may become full citizens and adults.
Following from this initial definition, the leading question is about 
appropriate treatment and ideals. It is possible to ignore or deny 
personhood, as the Nazis did, and to dispose of the handicapped on the 
grounds of the expense of maintaining a burden. This is to treat 
persons as ciphers, or as equipment for the operation of the state. 
Similarly, it could be decided that the adequate education of 
handicapped people was too costly in view of other priorities.
By comparison, the English state education system has been developed 
since 1944 on the basis of education of each as is
"...suitable to his age, ability and aptitude..." (14)
This has been interpreted in very different ways, the 1981 Act adding 
statements about ’special needs’, but the ideal is left intact. In 
recent years, the aim has been that education or schooling should deal 
with the individual as he is, to help him develop along his chosen 
lines in the best possible way. This approach opposes that of 
education as a given body of knowledge and doctrines to be passively 
imbibed whatever the pupil's interests or abilities. Thus the modern 
system tries to ensure that, as a matter of respect and concern, each 
shall count for one, and none shall count for more than one.
However some may need to count for more than one in terms of the 
necessary financial provision. The philosophy of special education 
has of necessity been a quasi-Aristotelian notion of relevant 
differences between children, allied to a respect for personal worth.
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5.1.2 Treating ’as a person’.
The recommendation to treat someone as a person has its own problems. 
It is a difficult plea to understand, since all people are treated 
differently. The necessary parameters differ from those used in the 
understanding of a person's role, where it is unreasonable to expect 
the plumber to rewire the house, or the electrician to deliver milk in 
the morning. The doctor is not expected to direct traffic, nor the 
constable to prescribe pills.
Yet even for people with specific roles towards an individual, there 
are further difficulties. What does it mean to treat someone as one's 
father ? Presumably there are certain expectations in any society.
The father may be someone who is respected, or treated as an authority 
figure, or looked after when ill. Similarly, there are many ways of 
being a mother. Central to twentieth-century English culture is the 
belief that the mother has charge of her children unless the process 
of law has decided otherwise. Thus the mother may call her children 
in from the street, choose their food, and guide their actions in a 
way that she has no right to do for others’ children unless in loco 
parentis as a nanny, minder, or baby-sitter. There is little which is 
vital to the idea of motherhood, apart from the biological fact of
bearing the child, and even that does not apply in the case of
adoptive parents.
Accepting this, there are two misconceptions which elicit the response 
’the disabled are people'. Firstly, the individual is a case, an 
interesting specimen.
"Anyone who works with an articulatory case soon recognizes that 
the case seems to have difficulty in detecting, locating, or 
understanding the nature of his errors. This seems to be true 
even when the case has completely normal hearing. Like some
aphasics, the case seems to find it hard to realize that his
utterance includes deviant sounds." (15)
This is an inappropriate attitude rather than a misconception, and is 
most frequently encountered amongst those professionals dealing with
109
the handicapped, or even with those able-bodied persons temporarily in 
their care, as anyone who has been in hospital will aver. This is 
treating the disabled person as a non-person, whereas, secondly, and 
more commonly among the general public, is the misconception of not 
treating the disabled person as responsible, of treating him as a 
child rather than an adult, or of treating him as possessing some 
handicap other than that which is actually relevant.
These two misconceptions are deleterious. When an individual is seen 
as a case, his needs may be subordinated to the analysis of his 
handicap or disability. This is one reason for Warnock's insistence 
on jettisoning the system of formal categorization, although it may be 
considered that the professional attitude, although inappropriate, is 
less damaging, because it occurs less frequently, and is applied 
indiscriminately, than the misconceptions of the general public, which 
may well in addition become stigmatising. When a responsible adult is 
treated as a child, his freedom is restricted, leading to frustration, 
and the feeling that he is being stigmatised.
Yet, in some cases, such treatment may seem to be appropriate, as when 
someone of adult years has a child’s lack of understanding of cause 
and effect. However, even in these cases, there are those who claim 
that even the most severely handicapped |adults have the right to make 
their mistakes and decisions, and to learn or not from their errors. 
Paternalism and 'ends and means’ will be discussed more fully in 
Chapter 8. Suffice it to say here that assigning responsibility in 
deciding what is best for an individual, and deciding whether there is 
more value in the individual making his own, perhaps unfortunate, 
decision or having that decision made for him, can both cause 
difficulties.
Treating someone as possessing a different handicap leads to other 
problems, as has been discussed above (pp.57 et seq.), since social, 
educational, and medical treatment must all be appropriate if any real 
meaning is to be given to the concept of needs.
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5.2 The concept of an adult - Introduction.
In extreme cases, handicapping conditions, by their very nature, can 
preclude a meaningful exercise of civil liberties and affect personal 
relationships. For many of these, comparison with a child, a 
non-responsible being with certain rights and obvious limitations, may 
be acceptable. For others, a more appropriate comparison is with 
young people, with more rights and fewer limitations. Thus, at the 
summit of the comparison is the adult, rather than the person.
Schrag has satirised the treatment of children in his fable of the 
Namuh and the Nerdlihc, in which a dominant tribe mistreats a 
dependent one (16). This demonstrates that childhood can be defined 
by two different approaches. The adult, considering the legal 
position of children, regards the laws as a protection for the 
innocence, physical weakness, and inexperience of minors. 
Alternatively, the same laws can be regarded as restrictive, and 
overdue for reform. Proponents of children's rights seek powers for 
children which may result in damaging that which others believe 
defends the children's well-being.
For an able-bodied person, childhood is a stage in development, 
leading to the freedom of adulthood. The handicapped person may wish 
to be able to enjoy the same development from childhood through 
adolescence or youth, to adulthood; a development which is sometimes 
denied him. This development encompasses the chance of further 
education or employment in late adolescence, the possibility of 
relationships with the opposite sex, and the independence of choice in 
spending one’s leisure time. The institutional life of the severely 
handicapped militates against this development. For those in such 
institutions, there is not only the wish for rights and civil 
liberties of voting, marriage, procreation, and independent living, 
but also the desire for control of the petty decisions of diet, 
clothing and friendship which mean freedom more than the major items, 
which even for the able-bodied are so often governed by circumstance. 
Indicatively, they are also commonly referred to by the staff as 
'boys' and 'girls', although this is now occasionally replaced by 
'clients'.
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adults who have duties towards him. Restrictions on earnings, the 
hours and types of employment, sexual intercourse, and access to 
pornography, were all designed to protect the exploitation of 
children, and reduce the psychological and physiological damage to 
them.
It might appear that childhood and adulthood are definable only in 
terms of each other or of citizenship, that a child is someone who is 
not an adult, or that an adult is a full citizen and a child is not. 
However this simplification covers the fact that children are allowed 
to develop gradually, and are given more responsibility as they 
mature. The youth of fifteen is permitted greater freedoms by his 
parents and his school than his brother of seven. Despite much 
criticism of the legalities of the age of majority in Britain, the 
different ages at which marriage, consumption of alcohol, or the power 
to vote, are permitted do mark, albeit in an illogical fashion, the 
fact that the process of maturation is a gradual one. Furthermore, it 
suggests that there is a need for a concept of an adolescent or a 
young person, who can be given some responsibility such as withdrawal 
of funds from a personal account, which lies between the child and the 
adult.
Discounting the minor differences between men and women in the field 
of employment, which, like the restrictions on child employment, 
reflect a protection against the exploitation of the past, the adult 
in our society is allowed freedom within the law in choice of spouse, 
employment, and leisure activities, although being allowed these 
freedoms is not the same as being ensured such freedoms. Indeed what 
appears to a child as a freedom is in reality restricted by financial 
and social pressure rather than by the directive of the law as is the 
case under the anti-miscegenation laws of South Africa. Furthermore, 
all freedoms and legal rights carry consequent duties.
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5.2.1 Adulthood and citizenship.
It may be argued that adulthood and citizenship are the same thing. 
Certainly, in our society, they are for most of the time, and although 
citizenship may be a dated concept, it has no real replacement. In 
many primitive societies, where adulthood is linked to puberty, the 
ceremonies making the adolescent a full member of the tribe are 
inextricably linked with the sexual maturation of the individual.
This closeness is not reflected in our society, where citizenship is 
based on certain legal rights and duties, which are granted when the 
individual reaches a given age, irrespective of his maturity, either 
physical or emotional. Indeed, sexual maturation normally occurs 
rather earlier than the attainment of any of the rights of a citizen. 
The mismatch which this produces may be exacerbated in cross-cultural 
situations by differences in the approximation between maturation and 
attainment of citizenship.
Even if it could be established that adulthood and citizenship were 
related to maturation, they would still not be the same thing, since 
there are those who, although adult, are denied their citizenship. 
Prisoners have forfeited their citizenship by their offence against 
society. Their rights are circumscribed by their imprisonment, 
although other special rights are bestowed on them. Long-stay 
patients in psychiatric hospitals are, to a certain extent, in a 
similar position. Certainly, Laing and Szasz both describe such 
illnesses as a social problem, rather than a medical one, requiring 
punishment rather than cure. Both prisoners and patients can thus be 
non-citizens, if the period of their imprisonment or hospitalisation 
is temporary, or former citizens, if it is permanent. Additionally, 
some immigrants may be future citizens, although, despite being 
adults, they are not at present citizens of the country they are 
entering.
Furthermore, citizenship can, in some measure, be granted by one 
citizen to another. Just as a parent acts for his child, so the 
possesor of a power of attorney acts for, and as, the person who has 
made the grant. Power of attorney is normally adopted in cases of 
senility, but ’Advocacy Alliance' (17) has a more general application
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never obtain their citizenship in its entirety. The adoption of some 
rights of citizenship by another enables the patient to progress 
towards full citizenship.
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5.2.2 Entitlement, citizenship and rights.
There are a number of possible attitudes to entitlement, that is 
towards the grounds on which special treatment should be given to 
handicapped people, or indeed any group held to be in need. Those 
discussed here, with one exception, are based on the acceptance of the 
common humanity of the other person, and of his fellow membership of 
the society.
The exception is utilitarianism, which can hold that on prudential 
grounds, resources expended on the initial education for the 
independence of an individual will reduce the final cost of his 
support by the state. The individual may even become economically 
productive, and hence cease to be a drain on the state. Such a bald 
statement of the argument may be qualified by the assertion that this 
attitude will also be to the individual's best interest, allowing him 
to develop as an individual. This goes well beyond utilitarianism.
On more humanitarian grounds, Mary Warnock, in her own writings, 
argues for compassion as the correct attitude (18). This is similar 
to the type of altruism described by Aspin (19). Mary Warnock 
criticises a third attitude, that is the provision of special 
treatment on the grounds of equality, since differences between people 
are often too great to allow for compensation. The argument for 
compensation to achieve equality is, however, frequently given as a 
reason for expending additional resources on the education of deprived 
or handicapped groups (20). It is sometimes separate from, and 
sometimes linked to a fourth attitude. This holds that there are 
certain definite and circumscribed rights which exist for all, whether 
handicapped or able-bodied.
The utilitarian attitude seems valid, although inadequate. That is, 
it does seem prudential to lessen final dependence. However, the view 
of individuals merely as numbers, either currently productive or not, 
is not a view of society which many would wish to hold, since it 
ignores all notions of the possible worth of the individuals 
themselves. When extended beyond economics to educational or social 
discussion, the argument is that independence, both financial and
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society. It involves self-satisfaction. Since the independence and 
freedom of choice to be achieved by utilitarianism are often regarded 
as rights by those holding the fourth attitude, it can be seen that 
the four attitudes involve a considerable degree of interdependence. 
Utilitarianism, on its own, is not enough, but allied to one or more 
of the other attitudes, it provides a valuable perspective on 
entitlement.
Aspin bases his attitude of altruism on the understanding of the 
handicapped individual as being like oneself (21), a possible member 
of one's own family, a view also held by Segal :
"Those of us who find it hard to identify ourselves with 
unfortunate children or their parents, might like to conjecture 
that in the history of each of our families, some children have 
been handicapped. Similarly, if future history emulates the 
past, each of us will be ancestor at some time to a handicapped 
child." (22)
This is like the older meaning of compassion and humanity, used by 
Mary Warnock, of not just being externally sorry for the individual, 
but suffering with that person, and sharing their pain and sorrow.
The two ideas are linked in that they both arise from the concept of 
an ill or handicapped person as a fellow human being with needs and 
difficulties, rather than as an abstract 'case'. Mary Warnock also 
links her attitude to the notion of justice, since all human persons
are of equal worth and have an equal need of consideration for
themselves.
"If we are humane, we will recognise a duty to improve the lot
of all human beings, and particularly those who are most
helpless." (23)
In discussion on this matter, Mary Warnock offers a critique of those 
who adopt the attitude of numerical equality. Her argument is that 
although attempts at compensation are well meant, and are often 
helpful in the case of children with minor disabilities, no amount of 
additional education can make a mentally handicapped child equal in 
attainment to an academically gifted child. However, the approach
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way may provide the best outcome for both of them, and seems just.
Mary Warnock quotes Tawney with approval as the 'voice of 
paternalism', to show that
"...it is these needs which a nation ought to satisfy, as a good 
parent will seek to satisfy them for his family." (24)
One of the reasons given by those holding the rights attitude is 
dissatisfaction with the previous arguments. These appear to be 
founded on a form of social discrimination between the dependent and 
those who help them, which persists however good the latter's motives 
are. Compassion and altruism are thus to be denigrated, as are 
paternalism and charity, as involving an outmoded social relationship 
of subservience for the handicapped and inflation of importance for 
the able-bodied. Charity is seen as the 'normal' condescending to the 
'abnormal', who are intrinsically less valuable. Moreover, charity is 
seen as personal, and thus subject to whim. Rights, by contrast, are 
held to be timeless, despite the possibility of legal rights being 
lost, or altered, by a change in government or a change in economic 
circumstances. Rights confer the status of a full citizen, an adult 
with a positive role to play in society. Rights are not only held by 
all citizens, irrespective of personal circumstance, but themselves 
confer status. It is held that these claims of rights should thus be
paraphrased as demands for treatment as a full citizen of the
particular society. The Warnock Report thus claims, as a culmination 
to its first chapter,
"Those who work with children with special educational needs 
should regard themselves as having a crucial and developing 
role in a society which is now committed, not merely to
tending and caring for its handicapped members, as a matter of
charity, but of educating them, as a matter of right, and to 
develop their potential to the full." (25)
Any extensions to the legal rights and duties of such citizenship can 
henceforward be made through the due process of law.
However, a life based on entitlement through rights might prove to be 
very much harsher for a handicapped person than one based on altruism.
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There is also the problem of persons being ends rather than means, and 
the problem of making one1s own mistakes, particularly if others can 
see a better choice, when there may be a conflict between a person’s 
needs and his freedom if he believes his needs to be other than that 
they really are. Given the claim for treatment as a full citizen, it 
is difficult to preserve good arguments for the need for preferential 
treatment. Indeed, if parity of esteem is only to be achieved by full 
citizenship, it may be impossible, since the rights of citizenship 
bring also obligations. These obligations may be unfulfillable by a 
severely handicapped person.
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5.3 Rights - human and legal
Popular discussion of rights often confuses what are called human 
rights with the particular legal rights of any particular society. 
Looking at other countries where there are fewer freedoms than in 
Britain, it is declared that the rights of the people are abused by 
their legal system. A distinction is thereby drawn between the legal 
rights that are actually allowed to the citizens of those countries, 
and those rights which, being part of the legal system here, are 
believed so desirable that they should be allowed everywhere. These 
last are human rights.
Most arguments about rights in this country, with the notable 
exception of animal rights, are about legal rights and the 
interpretation of the statutes. Attempts have been made, for example, 
to prove that there is a right to both nursery and adult education. 
These are based on variant readings of the 1944 Education Act.
Since the 1981 Act, parents have had extended their legal rights in 
respect of handicapped children, although the children have no such 
rights themselves.
Human rights are held by their proponents to override legal rights, 
and the existence of the European Court of Justice has enabled suitors 
to reverse the argument given above to state that given legal rights 
in other European countries are so desirable that they should be 
allowed here. Thus corporal punishment, regarded by many British 
schools and local authorities as a necessary sanction, is held in 
other countries to be an infringement of both the parents’ human 
rights and the child's. This view is supported by the European Court, 
and thus a legal right in another country, claimed by some as a human 
right here, becomes a legal right in this country.
It could be argued that the concept of human rights should be 
conflated with the concept of legal rights. However, it is an 
extremely important concept and particularly for the treatment of 
handicapped people, since it has been claimed that handicapped people, 
as humans, have human rights to better treatment, even where this is 
not currently accepted under the law. Thus legal rights are
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extended to underprivileged members of one’s own or other societies. 
Claims for human rights are really claims for a changed type of 
society. When studying other societies, the claimants are demanding 
that a society similar to, or idealised from, their own be adopted. 
When studying those on the fringe of their own society, the claimants' 
demand is for an extension of existing legal rights.
That there are differences between human and legal rights may be shown 
by a consideration of the situation after a total nuclear war. This 
would bring an end to all legal rights and systems, leaving a 
desperate fight for personal survival. The outcome might be the 
gradual evolution of a very different set of legal rights from those 
of present day Britain.
Some of the legal rights in this country are built upon a lack of 
legal rights in other countries. Thus the British housewife has the 
legal right to buy any coffee on the market, even though by buying the 
cheapest, she may be aquiescing in the exploitation of the producers. 
The housewife may feel morally bound not to use her right, or the 
government may feel bound to restrict her right, to bring pressure on 
the other country to provide the legal right for reasonable working 
conditions or pay, since the plantation workers are held to have a 
human right to a decent standard of life. This also shows the 
interrelation of human and legal rights.
There are occasions when legal rights conflict with other perceived 
needs of the society. Thus, in time of war, press freedom and the 
legal right to information may need to be restricted on operational 
grounds. Thus, even the most simplistic view of history shows that 
human rights cannot be, as their proponents would have them be, set 
ideals which are necessary for all time.
Any discussion of rights presumes a desired form of society. Thus 
discussion of rights for the handicapped should mean the extension of 
the legal rights to those who have not previously been allowed to act 
as citizens. However, rights for a person involve him in duties or 
obligations. First among these is the duty to live so as to preserve 
the similar rights of fellow men, and to help them to enjoy their 
rights. Rights, like freedom, are limited by the necessity of social
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animals cannot live a social life with us, and cannot be described as 
possessing rights which must be respected by men, since they have no 
conceivable obligation towards men. Man does have duties and 
obligations in his treatment of animals, which arise from his right to 
keep animals. Thus if the animals are pets, man has assumed the 
responsibility of caring, in return for the pleasure of their company; 
if the animals are to be used in laboratory experiments, since man 
benefits from the experiments, he has a duty to cause as little pain 
as possible, and not to research on frivolous or unimportant topics; 
if the animals are bred for food, the benefit to man and the fact that 
they would not exist were it not for human intervention, again gives 
man the responsibility to treat them sensibly and without cruelty; if 
the animals are wild, man still has a responsibility not to be cruel 
or prodigal with resources shared by man and animals. It is not 
always clear whether conservationists' arguments are given as being 
about survival for the animals1 own sake, or because such survival 
ensures a richer or more varied world for mankind.
Similarly, the foetus has no rights enshrined in a legal sense, yet 
adults have certain obligations towards any particular foetus whether 
as parents or doctors. However, it does not follow that, if the 
foetus has no rights, abortion is permissable; other arguments must be 
considered. The mother herself has legal rights to an acceptable 
level of care by the doctor, midwife, and other medical staff which 
protects the developing foetus and neonate. Both parents share a 
special position towards the unborn child.
Once born, a child is a legal person with certain legal entitlements, 
having a name, an address, and a National Health Number long before he 
is a full citizen. A baby has rights, although only his parents, or 
those in loco parentis, can defend them for him. Developing into 
adulthood, he assumes the obligations inherent in those legal rights. 
Part of the process of maturation is learning the parameters of one’s 
own freedom, and that other people have needs and hurts like one's 
own. Becoming an adult is a gradual process. There are various 
official landmarks, as particular rights and duties are assumed, and 
for most people, general understanding and development also progress 
with age. A full citizen is the result, but there is no reason why 
some people should not take longer to reach a level of understanding
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citizenship were to be based on maturity rather than age, the problem 
of who should decide when a person is 'ready' would arise.
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5,3.1 Protecting and ensuring rights.
It is useful to examine a list of rights typically claimed for the
disabled or handicapped. The list below is compiled from various
sources to give the fullest possible range.
The handicapped person has a right to :
1 Prevention of disability
2 Health service and medical care
3 Education to the fullest extent of which intellectually
capable provided in the regular channels of education
4 Training - vocational and avocational
5 Work
6 An income
7 Live how and where chosen
8 Barrier free public transport
9 Function independently
10 Petition social institutions as a citizen
11 A sex-life, marriage, and children
12 Privacy
Some of these rights are already allowed as specific legal rights to 
all in Great Britain, whether handicapped or not. Some are part of 
the normal expectation of the able-bodied, although are not legal 
rights. All have been claimed as human rights for which legislative 
provision should be made so that they become legal rights, although 
this might appear utopian in many cases.
Any discussion of such a list must show the difference between
allowing someone the right to something, and ensuring that he gets it. 
The 'right to work' provides one example of this difference, while 
another is the 'right' to a sex-life. In one sense, all members of 
society in this country over the age of sixteen have a right to a
sex-life, since there is no law against it as there is for those under
the age of consent. However, this is an odd sort of right. Nothing 
in the law can ensure that an individual finds a partner, nor having 
found one that he or she will provide a satisfactory sex-life beyond 
the limited demands of conjugal rights. This argument is also valid
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these things, they only have the right that no-one may prevent them 
from marriage (assuming it is not bigamous, or within the bounds of 
consanguinity), or having sexually intercourse (again within certain 
legally prescribed limits), or children, if they can find a suitable 
partner. The right to non-interference by the state may be considered 
to be a human right, which is allowed as a legal right, within certain 
limits, in Great Britain. In otheiT countries the limitations that the 
legal right makes on the human right are different, so that for 
example, 'miscegenation' is not permitted in South Africa,
As to the encouragement of such relationships among the mentally 
handicapped or psychiatrically ill, there are valid arguments on both 
sides. Many mentally handicapped people are regarded as less than 
adult in this respect, or even as a threat to the community. There 
are obvious difficulties over contraception and sterilisation, and 
whether these should be arranged without the consent of the patient, 
even when the patient is unable to give, or understand, such consent. 
There are few eugenic reasons for refusing the 'right' of handicapped 
people to bear children, since the correlation between handicapped 
parents and handicapped children is very low (26). Furthermore, it 
may be argued that since many able-bodied parents prove quite 
incapable of bringing up children, the grounds of unsuitability for 
the responsibilities of parenthood cannot be used either. The 
contrary arguments can easily be appreciated, and although it is true 
that the children of unsuitable (whether handicapped or able-bodied) 
parents are often taken into care, the argument that this leads to 
more children being available for fostering or adoption hardly seems 
adequate.
There are however some illnesses and handicaps which are genetically 
transmitted. Genetic counselling is normally available, but the 
decision usually has still to be faced whether or not to attempt to 
conceive, knowing that the outcome may well be a handicapped child.
The gene may be recessive in the prospective parents, for example in 
muscular dystrophy, cystic fibrosis, or haemophilia. In these 
instances there may be eugenic reasons for certain people not to 
produce, and it can be argued that they should not be allowed to do so 
on the grounds of preventing the birth of a handicapped child. This 
seems unthinkable in a society that is less than totalitarian, but
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may well be the outcome of promoting abortion and euthanasia.
Discussion of rights, whether general or particular, tends to founder 
on this difference between ensuring and protecting. This is certainly 
so for legal rights. Indeed, although there is, in this country, the 
right to a fair trial, there is no right to be found innocent. It may 
be that a claim for a human right is really a claim that a particular 
protected legal right should also be ensured. Even in practical 
terms it can be seen that for most of the cases listed on p.123, this 
would be impossible.
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5.4 Conclusion.
There are elements from the various approaches to the 'concept of a 
person' which are reconcileable in the light of the idea of a human 
being per se deserving special care and respect, whatever his 
abilities or failings. The utilitarian view that the course of action 
be chosen for its financial soundness may be helpful if it is 
interpreted as spending on education to ensure an increased future 
independence. If, however, the choice were interpreted as being 
between minding the handicapped and compulsory euthanasia, which might 
well cost less, the utilitarian view would find less ready acceptance. 
Utilitarianism is only acceptable when it comes to certain 
conclusions. In this example that conclusion is to provide 
independence, which is seen as a good desired by all.
Dependence, when wanted or needed, is also desirable. Indeed, the 
desired end for all is to have as normal a life as possible, and as a 
matter of altruism for other humans to have this too. The difficulty 
for the handicapped is that they may not be regarded as completely 
human, and thus not having interests, hobbies, the desire for fun and 
friendship, and responsibilities. The handicapped may be regarded as 
pets, in the same way that some children are treated as appendages, 
rather than as individuals in their own right. The approaches of 
altruism and compassion emphasise the need to look beyond mere rights 
to the needs of the person, which may be extraordinary rather than 
normal. Furthermore, regarding people as humans with a moral career 
links these approaches to the idea of a moral view of rights.
This chapter has sought to establish that all those who are conceived 
of human parents demand special care and attention, just because they 
are human. This form of speciesism is both physiologically and 
psychologically necessary, and also morally right. Only in some 
rather extended senses is it possible to regard animals as people; 
they are certainly not human. Humans are special, and this is why 
proposals for cross-breeding people and animals to provide workers 
would be viewed with horror. Being a human demands that the 
individual is treated as an end in himself, rather than as a means to 
another's ends.
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interdependent, and that arguments for human rights are actually moral 
statements about the sort of society desired by their proponent. In 
this chapter it is held that all humans have a right to a basic 
decency of treatment, purely because they are humans, and human rights 
for the handicapped are those rights which they ought to possess as 
human beings, as should all.
Part of this decency of treatment to be given to all humans should be 
to ensure that they develop their abilities as far as is possible, 
even if this demands extra provision. Most handicapped people should 
be enabled to live the normal life of a citizen, with full legal 
rights and obligations, and not as second-class citizens or 
non-humans. (Conversely, animals cannot fulfil the legal rights and 
obligations of citizenship, and cannot be considered as persons.)
There is a limited number of people, however, who will never be able 
to fully achieve this status. These will largely be either severely 
mentally ill, or severely mentally handicapped. They should be 
assisted, through education, to take on the dignity of advancing as 
far as possible towards citizenship,and to accept those legal rights 
which they are able to use. Through their families, or through 
Advocacy Alliance, they may gain their full legal rights.
The possession of legal rights shows that a person is a full member of 
a particular society, whereas the possession of human rights shows 
that the person is a full member of the human race. The availability 
of human rights, however, is determined by practical considerations 
which are applicable to the whole of humankind, rather than to the 
ability of a particular human being to use or understand them.
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PART III
THE HANDICAPPED PERSON IN EDUCATION
Chapter 6 
Education - a contested concept
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6.1 Education - a contested concept : Introduction
6.2 What is education ? - the traditional approach
6.3 What is education ? - the emotive approach
6.4 What is educational ? - a new approach
131
6.1 Education - a contested concept : Introduction.
"While there are good grounds for devoting a larger proportion 
of a nation’s resources to the rehabilitation of a mentally, or 
a physically handicapped child, this is not, properly speaking, 
education." (1)
This statement is made by Gribble, who takes a particular view of 
education as essentially academic because of the influence of Peters. 
Gribble goes on to assert that the teaching of literacy skills, basic 
reading, and writing, are not truly educational activities, since the 
skills have no intrinsic value. This may be contrasted with the 
following quotation from Segal :
"It is increasingly recognised that some handicapped children - 
including some who have been left out of our school system - 
could be educated if given special facilities, special methods, 
more teacher time, and a special curriculum." (2)
Segal and Gribble hold clearly opposing views as to the nature and 
value of education for the handicapped. Gribble’s view contradicts 
that of most teachers, particularly those in the primary sector. They 
see the teaching of even such basic skills as recognising letter 
sounds as a very important educational activity, and would similarly 
view the many comparable tasks in special education, such as speech or 
language training for the deaf, or braille instruction for the blind. 
All teachers would acknowledge that time is spent on peripheral, 
non-educational tasks, like taking registers, but Gribble must be 
shown to reject too much. Sharpening pencils and hearing reading 
practice are different in essence. Indeed, it is also arguable how 
much administration is integral to Gribble's concept of education.
As has been said, Gribble*s attitude is based on his interpretation of 
Peters' work, that to be educational, activities must be intrinsically 
worthwhile or valuable and involve knowledge. Since literacy skills, 
runs Gribble's argument, have an instrumental value in leading to 
information or pleasure and in furthering knowledge and academic 
ability, they cannot be intrinsically worthwhile. Thus, in addition
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to assessing Gribble's work, it is also necessary to discuss that of 
Peters, to establish whether the interpretation is fair, and to 
discover how apparently extreme statements, such as the first 
quotation on p. 132, came to be made. This is important, since 
similar dismissive statements could presumably be made about the 
teaching of basic mathematics, or logical skills.
The influential analyses made by the Peters school can be contrasted 
with Segal's work, and with the wider view taken by the Warnock 
Report, which has developed from Segal. It is here concluded that the 
educational theory underpinning the Warnock Report best represents the 
contemporary attitude to the school's place in a child's upbringing, 
although the theory is not as different from that of Peters as it 
first appears, since both Warnock and Segal value academic success, 
and hope to extend it to the many children who could achieve more.
Gribble offers a far too simplistic interpretation of Peters, and his 
use of the term rehabilitation for work with handicapped children can 
be speedily rejected, as this is plainly an incorrect use of the term. 
Habilitation, although unusual in English useage, is the more 
appropriate term. Rehabilitation refers to the giving back, or 
restoration, of skills that have been lost for some reason. Thus it 
would be possible to rehabilitate a child who had lost a hand in an 
accident by teaching him to write with the other. Similarly, a stroke 
victim could be partially rehabilitated by being taught to speak, 
read, or dress himself again. Attempts are made to rehabilitate 
ex-convicts or former psychiatric patients on their return to the 
community. They are helped to readjust to the demands of freedom and 
responsibility.
Children who are physically handicapped because they have been damaged 
in an accident subsequent to their acquiring a particular skill, and 
those who have been brain-damaged, with this damage affecting a skill, 
may be rehabilitated in respect of that particular skill. However, 
for a mentally or physically handicapped child who has never acquired 
that particular skill, the difficulties and the description must be 
different. Gribble uses the term rehabilitate because he needs to 
reserve the term education for something he regards as more important, 
namely academic education.
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It is not certain whether habilitation, which Gribble calls 
rehabilitation, includes all school-based tasks with handicapped 
children, or only the specifically non-academic. That is, is Gribble 
defining all work with the handicapped as non-educational ? If he is, 
then he is plainly in error, since many handicapped children, even in 
the traditional classification, manage to achieve high academic 
levels. This is particularly true of physically handicapped children. 
In Warnock's wider notion of special educational needs, many of the 
children will have some strictly academic achievements, even though 
they may be from the small group requiring special placement.
If, on the other hand, Gribble is rejecting only that part of the 
schooling that is not academic, his position is still debateable.
Many would consider that this non-academic part of schooling should be 
dignified by the term education, and that Gribble's and Peter's 
concepts are far too narrow.
Bridging this gap may be achieved by different approaches. The first 
of these is to ask - What then is the teaching of the handicapped, if 
it is not education ? There are three alternative answers to be 
considered. Firstly, it is not education, but health care. In 
organisational terms, at least some of it was until 1971, when 
responsibility for the education of children in mental hospitals was 
transferred from the Department of Health to that of Education. At 
the time, this was thought to be appropriate because of advances in 
teaching techniques as well as greater understanding of the potentials 
of individuals, and consequently, of enhanced expectations of the 
value of teaching for the handicapped individual. Secondly, the 
teaching of the handicapped can be held to be minding. This supposes 
no real intervention, and is seen as having a lower value than 
education, and a lower value even than the third possible answer, that 
the intervention is training. It has to be admitted that some of the 
work done with the 2% of children who are to be recorded, in Warnock’s 
terms, and particularly with those who have mental handicaps, will be 
training within the terms of Skinner's operant conditioning (3). The 
overall approach may, however, still need to be viewed as education, 
that is, part of a more prestigious, and valuable, system.
The second approach is outlined at the end of the chapter, and is to 
ignore the noun education, and look rather at the adjective
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educational. An activity can be educational, that is developing a 
person’s knowledge or understanding, abilities or skills, experience 
and interests; it can be anti-educational that is stunting the 
person’s knowledge, experience, abilities, or interests; or it can be 
non-educational, that is irrelevant to these. Illustrating this in 
terms of television programmes, ’Blue Peter' could be classified as 
educational, for it tells of foreign countries, of childrens’ lives 
there, and it inculcates certain positive attitudes towards others. 
Advertisements could be classified as anti-educational, although they 
can be discussed in an educational manner to demonstrate how they 
suppress thought and evaluation and press for conformity. Very little 
can be classified as truly non-educational, that is irrelevant to 
education, as the viewer is constantly being shown what different 
people take to be worthwhile, and how people react in differing 
circumstances. Such influences may, or may not, coincide with those 
that, in the case of a child, the parents or the school are trying to 
inculcate.
It is also possible to approach the debate by asking whether there is 
anything special about a school that separates it from any other place 
where children are cared for. Segal suggests that it is important to 
call a place a school to allow the possibility of calling the teaching 
of even the severely handicapped schooling. He still wishes to keep 
the term schooling distinct from education, reserving the latter, more 
prestigious, word for that teaching of children which retains at least 
some academic aspirations. Illich, by contrast, describes schools 
merely as a large child-minding service, part of an unnecessarily 
institutionalised society, education taking place outside in the real 
world (4). It is more usual to concede that something more than child 
minding is being undertaken. In traditional terms, which were 
recognised by the 1971 transfer of responsibility for hospital 
schools, the school is distinguished from the children's hospital by 
having educational aims and conditions, rather than aims revolving 
round the child's health.
Hospitals, although having as their primary role the physical welfare 
of their clients, who are patients rather than pupils or students, do 
take on an educational role. This is particularly evident in the 
treatment of mental and metabolic disorders, but also in the work of
the physiotherapist, who with the occupational therapist and the
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dietician teach the patients how to move, live, and eat. The 
behaviour and understanding of the patients are changed.
Furthermore, as well as other institutions which share enough of a 
school's procedures to begin to look like one, there are schools which 
look like something else. Summerhill, under A S Neill, was a school 
in name, yet from contemporary descriptions it sounds more like a 
childrens' psychiatric clinic (5). Neill specifically deprecated all 
academic aims as unimportant, and was particularly critical of 
examinations•
It is possible in Britain for a child not to attend school at all.
Home teaching is permitted if the parents are considered responsible 
and capable. Such action is usually taken by parents who do not want 
the specifically examination-based and academic elements of schooling 
for their child. These parents advocate a wider sense of education, 
deprecating formalism, competition, and institutionalism. However the 
same decision can result from the opposing philosophy, that academic 
achievement is paramount, and that the standards in the available 
schools are not high enough (6). In either case, part of the benefits 
of schooling have been ignored. Such conflicts over the relative 
importance of different parts of education are perhaps inevitable. 
There are conflicts over the relative value of different subjects, and 
over which subjects should be properly the concern of the school 
rather than of the home.
Home is generally contrasted with school, and yet parental involvement 
in formal education is increasing. Moreover, parents are increasingly 
encouraged to take more positive steps with children of all ages in 
the development of their learning powers. The relationship between 
teacher and parent is becoming one of partnership, rather than one of 
professional and client. It is necessary to distinguish here between 
the role of a parent as an extension of the teacher, for example in 
supervising homework, listening to reading, or insisting on music 
practice, and his role as an addition to the teacher, for example in 
outings to castles or zoos, or using the home computer. With the very 
young children, the latter function, albeit it at a simpler level, is 
an important preliminary to school-based learning. With handicapped 
children, some of these preliminaries have to be undertaken in school,
but the location of the activity is less important than its nature, as
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will be shown below in the discussion of educational activities. It 
must also be argued that much of any child’s education, in any sense, 
can take place outside the influence of both school and parents.
Three important influences are television, private reading, and the 
non-school-based lessons, clubs and societies attended by children at 
evenings and weekends. These influences are greatly underestimated by 
the school-based professionals, just as much as by the volunteer 
coaches, instructors, and leaders involved. Peters, as a former youth 
leader, stresses the importance of moral education in this context 
(7), but some strictly academic education can also be gained.
These external influences are especially important to the handicapped 
child, where they can provide a ’normal1 childhood, with hobbies and 
interests. For physically handicapped children, ’Riding for the 
Disabled', or swimming, both provide opportunities for the handicap to 
be overcome. Additionally, the contact with other people, the helpers 
and coaches, and the responsibilities given to the child help to make 
him more like 'other children'. Similarly, the opportunites offered 
by the Scout and Guide Movements, whether in specialised units or in 
integrated ones allow the handicapped child a similar social life to 
that which is available to the normal child.
The concepts of schooling, education, and upbringing are thus 
interrelated, and shared by teachers, parents, other adults, and 
peers. While it is hard to attempt to separate these concepts, it is 
clear that they can be linked through the idea of an educational 
activity, which is one implying change and advance of knowledge, 
experience, skills and interests, at any level. This relates to 
Segal’s demonstration that all children are capable of some
advancement, and that none are ineducable (8).
Thus it is necessary to distinguish, in discussion, between the three
useages of the word education. The widest of these involves all kinds
of upbringing of children, and may be called education11. A 
sub-class of this is the education envisaged by the Warnock Report, 
which is mainly concerned with school-based activities, but which 
contains enough discussion of work with parents, health visitors, and 
others, for the inclusion of the notion of upbringing to be essential. 
This is educationw# ^ more limited concept is the academic 
definition of education developed by Peters (educationa^#
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elements of educationa are found in educationw , as the Warnock 
Report acknowledges the importance of academic learning and the 
knowledge component, but the Report also asserts that education is 
more than this, especially for handicapped children (9). The 
interrelationship of the three educations is shown in the Venn diagram 
in Figure 9,
Figure 9. Venn diagram of the three educations.
The distinction between the three senses of education might at first 
appear simplistic, since even those who restrict education to the 
academic sense would probably include some wider teaching of what 
might be called good manners or proper behaviour. There can also be 
considerable argument over the constitution of education3. Peters’ 
work, as elaborated by Hirst, suggests the need for a wide curriculum 
(10), whereas it could be argued that science or arts alone could 
suffice.
The definition is particularly important in the context of the 
upbringing of handicapped children, because of the arguments, notably, 
as has been seen, by Gribble, that this is not education at all. In 
the case of children with special educational needs, the wider group 
suggested by the Warnock Report, much of their education will be 
education3. Warnock however, adopts the wider educationw to 
include more than education3, because of the prestige of the term 
education, and because of the expectation of social gains under the 
prevailing social system as well as 'educational' gain.
The argument of the present thesis is in direct contrast to the works 
of Barrow, who states that schooling includes education (11). Here, 
as has been shown, education includes schooling, as well as 
socialisation, and many other processes. For Peters, education is 
that which leads to the formation of an educated man (12). It is 
argued here that more than academic lessons are needed to form such a
man, and that a process can still be called educational, even if it
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does not lead to this result, or even if it is not intended to.
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6.2. What is education ? - the traditional approach.
The previous section has demonstrated that there are many different 
philosophical approaches to the role of the school, and to the 
education of children. Of these, Peters concept of education will be 
examined first. This has been gradually evolving over a number of 
years since its first appearance. It has generally been understood to 
be defined as initiation into worthwhile forms of life by morally 
acceptable means.
Most of the subsequent discussion has focussed on the meanings of 
initiation, worthwhile, and morally acceptable. Peters himself 
specifically ruled out torture as a morally acceptable means, but it 
is still necessary to discuss whether conditioning is either logically 
or morally permissable. This is done in Chapter 9. Peters also 
stresses a knowledge content to education, and it is this above all 
which seems to disqualify much basic teaching of particularly the 
mentally handicapped as education, since it is thought that although 
they do things, they do not understand what they are doing.
Peters stated that he had not tied education to any specific content 
(13), although Hirst subsequently defined the forms of knowledge (14). 
Nevertheless, the concept as stated above is still an evaluative one. 
In 'Education and the educated man', Peters acknowledges the 
possibility of the accusation of elitism (15). The ideal of the 
educated man is that to which all education is meant to be leading. 
Peters does not seem to accept, however, that this in itself is a 
moral or evaluative judgement, and that what is valuable or 
worthwhile, like the very concept of the educated man, is wholly 
questionable. The attributes are not necessarily universally valued, 
nor is the product necessarily an educated man. Such doubts are 
increased when Peters states that the educated man would have certain 
moral qualities. We presume that such a man would not be involved in 
burglary, as a matter of definition, yet this ignores the possibility 
that the two are not mutually exclusive. The question of Peters' 
reaction on finding a person previously categorised as educated 
subsequently engaging in burglary remains : would Peters say that he
has ceased to be educated ? Or would he say that the man never was,
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and that the previous categorisation was inaccurate ? Or can a man
only be described as being educated in bis obituary ? If this last is
so, what is education ?
Perhaps the type of education which would produce the educated man 
should be determined by empirical study rather than by the logical 
definition given by Hirst and Peters in their discussion of liberal 
education and forms of knowledge (16), It may be that different 
people require different forms of teaching to reach the same end.
Peters does, at least at one point, accept an extended use of the word
education as referring to all aspects of child rearing (i.e. 
education^ ) y but this is discarded in favour of his own concept 
(education3) (17).
"The more recent and more specific concept links such processes
with the development of states of a person that involve
knowledge and understanding in depth and breadth..." (18)
The logic of the words education and educated is not always clear. 
Firstly, it is not until 'Education and the educated man1 that the 
possible separation of education from the educated man is 
acknowledged, and the admission that the terms can be used in a more 
general sense occurs. Peters' earlier statement that a Nazi or a 
Spartan could not be an educated man demonstrates a moral 
impossibility not a logical one. That is, it is a matter of opinion.
Secondly, as Peters acknowledges (19), the logic of education and
educated is not the same as that of reform and reformed. It is nearer
to civilisation and civilised in the way that it can be said that the
Aztecs had quite a well-developed civilisation, but they were not
really civilised because they practised human sacrifice. The logic of
culture and cultured is the same.
When discussing education and civilisation, it cannot be assumed that 
there is a consensus of opinion on what constitutes either a civilised 
man or an educated man, although there may well be features which 
would generally find agreement. A definition of either term may be no 
more than what is held to be valuable or desirable in a civilisation
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or in education. Certainly, both concepts are wider than reform. If 
a man is said to be reformed, that statement must be qualified by a 
statement of the respect in which the man is said to be reformed; for 
example, before he stole, or was constantly in prison, or beat his 
wife, - and now does not. The word reform cannot be used in what 
Peters calls the external sense; he is reformed alright, but he still 
beats his wife. This sounds merely like a flippant joke.
Thirdly, education or educated can be taken as achievement words, that 
is following Ryle, who in 'Concept of mind' shows the difference 
between running a race and winning as a task and an achievement (20). 
There are not two separate activities of running and winning. It 
would be novel, though permissible, to use teaching as a task word, 
that is trying to teach, even if it has been unsuccessful, and the 
pupil has learnt nothing. It is not proper, however, to do this with 
education, which is thus an achievement word. This analysis is not 
wholly satisfactory, since with caught, won, or finished, one can 
point to the clock and say 'he has done it'. With teaching, 
conditioning, or indoctrinating, it is more difficult, but it is still 
possible to lay down criteria for success. Thus, 'I will have 
conditioned that rat when it has run through the maze x times', or 'I 
have taught him to add when he gets all the sums right'. With 
educated, it cannot be said that 'When he can resolve this problem, he 
will be educated', or 'I have educated him now'. There is not a 
specifiable act. It can be said 'There is an educated person', but it 
cannot be said when he became one. The recognition can only be 
afterwards, in perspective. Thus, if it is an achievement word, it is 
an achievement word with a difference.
Gribble's own work adds a further complication, since he discusses 
what is intrinsically valuable. This arises as it is not certain 
whether the intended meaning of the definition on p.140 is 'initiation 
into what a particular group calls worthwhile' or 'initiation into 
what is really worthwhile'. The terms intrinsically valuable, from 
Peters, and intrinsically worthwhile, even if synonyms, are not 
satisfactorily defined. Some things can be justified in terms of 
benefit accruing, but in other cases, talk of justification is quite 
out of place. The same sort of end-stop is reached as where it is 
inappropriate to ask 'Why do you enjoy what you enjoy ?', or 'Why do
you obey God ?'.
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It is not clear whether the statement that something has intrinsic 
value can mean any more than that it cannot be justified. It is also 
difficult to see how intrinsic value can be applied in any particular 
case of curriculum choice. It certainly seems to be out of place in a 
discussion of reading or writing. By contrast, it is quite clear what 
it means to have instrumental value or usefulness.
There are various possible meanings for ’it has intrinsic value'. 
Firstly, 'it has no practical use, but I think it is important, and so 
should you'; secondly, 'it has no practical use, but it has its own 
special value'; which could be the same as thirdly, 'it has no 
value at all'. With no criteria to form a judgement, the last two are 
indistinguishable, which suggests that the first meaning is the 
operative one. This is a persuasive definition.
As Peters shows, it is possible to establish an instrumental value 
even for such pursuits as philosophy, which may be said to develop 
powers of reasoning. It could be that this type of value, that is 
instrumental value, is what those who claim intrinsic value are 
looking for. As it leads to different ends, this is just another form 
of instrumentalism.
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6.3 Education - an emotive concept.
It does appear that the statement that somebody is educated is very 
much like the statement that somebody is a painter rather than a 
dauber, or a poet rather than a versifier. That is, it is an 
evaluative term which is applied within quite a wide field of relevant 
human behaviour, but for the application of which, no logically 
necessary criteria can be given, an example of Wittgenstein’s 'family 
resemblances’ (21). These words all work in the same way as good, 
although more specifically. Peters believes that he has not made a 
value judgement, as he has not specified exactly what the content of
initiation is to make the man educated. He does however assume an
academic preference, and he accepts Hirst's elaboration of this.
What Peters does demonstrate is the impossibility, or the illogicality 
of attempting to allow other people's views equal weight to one's own. 
In the present case, one cannot honestly say 'I mean one thing by an 
educated man, but you can believe something quite different'. A 
Spartan would claim that another Spartan was educated. It is , 
however, possible to say, as does Barrow, that there are various 
routes to being educated in Peters' sense.
This analysis of educated can also be given to the word education, 
itself equally an evaluative concept. Education is, in fact, what 
O'Connor calls a prestige word, and
"Like most such words, it is used more often for its prestige
value than for its strict descriptive sense." (22)
That is, it is a positive emotive word. O'Connor's own example is 
'theory', which would presumably be contrasted with 'hunch' or 
'guess'. Education can be contrasted with the pejorative term 
indoctrination. The word training has come to share this pejorative 
nature, as have caring and minding. These were all originally 
prestige words. When Physical Training Colleges were renamed Colleges 
of Physical Education, the change was made for two main reasons. 
Firstly, the type of teaching advocated by the Colleges has changed.
Physical training involved the copying of drill, whereas physical
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education requires the pupils to decide their own movements.
Secondly, there was the reason of prestige. What the students learnt 
was to be part of their own education, as well as that of their 
pupils. Furthermore, entry standards were upgraded, with a 
concomitant theoretical increase in the status of the institutions.
Segal demonstrates a similar ambivalent use of a prestige word, in 
this instance 'educable', stating ’no child is ineducable1 for two 
reasons (23). Firstly, in the 1960’s, there were many children in 
training centres who were not receiving the teaching that would have 
enabled them to progress, and Segal believed that progress was 
possible with all children. He also believed that it was wrong to use 
the term ineducable since this implied that the teaching of such 
children was less important than that of children in the mainstream or 
in special education. This had been partly acknowledged in 1959, when 
the 'ineducable' children, had been renamed 'unsuitable for school', 
and their 'occupation centres' were renamed 'training centres' (24). 
Segal was among those influencing the changes which occured in 1971, 
when the children were renamed severely subnormal, and the centres 
became schools. The series of name changes was continued in 1981, 
when on the advice of the Warnock Report, the severely subnormal 
became 'children with severe learning difficulties'.
Segal's intentions in advocating the transfer of the children from the 
health service to the education service were twofold. Firstly, the 
actual quality of the teaching should be found to improve if more care 
was taken over teacher training, provision of equipment, and the flow 
of ideas and techniques. Secondly, the pupils would gain in dignity 
from the renaming. In this, Segal is a clear ancestor of Warnock, in 
its emphasis on the need to eliminate stigma.
Education is thus seen to be one of a family of emotive or highly 
charged evaluative terms which are found too frequently in the Warnock 
Report and in discussion of the 'educational debate'. Inter alia, the 
list of these words includes normal, education, stigma, 
discrimination, handicap, categorisation, integration, needs, and 
development. Peters uses 'education' in the same way, for he states 
that education is itself intrinsically worthwhile, that is to say that 
he includes as education only those facets of which he approves.
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6.4 What is educational ? a new approach.
The last two sections have shown how important the academic sense of 
education can be, and that any discussion of the term must acknowledge 
this and also recognise the emotive nature of the term. However as 
Barrow states, too much discussion of the word education
"...has lead much philosophy of education quite unnecessarily 
astray." (25)
Equally, seeking approval, or funding for an activity by calling it 
and absolutely everything education has its own dangers, not the least 
of which is the trivialisation of the concept. Warnock, rather than 
trivialising the concept, attempts to extend it, so that aspects of 
some childrens' schooling may properly be called education, although 
these aspects will not be education for every child. Basic skills are 
hard won for some, and involve considerable effort in learning and 
teaching.
One escape route from the education debate is taken by Barrow. He 
entitles his book 'Philosophy of Schooling', because he wishes to 
acknowledge the many important things undertaken in schools which are 
excluded from his, and from Peters', definition of education. He also 
wishes to emphasise his acceptance of schools, rather than to support 
the 'de-schoolers', agreeing with Segal that school is the proper 
place for all children.
The route taken in this thesis, however, is to discuss instead the 
word educational, not least because of the title of the Warnock Report 
'Special educational needs', and because this permits the notion that 
not all needs are educational. It may be argued that there is very 
little in special education that is not education even in Peters' 
terms. Most learning in special education, which is largely language 
and concept teaching and involves Peters' knowledge component, is far 
from training. Even those aspects which resemble training most 
closely are, while acknowledging the possibility of the use of a 
prestige word, educational. That is, they expand the individual, his
experience, skills, and eventually his understanding, albeit in a
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limited way. This is the first part of the Warnock Report's 
'two-fold' concept of education (see p.9). It can be compared with 
the idea of an activity being 'pre-education'. Barrow adheres to this 
view, considering that,
"By and large primary school teachers do not educate as much as 
lay necessary foundations for education or contribute elements 
of education." (26)
rather than to Gribble's view of basic literacy skills, and special 
education contents, being not education at all. These skills and 
contents can be recognised, together with initial number work, as a 
necessary part of any person's academic education, without which no 
further progress can be achieved. Learning to read and write is very 
different from learning to type, since it is an absolute necessity for 
any academic success. It is inconceivable to think of an 'educated 
man' who could not read or write. Barking at print could be regarded 
as anti-educational, but learning the letter sounds is only one of the 
many aspects of learning to read, and the child will generally be 
learning reading and writing simultaneously, not as separate 
activities. Both will be part of a wider curriculum, even in the 
first class of a primary school, and together these methods of 
learning are educational. Indeed the Bullock Report emphasised their 
importance, insisting that every teacher should be a teacher of 
reading (27).
One advantage of adopting the pre-education notion is that a 
pre-reading stage is already recognised by many teachers. Children 
are given shapes and colours to match and differentiate. The 
activities of a good play-group are in this pre-reading stage; school 
starts with actual letters. The nursery school, intermediate between 
play-group and primary school, will probably teach the early steps in 
actual reading, in a way that the play-group will not, and both would 
see this as a difference between them. They have different methods 
and concentrate on different aspects of a child's development, but 
both aim to prepare the child for school at the age of five. Insofar 
as both expand the child, his experience, skills, and understanding, 
both can be educational.
Thus if it is accepted that pre-education can be educational, the
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the former term could usefully describe the activities of the teachers 
of severely mentally handicapped children, which are a vital part of 
the learning progression for those children. Particular tasks among 
children with any special educational need, such as language training 
for the deaf, braille learning for the blind, and even the prior tasks 
of walking or dressing oneself, which may be the limit of some 
childrens’ potential, can all be included. For the child with no 
special educational need, much pre-education may be accomplished at 
home, before entering the school system. This will also be true, to a 
greater or lesser extent, for many of those with special educational 
needs. However, there will always be some children for whom this is 
not possible, and for whom
"...continuous support from specialist services, including an 
intensive educational programme in a special school..." (28)
may be necessary, and just as important as the achievement of the 
status of an ’educated man'.
The connection between the skills teaching and the rest of the 
curriculum, and its methods and contents, all ensure that it is 
educational, that is expanding the individual, his experience, skills 
and understanding, even if it is not education in conventional terms. 
This is appropriate to mainstream teaching, since all children need to 
develop a modicum of personal independence before they can participate 
in school life. It is also appropriate to a consideration of which 
matters are the proper job of parents, and which should be undertaken 
by teachers.
One limitation is that a subject is not academically rigorous enough, 
for example, 'film studies’. Many social skills could be dismissed on 
this criterion. Such subjects can be made academic, and hence part of 
'education' by being given a literary basis, a logical and ethical 
approach, a historical perspective, and a link to other subjects in a 
form of knowledge approach. However, even without these accretions, 
the use of films may be educational. The difference between a film 
being entertainment and being educational is that in the former case 
it is merely watched, whereas in the latter case, the watching will be 
followed t>y reading, writing, making judgements. The use made of the
raw material is more important than the nature of the raw material
148
- a cartoon of 'Tom and Jerry’ can be used educationally, and a film 
of a Shakespeare play can be used anti-educationally. Indeed, such 
educational use of the media is held by its practitioners as 
corresponding directly to official objectives for English teaching, 
which are defined as
"••.comprehending ideas orally, following a line of argument, 
selecting, interpreting, and collating evidence, distinguishing 
fact from opinion, writing persuasively, reading with 
effect." (29)
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7.1 Four areas of difficulty
"Terry at 16 had little or no means of communicating. He 
couldn’t hear, couldn't speak intelligibly, knew no sign 
language and couldn’t write." (1)
"He still can’t write his own name - but the shy, withdrawn boy 
has disappeared. Terry ’talks' easily in sign language now.
He is confident and cheerful and his prospects are much 
improved." (2)
The content of a particular child's special education may differ in a 
number of ways from that of his peers. For a child with special, 
special needs, the differences will be greater. As Warnock explains,
"In very broad terms special educational need is likely to take 
the form of the need for one or more of the following :
(i) the provision of special means of access to the
curriculum through special equipment, facilities or 
resources, modification of the physical environment or 
specialist teaching techniques;
(ii) the provision of a special or modified curriculum;
(iii) particular attention to the social structure or emotional 
climate in which education takes place.
These are by no means exclusive and a child may very often have 
more than one of these forms of special educational need." (3)
Thus in the first category of child with special educational needs, 
the contents will probably be as for mainstream children, the same 
ground being covered, albeit more slowly, with some specific 
instruction being given in areas of need. For such a child, the 
special teaching is a preliminary to, or concomitant with, the 
mainstream academic curriculum, whatever the level finally reached. 
However, it is the extra special contents which mark out the special, 
special needs of those severely handicapped children that Warnock 
suggests should be 'recorded'. Specific instruction in skills, which 
other children learn before school and refine in late childhood, may
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well constitute the complete extent of a special, special schooling, 
although recent experience suggests that many more children are able 
to approach the academic curriculum although provided only with the 
basic literary skills, at a later stage than their peers. Chapter 8 
discusses the special educational methods for such an education, while 
this Chapter examines the special contents.
Four separable, but related, areas are discussed below. These are 
speech and language, writing and reading, mobility, and social skills. 
All form part of a mainstream education, with a continuous 
interaction, varying from child to child, between home and school 
influences, particularly as to the relative extent of the formal and 
the informal setting of different experiences. For the child with 
special, special educational needs, the amount of formal instruction 
and schooling will be greater.
Given their interrelationship, it is arguable which skill can be given 
priority. Reading and writing are not possible for all, and all could 
be classified as social skills, valuable for a community life, arid 
independence. Certainly, it might appear that mobility should be 
subsumed into social skills, yet with the modern methods of 
instruction used in teaching mobility, it is equally part of speech 
and language, and is an important background for meaningful literacy. 
The special aspects of mobility which make it a vital part of a 
visually impaired child's education, can be used as a paradigm case on 
a par with the paramount place of speech and language acquisition for 
a deaf child. Alternatively, language may be regarded as the most 
important of the four, since, academically, so little can be achieved 
without understanding and expression of ideas. Moreover, in personal 
development, the absence of communication in some form can lead to 
mental illness or the lack of understanding of the world found in 
autistic children. Reading and writing are secondary skills, 
dependent on language acquisition, although they themselves increase 
the vocabulary of all children. The true interdependence of skills is 
emphasised by the development of speech and language as a result of a 
growing social awareness and ability, and as a result of academic 
achievement. Not all four of these special contents will be relevant 
in the case of any individual child in special, special education.
The relative importance of each will vary. Children with multiple 
handicaps, as may be caused by rubella will need a very complex and
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specific teaching involving more than one aspect. Other children may 
just need additional help with language and literacy. In all cases, 
the need for language development appears of paramount importance.
For a number of reasons, it has been argued that the training of 
handicapped children, when restricted to these special contents, may 
not properly be called education. Even reading and writing have been 
called non-educational (4), although often because of the methods 
used, notably ’barking at print1, rather than for their content. It 
is somewhat difficult to comprehend why the teaching of a first 
language should be denied the prestige of being called education, when 
that of a second language never is.
The nature of basic skills teaching is more open to argument, yet this 
chapter demonstrates that all the pursuits termed special contents 
here can be placed in a continuum of child development through which 
all children must pass. That this is an educational development is 
demonstrated by use of the distinction between educational and 
non-educational and anti-educational developed in the previous 
chapter. It can also be illustrated by using the distinction between 
teaching or education and care which is given by Warnock (see p.7), 
and suggested by the Royal National Institute for the Deaf :
"Often our residential centres are a last resort before deaf 
people are sent to long-stay institutions or psychiatric 
care..." (5).
In Warnock, as in Plowden, education is concerned with the whole 
child; it is also for the child. When methods and contents are not 
for the child, but for the convenience of others, they could cease to 
be educational, and become anti-educational. It is necessary to 
distinguish here between teaching methods, and the media employed.
Thus Braille or lipreading are media, and like the information 
conveyed by these media, are part of the content. The skills of 
brailling or lipreading can be taught in a variety of methods, for 
example by drill, or by a more liberal, though structured, approach.
It may further be argued that nearly all such teaching can be regarded 
as education even in Peters' sense, since it involves a knowledge 
component in the understanding of language and concepts. In the small
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area of social skills development which has no definite knowledge 
component, still shares an element from Peters' education if it can be 
considered intrinsically valuable. To Peters, these skills may not 
seem intrinsically valuable, and may even appear trivial to those who 
have attained them easily, but to those who do not possess them, the 
position is rather different. Thus it cannot be fairly asked 'Why do 
you want to be able to talk ?', or 'Why do you want to look after 
yourself ?'. To those who either do not posess them, or to those who 
have had to work very hard to achieve them, the social skills have a 
great intrinsic value. The importance of developing an individual is 
such that it can merit the prestige of the term education. By calling 
it educational, and not limiting the use of this term beyond the 
definition already given, the commentator affords the individual the 
possibility of further development.
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7.2 Speech and language.
As has been asserted (p. 155), there are reasons why basic 
communication may be seen as the paramount need. It is not possible 
here to assess in detail the range of modern theories of the mechanics 
of the early acquisition of a first language by a young child.
However, following Chomsky, it can be said that in a sense, children 
have an innate ability to develop language skills, since most do (6), 
while following Skinner, it can be shown that experience is very 
important (7). A common-sense combination of both theories is that 
experience provides the material which is used by the innate ability
of the individual. A child with the ability will develop some
language, whatever the linguistic experience he has. The 
non-development of language is explicable by either the child not 
having the experience of spoken language, because he is deaf or not 
spoken to, or the child having the experience of spoken language, but 
being seemingly unable to process, understand, or reproduce, his 
experience.
A communications network is described by Robinson and Petchenik who 
enlarge upon Singh's work (8)
"... a typical communications network consists fundamentally of 
a source (or transmitter), a channel which conveys the message, 
and a receiver. In everyday terms a speaking person may be the 
source, the air which carries the sound waves of his voice 
would be the channel, and a listener the receiver. A more 
detailed analysis of the basic system will usually include the
insertion of an encoder between the source and the channel, and
a decoder between the channel and the receiver... The function 
of the encoder is to improve the efficiency of the system. In 
our original illustration, the voice mechanism of the speaker 
constitutes the encoder, taking the thoughts of the source and 
transforming them into sound waves, while the hearing mechanism 
of the listener is the decoder, transforming the sound waves 
back into thoughts." (7)
Robinson and Petchenik are concerned with adapting this model to the
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processes of map-reading, but here it may be used more readily (Figure 
»)• ,
Source ---5 Encoder---- 5 Channel----j Decoder----* Recipient
brain voice sound hearing brain
mechanisms waves mechanisms
--)
Speaker Listener
Figure 8. The communications system
Speech is only one form of language, albeit the most usual and 
widespread medium, which takes many forms, but all can be understood 
in terms of Figure 8. In addition to speech, gestures, formal sign 
language (e.g. BSL - British Sign^Language, or Makaton), mime, 
finger-spelling, the use of Blissymbols, computer screens, and even 
writing in the absence of other forms, are all channels of 
communication. Their formation is to be considered as encoding, while 
at their reception, their meaning has to be decoded through the 
mechanisms of hearing, touch, or sight, and is followed by the 
understanding of the message. In this thesis, the term speech is 
reserved for talking audibly with the mouth.
Not only the profoundly deaf are affected by the lack of speech and
language. In the case of the child unable to process the experience 
of language, the difficulty may be caused by an interruption at any
point in the communications system. Thus the signal may be failing to
reach the ears - that is the person has a hearing impairment; or it 
may fail to be decoded and unable to reach their brain; or the person 
may be unable to react to the received signal. These last are termed 
language-disordered people. Sometimes both features are present, and 
also brain damage, particularly amongst the multiply-handicapped.
Thus there are deaf children who can learn standard language patterns 
when these are presented through high amplification and specialised 
teaching. They may even be able to attend ordinary schools despite a 
profound hearing loss. However, other children can make no sense of
such teaching, suffering pain at the high levels of amplification,
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and yet still be unable to receive the message.
Work with adults recovering from serious head injury as a result of 
war or accidents, and with stroke patients, has demonstrated similar 
difficulties in receiving messages. These patients are said to have 
suffered brain damage. However except by analogy, or in cases of pre- 
or peri-natal trauma causing damage to the brain by a temporary loss 
of oxygen it is usually inappropriate to use the epipthet for 
children,'while the term language-disordered is too unspecific. The 
behaviour of autistic children, for example, is very different to that 
of conventionally mentally-handicapped children. Even so, recent 
research suggests that autism is indeed a form of mental handicap, and 
not a psychosis as was previously believed (11). In autistic 
children, the linguistic inability is part of a global inability in 
all forms of communication and social intercourse.
It is argued that spoken language is given undue priority over other 
forms of language by, in particular, trained teachers of the deaf.
The history of the controversy between oral and non-oral teaching is 
complex, and varies in different countries. The traditional rationale 
for teaching deaf children in this country has been oralism. This is 
based on the teacher training of the Ewings at Manchester (12). The 
ideal is to give the child a spoken language, with which they can 
communicate to most other people. However, there is, increasingly, a 
feeling that this is insufficient for two reasons. Firstly, 
profoundly deaf children very rarely learn to speak well enough to be 
generally understood; and secondly, the heavy investment of time on 
specific oral and aural training results in a neglect of other aspects 
of the curriculum, for which the relatively low reading levels 
achieved by most deaf children are cited as evidence. In contrast, 
the students of Gallaudet College in the United States reach high 
academic levels in a programme based on non-oral methods.
A more radical approach holds that sign language itself is acceptably 
regarded as a first language, comparable with any other as a valid 
form of communication. It is hence as much of an insult to a deaf 
child not to acknowledge sign-language as an acceptable 
’mother-tongue' and a proper vehicle for teaching, as it is to a 
member of any other linguistic minority to disregard their 
mother-tongue. Such arguments counter those for integration, unless
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it were possible for all children to learn sign language. There tends 
to be a polarisation of those who emphasise social acceptability, and 
those who emphasise the importance of the individual's development.
Even the confirmed oralist must accept that speech is not the only 
means of communication, nor even the most important, even for those 
whose use of it is not limited by handicap. The existence of 
1body-language', the influence of smell and touch on personal mood, 
the facial expression of speaker or listener, are all important to the 
hearing person, as is the use of gesture to a greater or lesser 
extent. Within families, or similar close groups, there is a 
considerable range of non-verbal communication by grunts, shrugs, and 
sighs. Thus proponents of 'total communication', the use of all 
possible means of conveying information, can claim to be building 
upon, and extending, the natural experience of the child.
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7.3 Reading and Writing.
Reading and writing are developed from forms of language, and indeed 
can themselves be classified as forms of language, as seen in the 
previous section. Respectively, they are receptive and expressive or 
transmissive. The usual adult mode of reading is swift scanning for 
comprehension, that practised in the reading of novels or newspapers. 
This can be extended into a more profound form of comprehension 
practised for study, using indices, reviewing, and note-taking.
Reading is frequently more valuable to the handicapped person than to 
his peers, and yet it is usually more difficult to succeed. For 
example, although there are subtitles on some television news 
bulletins, and although viewdata systems are advertised as ideal for 
the deaf, a certain reading level is necessary for their 
comprehension. That which may be helpful for the hard-of-hearing with 
naturally acquired language is less so for the profoundly deaf, who as 
was stated on p.160, frequently have rather low reading levels.
Perhaps surprisingly, this low relative capability is true even when 
the deaf are compared with the blind.
Reading, and writing, here defined as any method of producing language 
in a permanent or semi-permanent form are obviously potent forces both 
in and for education, and are often also held to be important 
political weapons as Freire’s work in Latin America has demonstrated 
(10). Peers commented about Africa in 1958 ;
"...the new political awakening in a number of colonies, 
accompanied by a rising sense of nationhood and the growth of 
democratic forms of government, both local and national, are 
stimulating the desire for literacy and a knowledge of the 
issues involved in elections. Illiteracy in this situation is 
felt more and more to be a mark of inferiority." (11)
Even if some of the political hopes expressed may have proved 
illusory, the conclusion remains valid. In the developed world, adult 
illiteracy carries even more stigma, as it implies failure at school, 
and hence stupidity. It is remarkable that ineptitude with numbers
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Traditional orthography
Reading is more useful to handicapped children than to their friends, 
ita
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Shorthand (Pitman 2000)
Reading is more useful to handicapped children than totheir friends
Moon (Grade 1)
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READING IS MORE USEFUL TO HANDICAPPED CHILDREN THAN TO THEIR FRIENDS 
Braille (Grade 2)
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(children)
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(friends)
Blissymbols
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> Chinese
Reading to handicapped children than to their friends is more useful 
Figure 9. Comparisons of scripts.
163
does not have the same stigma.
For both reading and writing, discussion can take place about three 
aspects. Firstly, there is the actual script that is written or read. 
This can be in traditional orthography, that is as used on this page, 
in ita (International Teaching Alphabet), Braille, Moon, or symbols 
like Bliss or Rebus (Fig.9). Secondly there is the medium by which 
the script is produced, by hand, or by machine, whether typewriter, 
word-processor, brailer, or type-setter. Thirdly, there is the method 
of instruction, mentioned above, and expanded in Chapter 8.
Word-processors, and other computer hardware and software, are now 
widely designed for, and used by, the severely handicapped, many of 
whom can now exhibit intelligence which had previously been 
unrecognised. For a severe case of lack of movement, an especially 
adapted individual 'Possum' machine can permit the use of, for 
example, a typewriter by controls in the form of the strength or 
number of directed breaths.
The recently devised symbol systems Bliss and Rebus are forms of 
language. They are also forms of writing, which since they are 
designed to match spoken language, with standard grammatical forms, 
can also be read, just as a ideographic script like Chinese although 
their vocabulary is much more limited, and hence complete sentences 
are difficult to render neatly. Moon and Braille retain not only 
standard grammar, but also, to a great extent, standard spelling, 
although there are contractions in long and in commonly-used words 
which result in a similarity with shorthand. In ita, the grammar is 
retained, but the spelling is rationalised, while in Chinese, the 
grammar is as different as the orthography (Fig.9).
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7.4 Mobility training.
Until recently, mobility was taught as a separate subject in a blind 
child's education, an important part, but one that could be added on 
at the end. Mobility training for the visually handicapped is now 
much more than just learning to move safely about one's environment. 
The change has occurred as it was realised that blind people were not 
able to learn to move sensibly, without learning a number of relevant 
concepts. These mobility or spatial concepts are now integrated into 
the child's general curriculum. In a sense, every teacher is a 
teacher of mobility, just as every mainstream teacher is a teacher of 
English, and every teacher of the deaf is a teacher of speech. The 
concepts are, moreover, an important tool in academic development, 
since they permeate all books and texts, and not only at the 
simplistic level of 'see above'.
Mobility training for the blinded adult is quite different from that 
for a child that has never seen. For the former, it is a matter of 
capitalising on skills and concepts already developed; the retraining 
involves learning a different deployment of skills, and is thus more 
akin to the older methods of mobility training. For the latter, the 
specific tasks of learning to cook, to organise one's belongings, to 
choose clothes, wash and dress, to go to the shops, and to use public 
transport, may be the same, yet the understanding of what is happening 
and where it is happening has to be learnt alongside the task itself.
Like speech training, mobility is both part of every lesson, and is a 
separately timetabled feature of the curriculum. Gymnastics, dancing, 
music and movement are all used as an adjunct to formal mobility 
training, conveying concepts and ideas of the individual's body in 
relation to his immediate environment. The learning process can be 
conceived as a three-stage progression. Firstly, there are the 
general language lessons in the classroom, which include mobility 
concepts; secondly, there are movement sessions in the gymnasium or 
'soft-room'; and finally, there are specific mobility lessons on foot 
in the wider environment. All are leading towards the same end, of 
providing the range .of spatial and directional concepts familiar to 
the sighted child, for example, up, down, over, under, left, right.
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That this must be integrated with, and is essential to, the curriculum 
is evident from even a superficial view of any syllabus in 
mathematics, geography, or history, to name but three subjects.
"It is a common enough experience in any branch of education for 
children to be talking and learning about things of which they 
have limited experience and understanding and this could happen 
in extreme form in blind children with the danger of using 
'empty' words and language forms." (12)
Accepting this with reference to spatial and mobility concepts enables 
it to be understood why Cassirer said :
"...a vast number of the most diverse relations, particularly 
qualitative and modal relations, come within the scope of 
language only indirectly, by way of spatial determinations." 
(13)
Teaching spatial and mobility concepts can thus truly be regarded as 
applied language instruction.
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7.5 Social Skills.
All skills may be classified as social skills, since all contribute 
towards the individual’s social life as a member of some community. 
Learning to drive, for example, extends the individual’s employment 
prospects; learning to play chess his circle of friends; learning to 
read his knowledge and his topics of conversation. The skills 
highlighted here as social skills are those particularly necessary as 
a basis for independence in community and family living. Social 
skills are taught both to the young mentally handicapped and to older 
’disadvantaged’ students, for example on Youth Training Scheme (YTS) 
courses, where they are a preparation for work and adulthood.
There are two groups of skills for the young to learn. Firstly, there 
are those which involve social independence, such as dressing, eating, 
and toileting, and secondly there are those which involve social 
acceptability and the lessening of stigma. An example of the latter 
is the perceived need to curb the exuberance and demonstrativeness of 
many Down's Syndrome children. There may also be types of behaviour 
to be unlearnt, for example self-stimulating and self-destructive 
behaviour.
The independence skills can also be part of social acceptability; even
among similarly handicapped people, for example, the additional
problem of incontinence, or rather the resultant unpleasant odour, 
will commonly produce stigma. For the adolescent, much of the 
emphasis in social skills will be in this area of social 
acceptability. The two groups of skills are allied through their 
importance as a means to end dependence.
The work with adolescents and young people is called training to
differentiate it from their schooling, at which they have failed, or
against which they have rebelled, and because it has a vocational 
bias. However, much of both is educational, as Gulliford recognises, 
using almost identical terms to the definition of educational employed 
in this thesis :
"These social competence skills are valuable first of all
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because they benefit the child - they put him increasingly in 
situations where he has to think for himself; they enable him 
to widen his experience and increase his skills. They are 
basic to the process of developing as a person." (21)
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Chapter 8
Special Educational Methods
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8.1 Behaviour modification : A special educational method ?
"Skinner’s teaching methods, however, may well often be 
appropriate as a last resort in an attempt to train handicapped 
people where all else has failed or seems inevitably 
unsuccessful. Only in such a desperate position could such a 
means be justified by its end result, since the method does 
seem to treat pupils as somehow less than human." (1)
This widely held view of operant conditioning as a form of behaviour 
modification expresses a moral and a logical concern about the 
treatment of pupils in classrooms. Blackman discusses these 
philosophical issues at length, going further than the above 
quotation, and he questions whether for even the most severely 
handicapped and institutionalsied person, it is a proper method.
"However, for many patients there may be no prospect of 
discharge from the hospital to the ’normal’ world, and 
questions concerning the ethics of behaviour modification in 
such cases may be more difficult to resolve. Is it better to 
encourage in such people more varied behavioural repertoires, 
or should we leave them to their own disturbed and limited 
horizons ?" (2)
Blackman concludes that ’Opinions are clearly divided'.
Behaviour modification does not constitute the sole method used in 
special education, nor even in special, special education. Indeed it 
is possible to argue that there are no special educational methods in 
the sense that there are no methods confined to special education.
All the methods may, like the activities, be found in the mainstream 
classroom, although the special equipment used, for example the 
electronic ’loop' system, is not. Despite this, behaviour 
modification is given extended treatment here, for three reasons. 
Firstly, it is controversial, and thus the arguments tend to stand out 
more starkly. Secondly, the discussion follows logically from the 
elaboration of the meanings of education in Chapter 6, since behaviour
modification is a form of teaching. Thirdly, the ethical questions
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which arise concerning free will and autonomy, paternalism, ends and 
means, relate both to the earlier discussion of the nature and value 
of a person (Chapters 4 and 5), and to the next chapter ’Special 
Educational Needs’.
Before looking at operant conditioning and its place in behaviour 
modification theory, a distinction must be drawn between the 
individual techniques, the overall methods, and the presuppositions 
inherent in the rationales of teaching. In the first instance, there 
are many techniques of teaching, many of which are not specific to a 
individual subjects. Thus the teacher of speech needs to know how 
different sounds are made, by varying the mouth shape and the use of 
air (i.e. inhaled or exhaled). To this has been added a requirement 
to operate various electronic aids to help, for example, a child make 
make his voice pattern approximate to the correct pattern shown on an 
oscilloscope.
Secondly, there the different methods which can be used to encourage 
the child to try the techniques. Some of these will be intrinsic to 
the task, some, such as rewarding the pupil by giving sweets, are 
extrinsic. Some can combine both. It can thus be argued that it is 
quite logical in using different techniques to reward or punish 
children in ways that Skinner advocates, while yet not accepting the 
view of man and teaching that Skinner propounds (3).
Thirdly, the teacher possesses an underlying rationale for attempting 
to teach the matter in hand. These rationales may vary, and may imply 
a variety of techniques and methods.
The techniques themselves are relatively value-free; it is the 
discussion of their application that is not. Thus this Chapter is in 
two sections, the first dealing with the logical questions arising 
from the methods, discussing the nature of behaviour modification as 
a teaching method, and the second with the moral concepts arising from 
the rationales, attempting to answer the two further questions, ’Is 
man as Skinner supposes ?’, and 'Is it right to treat people as 
Skinner suggests ?’. The relationship between these two questions is 
also explored, to see whether they can both be true together, or both 
false, or whether either can stand alone.
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8.2 Logic of behaviour modification.
In some senses it is true to say, that all teaching is behaviour 
modification. All teachers expect their pupils to be able to perform 
tasks following instruction, of whatever form, that they could not 
perform before. ’Knowledge’ is tested through behaviour, that is a 
test or examination is taken, a map is drawn, an essay written, or a 
conversation in a foreign language takes place. For the behaviourist 
who accepts the arguments of Skinner, this comprises the whole of 
education. 'Knowing how’ is behaviour, and there is no 'knowing that’ 
beyond these expressions of behaviour. For most teachers, both 
education and training mean more than this.
A discussion of ’true’ behaviour modification, that is operant 
conditioning, is complicated by the fact that it comprises many sorts 
of activity. There are several different techniques, for example, 
punishment, differential schedules of reinforcement, timeout, and 
over correction, but all are based on systems of reward or punishment.
Behaviour modification can be contrasted with other approaches, to 
establish the differences between it and what may be seen as the norm 
in the classroom. This is explored fully by Cohen (4), and it may be 
said that since such modification is concerned primarily with 
behaviour and the learning of skills, it can be contrasted with the 
opposing rationale that knowledge and understanding represent more 
than behaviour, that is what Cohen terms the ’liberal tradition'. 
Furthermore, as mastery of the skills is paramount to the 
behaviourist, the approach can also be contrasted with the 'child 
centred' emphasis on individual development. Cohen believes that in 
the child-centered approach, insufficient attention is paid to the 
content of what is being learnt, and behaviour modification places too 
much emphasis on this aspect, while the liberal tradition holds a 
balanced view. Mary Warnock, in 'Schools of thought' (5), shows 
herself to be a member of this liberal tradition. The Warnock Report 
itself, with its emphasis on needs and on an individual's approach to 
education, follows the Plowden Report in being child-centred. Unlike 
Plowden, however, it can be criticised for not dwelling deeply enough 
on practical teaching methods or contents.
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8.2.1 Operant conditioning.
The form of behaviour modification devised firstly for work with rats 
and pigeons, and then applied to humans, is operant conditioning. It 
must be differentiated from the classical conditioning of Pavlov, 
which involved the triggering of reflexes. Salivation, in Pavlov’s 
experiments, happens to the dog. It does not occur by the dog’s 
action. Operant conditioning involves action by the individual.
Put simply, ’teaching’ for Skinner, involves developing new behaviour 
patterns. Forms of behaviour are either rewarded, or reinforced in 
Skinner's terminology, or punished by negative reinforcement.
Behaviour can also be ignored, which seems to be a form of negative, 
reinforcement. Reinforced actions tend to be repeated by the subject, 
be they pigeons or humans, while those which are ignored or punished 
tend to die out. Rats in cages can learn to press levers, since by 
doing so, they obtain a food pellet, and hence they tend to repeat the 
action. This has long been a piece of commonsense knowledge for 
parents and teachers, who praise and reward good behaviour and actions 
they wish to encourage, and punish bad behaviour and actions they wish 
to eradicate. Many toys for very young children are designed to this 
principle. The Jack-in-a-box jumps out when a lever is pressed, so 
the child keeps pressing the lever. Thus it is not controversial that 
behaviour can be modified by Skinner's methods. Operant conditioning 
may even help to solve the problem of motivation that besets the 
teacher of a large or recalcitrant classes. However, it may be 
questioned whether Skinner’s methods actually succeed in teaching 
anything. The teacher may have to use conventional techniques for 
teaching reading, but employ reinforcement of some kind to keep the 
children interested and compliant.
It has been demonstrated how patterns of behaviour can be built up in 
rats or pigeons
"...most of his pigeons developed stereotyped patterns of 
behaviour between the five-second periods of access to food. 
Thus one of the birds was seen to turn round and round in the 
box, always in an anti-clockwise direction." (6)
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As a teaching method, operant conditioning can be used similarly to 
build up patterns of behaviour in a very young or handicapped child.
The principle advantage claimed for this method is that it works. 
Traditional education is criticised by the proponents of operant 
condition because it is not efficient. It has, it is suggested, 
neither a properly planned schedule, nor a clearly conceptualised 
outcome. Efficiency is held to be the most important aspect of 
education. Furthermore, traditional education uses concepts like 
knowledge and understanding, which Skinner considers to be otiose. 
Similarly, provided the skills are performed, a commitment to learning 
is unnecessary.
Skinner's critics regard operant conditioning as limited and possibly 
stultifying. It is close, they argue, to indoctrination or 
manipulation, and is non-educational, since it may be restricted to 
specific tasks and hence does not allow for transfer of techniques or 
knowledge in the way aimed at by most teachers.
However, the very point of criticism, that operant conditioning does 
not involve commitment or understanding, has led it to be seized as a 
revolutionary method in the teaching of profoundly mentally 
handicapped people and for those who suffer from such severe mental 
illness that they need long term hospital treatment. Indeed, Skinner 
showed at quite an early stage in his corpus of writing that the 
methods could be used to extend the behaviour of what he termed a 
microcephalic 'idiot' whose
"...intellectual accomplishments ... in the forty-first year of 
his life have exceeded all those of his first forty years.
They were possible only because he has lived a few hours of 
each week of that year in a well-programmed environment." (7).
In practical terms, any task can be broken down into very small steps. 
Each step is taught successively by reinforcement of each movement 
that approximates to that desired. As each movement becomes more like 
the desired step, and as each step is performed, the next step is 
taught as a follow-on. Then reinforcement is given for the completion 
of the two in order, and the process is continued until the whole task 
can be completed. This is called chaining.
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Practical problems with the method are legion. Additionally, 
considerable controversy surrounds the practice of reinforcement. As 
Furneaux indicates, there are children, particularly amongst the 
autistic, for whom it is difficult to find a reinforcement (8), since 
they are not interested in the sweets or potato crisps suggested by 
Gulliford (9). A more radical difficulty is that it is not always 
possible to decide what is a punishment and what is a reward. This 
problem may be more evident to the child than to the teacher, to whom 
the matter seems clear-cut. Thus a teacher may ignore a child for 
most of the time. When the child does something wrong, the teacher 
punishes him. However, since this punishment means being given 
attention, which is itself a reward in the child’s mind, the negative 
reinforcement becomes a positive reinforcement, and the ’naughty’ 
behaviour is repeated.
A different problem arises when meals are used as reinforcement. As a 
meal is expected to occur as a matter of course, deprivation is 
regarded as a punishment, rather than simply as a lack of a 
reinforcement. In due course, such deprivation may actually harm the 
child, making the logical dilemma an ethical one. It is noticeable, 
that although Skinner demonstrates that positive reinforcement is more 
efficient than negative reinforcement, he does not consider the moral 
implications of either.
The logic of ’time out’ as a punishment also merits evaluation. ’Time 
out' is the removal of children from, for example, the meal table, and 
is used as a negative reinforcement for bad behaviour both at the meal 
table and elsewhere. The rationale is that at the next meal the child 
will not evince the same unwanted behaviour, so that he may remain at 
the table and enjoy the meal. This rationale is frequently 
ineffective, as the child does not make the connection between the 
unwanted behaviour, for example, head-banging or rocking, and the 
negative reinforcement. Indeed, the time away from the table may 
provide the opportunity for the undesireable form of behaviour to 
occur, and is thus a positive, rather than a negative, reinforcement, 
and the behaviour is maintained rather than extinguished.
The concepts of Skinner’s theory form a family of terms which are 
defined only by reference to each other. This circularity is explored 
by the present author, in a treatment of Skinner as a philosopher
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rather than as a technician (10), Briefly, however, it has been 
demonstrated that most applications of behaviour modification by 
operant conditioning go well beyond Skinner's original ideas since 
they involve learning and understanding on the part of the pupil. 
Except in a few very limited tasks, it is also, too time consuming and 
unnecessary to wait for the appropriate piece of behaviour to appear 
'naturally'. Thus a child is usually shown, guided, or forced, 
through a pattern of behaviour, which is then rewarded to maintain the 
behaviour and to make it part of the child's repertoire. The teacher 
normally undertakes an active role, not only shaping the environment 
in an appropriate way, but also acting as a model for the behaviour of 
her class. The resultant copying of behaviour goes beyond operant 
conditioning. Thus it can be said that most attempts at operant 
conditioning require an element of understanding, which brings them 
closer to traditional education, even though the child may not be able 
to verbalise what he has seen.
True operant conditioning is very useful at the commencement of 
learning, but is soon discarded as it can only be applied in limited 
areas. Thus a young deaf child can, at first, be reinforced by a 
teddy bear whose eyes light up when a noise is made. As a result, the 
child vocalises frequently. However, in order to teach the child to 
discriminate between the different sounds produced either by himself 
or others, the teaching must progress beyond this simplistic level. 
Once the child understands the process, different teaching methods are 
adopted. Thus once the association of the approximation of speech 
pattern to those of the teacher as recorded in an oscilloscope is 
made, guidance can be given in the placing of the mouth, tongue, and 
lips to improve the correspondence, and henceforward, success is its 
own reward as the child's speech pattern matches that on the screen.
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8,2.2 Training, drill, and computer assisted learning.
Training, drill, and computer assisted learning are all considered 
here as methods which, although appearing to be similar to operant 
conditioning, are not.
Training, in philosophy of education, is a derogatory term, and yet in 
many respects it is used as a prestige term. Thus, for example, 'she 
is a trained teacher', or 'it is important for a woman to get some 
kind of training before she gets married'. In these uspages, the term 
indicates someone following a course with practical, and sometimes 
academic, contents. The person is generally regarded as committed, 
and knowledgeable. The concept is only differentiated from the 
academic notion of education by its specific nature, rather than its 
generality. The proportion of academic content varies, for example, 
between the training of a doctor and the training of a dancer; in some 
cases, the training may amount to an education in Peters' sense. 
Despite this, in the philosophy of education, training has been 
opposed to education, as noted above. Generally this is because 
'training' is vocational and specific, but also because it uses more 
limited methods. Consequently, it seems to be much closer to the 
training of animals, which is achieved by operant conditioning, than 
an important part of education. Thus, children are trained in ways 
resembling operant conditioning; they are, for example, 'potty 
trained'. Yet in most normal children this occurs as a matter of 
maturation as much as a matter of reinforcement or punishment.
Drill may be viewed as an earlier, undeveloped form of behaviour 
modification. It has as its main aspect, the constant repetition of 
an action until a pattern of behaviour is built up. An individual 
follows this pattern so automatically that if he is interrupted, he 
may be unable to continue the pattern, but will need to recommence the 
pattern from the begining. The pattern is a whole, not the sum of its 
individual parts. However, unlike the method in true operant 
conditioning, the instructor will not wait for the desired behaviour 
to appear, but will demonstrate the specific skills. These are then 
either performed correctly or incorrectly. However, drill does share 
with operant conditioning the method of breaking down a task into its
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component parts which can be strung together as, in a different 
context, a dance routine is learnt.
Both in training and drill, operant conditioning is seen as a way of 
motivating, ensuring, and maintaining learning, rather than a way of 
actually teaching.
With adults, there appear to be appropriate methods for teaching 
specific skills, such as learning to use three dimensional maps, or 
learning to discriminate between different colour changes in a 
chemistry laboratory. For children, similar skills, for example 
learning tables or letter sounds are a necessary part of their 
schooling. However, these may well be regarded as only part of the 
child’s schooling. As well as learning, in a mechanical sense, the 
repetition of his tables, the child needs to learn and understand the 
what the tables mean. Similarly, although an older child can learn to 
speak a foreign language through the pronunciation of the words in a 
language laboratory, even this demands far more than operant 
conditioning can provide, as reading skills and an understanding of 
the task are required.
Computer assisted learning can combine facets of operant conditioning, 
training, and drill. For a handicapped child, the computer represents 
a reinforcement more potent than any teacher, since it never gets 
tired, bored, or irritable. On the other hand, it cannot show 
sympathy or provide human comfort, and except for those cases which 
have already been programmed into it, cannot allow for individuality. 
Furthermore, most programmes can permit progress well beyond the 
limits of operant conditioning, especially those which are branched, 
rather than the original simple linear programmes prepared by Skinner 
himself. The computer itself is not a teacher. That is the person 
who devised the programme. The computer is merely a reinforcing and 
presenting instrument, albeit a very 'efficient' one in Skinner's 
terms.
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8,3 The ethics of behaviour modification.
As a prolegomena to a detailed analysis of the ethical terms used in 
descriptions and criticisms of behaviour modification, it will be 
useful to indicate the nature of the practical moral problems 
involved. As in all moral argument, there is a conflict over the 
primacy of different moral principles. This the teacher may be torn 
between two aspects of her ethos; firstly, should she help the 
children learn all they can, or secondly, should she treat these 
children as individuals. The basic moral dilemma is whether anybody 
be treated in the way behaviour modification demands, or if they are 
so treated, whether they do not become objects rather than pupils.
More subtly, can it be argued that while it is not right to treat most 
people like this, may it still not be permissable to use the method 
for severely handicapped people, since there appears to be no 
alternative ?
Two answers can be given. The affirmative answer is given on the 
grounds that any action which is successful is better than no action. 
By contrast, the negative answer holds that this is social 
discrimination, and that operant conditioning is wrong as is any 
approach which treats anyone as less than human. An extension of this 
view is that all teaching of children by adults is discriminatory, 
paternalistic, and wrong, since it imposes standards. Skinner 
capitalises on this argument to say that, given that this aspect must 
exist as a matter of definition, teaching should at least be specific 
and directed, rather than irrational and random.
Turning from the ethics of the situation to what has been termed 
meta-ethics, it is necessary to demonstrate the inter-relationship of 
a family of emotive concepts which are used in such moral debates. 
These terms are autonomy, free will, paternalism, means, and ends. Of 
these, the central concept is autonomy. An autonomous person is one 
for whom
"...what he thinks and does, at least in important areas of his 
life, are determined by himself. That is to say, it cannot be 
explained why these are his beliefs and actions, without
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referring to his own activities of mind." (11)
Such an individual has free will. Treating people as non-autonomous, 
in the sense imputed to operant conditioning, both overrides free-will 
in a practical sense, and in a theoretical sense denies that there is 
such a thing as free-will. Thus to Skinner, the autonomous man is a 
fiction. Those who value autonomy, and believe in free-will, allow 
that people can act to influence, educate, or help others, but 
emphasise the importance of treating each individual as an end in, and 
for, himself; not as a means to another's end. Treating a person as a 
means overrides his autonomy. This is the argument against 
paternalism, which by implication overrides autonomy by deciding for 
an individual what his ends should be. Clearly this discussion is 
closely linked with the traditional rational ethics of Kant, and with 
the rationally based ethics of Rawls.
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8.3.1 Autonomy and free-will.
The concept of free-will is central to much of the ethical thought of 
the Western world. Philosophers as disparate as Sartre and Kant have 
held it at the centre of their ethics. Skinner intentionally sought 
controversy by entitling one of his works ’Beyond freedom and 
dignity1. Anticipating the criticism that his methods do not allow 
students the dignity of being treated as autonomous, he argues that 
no-one is autonomous. Free-will is an illusion, and since free-will 
and autonomy stand together, both concepts should be ignored. Skinner 
is able to argue in this way because he polarises random and 
determined behaviour. In answer, it can be said that freedom does not 
involve randomness, but is compatible with a certain form of 
determinism, although not predestination. Thus the person who is 
autonomous has free-will, not in an absolute sense, but in the sense 
that any actions are not wholly predictable. Each individual makes 
choices on a number of bases, including his own nature as well as the 
influence of others. Thus this limited autonomy can be misused, 
abused, or ignored as a contrast to being fostered, developed, and 
encouraged. The autonomous man is thus different to Kant’s 
heterogeneous being (12). However, 'free-will' displayed in the form 
of random, unpredictable behaviour is not the sign of an autonomous 
person, but of one who is not ’in control'.
This approach to free-will and autonomy provides the following view of 
behaviour modification. Operant conditioning, based on the rationale 
of behaviour modification, does not seem to respect sufficiently an 
individual's free-will or autonomy, because it treats the subject as 
an object, as an organism whose behaviour is to be 'shaped' in 
Skinner's terms, but 'manipulated' in the eyes of others. The total 
path of behaviour is to be chosen, either by a teacher, or an 
administrator, or a programmer. It is noteworthy that in some 
contexts, the teachers are called 'instructors' or 'supervisors'.
Both the path to be followed, and the method, as well as the outcome, 
are chosen by the organiser of the learning. The student's own 
interests are ignored, except in so far as they may be exploited as 
reinforcement, although the programme may be considered to be 'in the 
student's best interest'.
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One response to this is that all education necessarily follows such a 
pattern. Only at a very advanced stage does a student ever choose his 
area of study. In this country, choices of ’options1 are made at 
fourteen, but these are clearly circumscribed, and are, at best, 
choices within groups of subjects. The syllabus is determined. Even 
with the ’Mode 3 ’ examinations, the work has to be approved. 
Originality of thought is rarely rewarded as much as is logical 
analysis of the material. The same holds of first degree work, and 
even, in some senses, of research. However, there is a difference, as 
Peters points out (13), in following the advice of an authority as a 
rational procedure from a respect of his knowledge rather than of him 
as an individual. Even quite young children can enjoy an academic 
task, become involved and want to learn, for the sake of the task 
rather than for any external reward.
As far as handicapped children are concerned, any approach must be 
varied and tailored to the individual. Much depends on the extent of 
the handicap. It seems obviously wrong to say that in the case of 
mentally handicapped people, free-will can be ignored since such 
people have no rational way of acting, and therefore cannot be said to 
possess free-will. This represents a simplistic view of what 
constitutes mental handicap, and of the variations that are subsumed 
in the term (14).
However, the situation may.appear to be different when considering 
those individuals so profoundly handicapped that they can do nothing. 
The functions of their bodies continue, to a greater or lesser extent, 
but there is no medical hope of improvement. Thus, it is clear that 
the work of enrichment programmes cannot be judged in utilitarian 
terms. For these people, the enrichment of their environment through 
the use of textures, tastes, and lights is performed by devoted 
teachers and nurses from a conviction that they are doing the right 
thing. For these very special, special pupils, behaviour modification 
has no place. It becomes no longer sensible to ask 'What is 
education ?’, but rather ’What should we do ?' It is compassion that 
dictates such action, with a belief that there is something special 
about the human individual. In a sense, each is autonomous, as each 
is an individual unlike any other.
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8.3.2 Paternalism, ends and means.
Paternalism is a term of either praise or criticism which has long 
been used in the social and political considerations of education, 
which often replace the methodological considerations in a debate. 
Paternalism involves the making of choices for other people, choices 
which they are supposed to be unable to make, or are prevented from 
making, for themselves. This inability occurs for several reasons, of 
which the prime reason is that the individual is too young. Good 
parents are paternalistic since they take care to make decisions for 
their children's future, as well as protecting them from present harm. 
Matches are hidden, and gates are placed on stairs. As the child 
develops, the gates are removed, to be replaced by other precautions. 
Pills are hidden from the child and the proper use of, and respect 
for, medicines is taught. This is paternalism in its appropraite 
context, although some extreme proponents of freedom hold that 
children should not be guided in any way. More generally, paternalism 
is opposed when it is seen as inappropriate, either because the 
individuals should be able to choose for themselves, or because the 
very choices are defined for them.
It is felt by many handicapped people that charity is degrading as it
is a form of paternalism. The recipient has a lesser status than the
donor. Moreover the recipient has no role in decisions over the 
distribution of the charity. Thus this form of paternalism is 
believed to involve an unequal relationship, together with a lack of 
dignity, which leads to stigma.
Such criticisms take on an added force when they are viewed in the 
light of behaviour modification programmes. These define the socially 
acceptable behaviour sought by the paternalist, without reference to 
the students, or even to outside norms, and thus both the treatment 
and the standards are imposed on the student. It must be accepted 
that what is 'socially acceptable behaviour' is open to debate, and in 
the treatment of maladjusted or mentally ill people there are real 
moral problems, since both these terms are as emotive in their nature
as is 'socially acceptable behaviour'.
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Two examples can demonstrate tne dirrerences Between individual cases. 
Firstly, if an adult should wish to rid himself of a phobia such as 
the fear of flying, or of an undesired habit like smoking, he may 
voluntarily agree to a programme of behaviour modification. In this 
case the subject remains the subject, even when he submits himself to 
the 'treatment1. This is to be compared to the acceptance of a 
surgical operation or of a course of prescribed pills. All these 
offer a solution to a condition which the adult considers to be 
unwanted. A second, and more dubious, example is that of the person 
convicted of homosexual offences who may yet not wish to change, or 
may believe that paedophilia should not be punishable. He may still 
be forced to undergo operant conditioning or drug therapy to change 
what others regard as errant. Moreover, in a case of a homosexual who 
has a stable relationship which he likens to the heterosexual's 
marriage and also not wishing to change, it might be considered that 
operant conditioning is an unwarranted assault, while still holding it 
to be necessary for the former case.
In these examples, not only is there the question of what constitutes 
socially acceptable behaviour, particularly in a time of changing 
mores, but also there is the question of the morality of making 
choices for another, against his will. The counter-argument that the 
paternalistic psychologist can see what will be in the patient's best 
interest may be regarded as no more than a mask for the political 
control of that person, as in Russia, and is connected to Rousseau's 
contention that a man can be 'forced to be free', which is true only 
under Rousseau's definition of freedom.
Paternalism does not allow people to make their own mistakes. The 
parent eventually recognises when a child can be allowed to do this, 
and indeed learn from his mistakes. This change occurs because the 
parent recognises that the child is an end, not a means. The concept 
of paternalism is closely interwoven with that of ends and means, 
because of the need to ask who should make the choices. Kant advises 
that all actions should be performed so as to respect another's 
autonomy, to treat him as an end, not as a means to one's own end. 
There is the concomitant hope that others will act in the same way 
towards others. This kind of rational approach is taken up by Rawls 
in his advocacy of the 1maximin' principle, whereby the natural choice 
for a person not knowing his own position in a society is shown to
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be an arrangement which only allowed improvements for the better-off 
if these involved an improvement for the least well-off. This, of 
course, supposes that all people want the same sorts of things. Both 
Kant and Rawls presume that to be rational means to choose in the same 
way (as Kant and Rawls). It is when people do not choose, or are 
unlikely to choose, what is held to be rational, that others feel the 
need to choose for them.
A further implication of the difference between using someone as a 
means to one's own end, rather than to his own end, may be illustrated 
by the difference between what is in the individual's best interest 
and what is in the best interest of the staff of the school or 
hospital. Thus, a patient in a psychiatric ward who continuously 
calls the nurses may be ignored, so that losing the reinforcement of 
the nurses' responses, she ceases to bother them. While this clearly 
makes life easier for the nurses working in an understaffed 
psychiatric ward, it also suggests that the purpose of sending the 
patient to their care has been forgotten (18). The patient's best 
interest might well be served by an entirely different course of 
action, for example by providing the patient with an activity such as 
helping the staff, which absorbed her to the extent that she did not 
need to call the nurses and which would have a positive advantage to 
the running of the ward.
Similarly, the use of behaviour modification with a child may change 
his behaviour so that life is made easier for his family or teacher. 
While this may be an important and necessary aim for such treatment, 
it cannot be the only one. It would, for example, make life 'easier' 
for the family if the child was in a permanent drug-induced coma, but 
this cannot be said to allow for the quality of life or the concern 
for the individual that has been defined as his right as a person.
It may appear acceptable to use operant conditioning to teach the 
mentally handicapped the basic skills like communication, rather than 
the social skills or behaviour, since these, it can be argued, are 
clearly beneficial to the child. However, the 'basic skills' in this 
context are the social skills. Evaluative decisions must be made 
about what is acceptable, and what is not.
It is not appropriate, in this thesis, to provide answers to the moral
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questions which have been posed. For the profoundly handicapped, 
decisions have to be made as to what is in their best interest. In 
certain limited cases, operant conditioning may be used if it develops 
skills and even understanding, for then it can be regarded as 
educational. It can never be considered to be a total education, even 
though it may occupy the whole of a person’s schooling in Barrow's 
terms. Operant conditioning appears to be a useful tool with which 
certain limited aspects of a wider education can be covered. Thus, 
for example, it could be used in an emotion-free atmosphere to teach 
the discrimination of similar letter shapes to a dyslexic child.
A moral dilemma has to be faced, and this is that although Skinner's 
'efficiency' may not be enough, it must still not be ignored.
Although teaching methods which do not work, however laudable their 
rationale, may not harm a child who has other means of learning - from 
his parents, his peers, or his environment, for a child with profound 
handicaps, there may be no other route. Efficiency may have to be the 
criterion, albeit mitigated by an appreciation of the necessity of not 
indulging in cruelty.
188
References to Chapter 8.
1 Tatham, M.Y.,1976 : Conditioning - a suitable case for treatment : 
a philosophical analysis of the work of B.F.Skinner, unpub.M.A. 
thesis, University of Surrey.
2 Blackman, D.,1974 : op.cit., p.220.
3 Skinner, B.F.,1973 : Beyond freedom and dignity, Harmondsworth, 
Penguin, ch.5.
4 Cohen, B.,1982 : Means and ends in education, London, George Allen 
and Unwin.
5 Warnock, H.M.,1977 : op.cit.
6 Blackman, D.,1974 : op.cit., p.20.
7 Skinner, B.F.,1968 : The Technology of teaching, New York,
Appleton - Century - Crofts, pp.77-8.
8 Furneaux, B.,1969 : op.cit., p.184.
9 Gulliford, R.,1971 : op.cit., p.53; p.87.
10 Tatham, M.Y.,1976 : op.cit., pp.1-6.
11 Dearden, R.F.,1972 : Autonomy and education, in : Dearden, R.F., 
Hirst, P.H., and Peters, R.S.,(eds.), Education and the 
development of reason, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, p.261.
12 Scruton, R.,1982 : Kant, Oxford, The University Press, p.65.
13 Peters, R.S.,1966 : op.cit., p.240; p.259 et seq.
14 Aspin. D.N.,1982 : op.cit., p.115.
189
Chapter 9
Special Educational Needs
190
Chapter arrangement
9.1 Special Educational Needs : a useful concept ?
9.2 Special Educational Needs : the Warnock approach
9.3 Needs
9.3.1 Educational Needs and Special Needs
9.4 Special Needs : a wider approach
9.4.1 The Special Needs of gifted children
9.4.2 The Special Needs of girls
191
9.1 Special Educational Needs : a useful concept ?
"...we wish to see a more positive approach and we have adopted 
the concept of Special Educational Needs, not in terms of a 
particular disability which a child may be judged to have, but 
in relation to everything about him, his abilities as well as 
his disabilities,- indeed all the factors which have a bearing 
on his educational progress." (1)
The title 'Special Educational Needs' was given to the Warnock Report 
as an explicit contrast to the title of a 1946 pamphlet 'Special 
Educational Treatment' (2). 'Needs' was thus substituted for 
'treatment' on the grounds that the former indicated an personal 
approach to a person as a subject, the latter an impersonal approach 
to a person as an object. It must also be admitted that the Warnock 
Report was following a trend, rather than creating one, for the 
concept of special educational needs was currently fashionable. The 
endorsement of the use of the term by the Report promoted this fashion 
for the use of the word needs, although not always in appropriate 
contexts.
The term special education has been current since the 1944 Act, while 
the first official use of the term special school was in 1926, when it 
was introduced to replace earlier labels, for example 'defective', 
which were seen as derogatory. The term special education was adopted 
to foster a popular acceptance of the idea that the teaching of 
handicapped children was at one with the teaching of the mainstream, 
that it is education, different, but not inferior to any other. In 
practical terms, because the exigencies of the post-war financial 
climate demanded that the new schools be established in isolated 
country houses, special education became socially and educationally 
isolated as well as geographically so.
In the U.S.A., the term exceptional has come into use instead of 
handicapped. Like special, this is a prestige word, used in a rather 
unusual context, to enact a form of persuasive definition. If people 
see such education as special, and such children as exceptional, it is 
thought that there will be less stigma. The useage of the term is
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thus seen as facilitating acceptance and integration, although as the 
analysis of the word normal in Chapter 4 shows, this need not be so.
The effect of the concept of special educational needs permeates the 
Warnock Report, and makes it a logical whole. However, the concept 
presents certain difficulties, since it is never adequately defined. 
The meaning is only given in relation to special education and special 
educational provision, which are themselves defined in terms of 
special educational need. There is no analysis of what might 
constitute a 'need1. Thus children with special educaional needs are 
defined as those who need special educational provision. This is no 
explanation.
Chapter 3 of the Warnock Report, which purports to discuss the 
concept, does not in fact do so. Reasons for adopting the term are 
given; it replaces stigmatizing words like handicapped and disabled, 
it strengthens the individual emphsis, it allows for children with a 
multiplicity of handicaps to be catered for, and the Chapter also 
discusses the proportion of children likely to be in such need.
"...about one in six children at any time and up to one in five 
children at some time in their school career..." (3)
This seems to imply no more than that the members of the Committee 
believe that finance should be provided for special provision for up 
to 20% of the population, including 2% who need to be recorded, 
figures which appear to remain constant.
Although special educational need is such an important concept that it 
provides the title of the Report, and represents the crux of the 
proferred argument, it will be argued in this Chapter that the term 
needs is otiose. Needs is shown to be a word with little practical 
meaning, but which is overlain with strong emotive tones. It is, 
indeed, another prestige word, similar to those discussed in 
Chapter 6. Special educational needs could be said to mean no more 
than 'we approve of special education with an individual approach'. 
'Needs' is here providing an assurance of approval, and acts as a 
contrast to the words formerly used, just as have 'normal',
'education', and 'special'.
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In Chapter 7, it was deemed necessary to add the concept of special, 
special needs to describe the position of children with profound 
handicaps for whom educational integration is an impracticality, 
although one might hope for some measure of social integration to be 
possible. It must be emphasised that for some children, the ’needs’ 
are so different and complex, when compared with those of children 
’with special educational needs’, that special is an inadequate 
description. If mildly handicapped children, such as those with mild 
learning difficulties, who may only ’need’ a sympathetic teacher, have 
special needs, then the prelingually deaf, the profoundly mentally 
handicapped, and many physically handicapped children must have a 
special, special need. Something extra has to be added, to 
acknowledge the severity of the educational problem facing these 
children, their teachers and their parents.
It is also possible to use Warnock's concept of special educational 
need and to extend it logically to cover areas not considered by the 
Committee. If by having a special educational need is meant that a 
child cannot develop to his full educational potential within the 
mainstream classroom without some extra help, then gifted children and 
girls must also be considered. It is argued here that these groups do 
have an educational need, which by this definition is a special 
educational need, and thus statutory provision should be made for 
them despite their omission from the current legislation. This 
conclusion is reached through an analysis of needs, special needs, and 
special educational needs, three areas which cannot be taken to be 
coincident.
If it were to be agreed that gifted children could be officially 
recognised as having such a special need, local education authorities 
would have to make a greater financial provision for these children 
than, through the current programmes of enrichment, bursaries to music 
colleges, and the assisted places scheme, they presently do. In the 
present climate, this would imply that other children were receiving 
less in these areas. At present, entitlement is not claimed on the 
basis of special need, although it can be argued that, logically, it 
should be.
Thus Warnock limits the concept of special educational need, using it 
only to describe differences of approach within a limited context.
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'Special' is an euphemism, and 'Needs' is almost a tautology. 
Interestingly, when taken to its logical conclusion in the case of 
special provision for gifted children or girls, it can be used to 
support arguments for educational divisiveness, rather than the type 
of integration that most followers of Warnock have adhered to.
It is, of course, an empirical question whether there will be any less 
social divisiveness or stigma as a result of the adoption of the term 
'Special Educational Needs' and the new descriptions of educationally 
handicapping conditions. It must also be, at least in part, an 
economic question whether the new system will be allowed to work, 
since it will clearly require more finance than can be saved by 
closing special schools.
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9.2 Special Educational Needs : the Warnock approach.
As has been shown, Warnock, within the terms of reference, gives such 
a wide application to the concept special educational needs that it 
begins to loose its meaning. The concept could be taken to an even 
wider context by the claim that, in fact, the educational needs of all 
children are special, in the sense that each should be treated 
individually, with a personally designed educational work programme. 
Yet, if all are special, none are. There is no meaning if there is no 
contrast. Warnock seems to believe that, by widening the group so 
covered, as well as by ensuring a more appropriate treatment for these 
children, stigma will be eradicated. One does not stigmatise those 
who cannot spell perfectly, or who have difficulty with arithmetic, 
so, Warnock would argue, why should children with greater problems be 
penalised for their disability. Such an approach is very laudable, 
although it must be said to fly in the face of human nature.
The approach in this thesis has been to accept that Warnock’s wider 
group have special needs, but to acknowledge that amongst this group, 
there are a relatively small number of children, those that Warnock 
suggests will be ’recorded1, the nature of whose special educational 
problem is so great that they can be regarded as having special, 
special needs. The children in this group require either to be taught 
extra special contents, or to be taught by extra special methods.
They are, by definition, those who cannot be integrated without a 
considerable educational loss to both themselves and to their ’host’ 
classmates. Warnock says that it is unnecessary to argue the issue of 
integration, since most of the relevant children are already in the 
mainstream, and the Report’s aim is merely to improve the quality of
their learning. The controversy over integration for those with
special, special needs is dismissed. Warnock does not emphasise the 
distinction between 'disabilities’ and ’significant difficulties', 
that is between the 'special' and the 'special, special’, because it
does not match the Report's arguments for social cohesion and the
lessening of stigma. Furthermore, although Warnock does admit that 
some children will always need special school provision, this aspect 
of the Report has been ignored by the local education authorities 
whose duty it is to carry out the provisions of the 1981 Act which
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have been distilled from the recommendations or tne Keport. xne 
variations between the Report, the Act, and the resultant provision, 
are discussed below.
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9.3 Needs.
"Saying what children need is a cloaked way of saying what we 
judge they ought to have." (4)
In their philosophical analysis of the Plowden Report (5), both 
Dearden and Peters single out the concept of needs as used therein for 
specific attention. The close relationship between the ethos of 
Plowden and that of Warnock means that much of this analysis holds as 
much for the latter as it did for the former. Writing in the same 
tradition, Hirst also discusses needs, in relation to the curriculum, 
in terms which are highly pertinent to a consideration of the Warnock 
Report. His conclusion, quoted above, briefly outlines the approach 
upheld earlier in this Chapter, and corresponds to that of Peters :
"...talk of childrens’ needs, is too much a way of dressing up
our value judgements in semi-scientific clothes." (6)
Dearden, Hirst, and Peters all connect the concept of needs to the 
type of individualistic approach advocated by those who support the 
’growth’ theory of education. This lies behind both Warnock and 
Plowden, and suggests that it is possible to talk of a child’s 
potential. If allowed to ’grow', he will develop to his full 
potential through an adequate and apposite education. Some 
educationalists imply that ’growth’ means leaving the child to develop 
as he will. This is not only impossible, since a child will die 
without adult intervention and care, but it also seems unethical, 
since not all tendencies exhibited by a child ought to be fostered : a 
child could ’grow' into a sadist. However, by this approach, it is 
acknowledged that a child has needs to be fulfilled, rather than 
themselves needing to fit into the mould of a set educational system. 
Amongst these needs, Warnock, while not accepting Peters’ picture of 
the child as a 'barbarian at the gate’, does acknowledge that there is 
a need to learn one's place in society and to be prepared for work 
(7).
The terms ’need', 'needs', and 'necessary' have a variety of 
applications. Thus, for example, in a thesis or book, it could be
written 'it is necessary to consider This capitalises on the
shared, but not explicit, understanding that both the reader and the 
writer wish to understand the matter under consideration. If the 
reader wishes to follow the writer's argument, he will acquiesce with 
the 'it is necessary...'. To clarify the point, it can be said that 
'it is necessary...' is really a shorthand for 'if one wishes to 
clarify this exegesis, the following arguments can be applied ...'. 
Similarly, a discussion of needs presupposes both a context, and a 
shared aim of a certain decided outcome, although, as in the case of a . 
thesis, these are seldom made explicit.
The term needs presupposes something lacking, a lack which can 
moreover be rectified externally, rather than by any action on the 
part of the child. Needs can only logically be discussed in relation 
to something else so that 'x' is needed in order to achieve 'y'.
Thus, children need certain foods to grow to healthy adults, they need 
parental love to grow to mentally healthy adults, they need certain 
forms of education to develop into full members of society. Because 
of the dependant nature of the achievement, it is always pertinent to 
question the reasons for the need, although it must be admitted that 
this is seldom done.
In this context, the reasons for the special educational needs are the 
the needs for special help to learn as much as possible, or to develop 
the individual's full potential along certain lines. In other 
societies, these educational needs may not seem so important as they 
do in our own. Even if needs statements are 'cloaked' value 
judgements, there should be no difficulty when the aims of education 
are clear. For the Warnock Committee, the desired outcome was clear, 
and that was that children should be helped as much as possible; to 
develop the different facets of their characters; to be helped to 
understand moral, practical, and aesthetic values; and to be prepared 
for work and leisure. These features should be available to all 
children, although the progress of some will inevitably be slower or 
carried less far than others.
Thus, if this and only this is said to be the desired end for all 
children, they can readily be said to have a variety of needs to 
enable them to achieve it.
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oniraren witn nanaicaps may nave a special neea ror a certain amount 
of extra help, or a special, special need for even more aid, depending 
on the severity of their handicap, and the possible extent of its 
educational palliation. Warnock is clear as to exactly what the 
schools are to achieve for their pupils, a clarity which is not 
possessed by all other writers, who do not realise that even though 
claimed, needs cannot be asserted if the desired outcome is not 
clearly delineated.
Warnock1s (1978) emphasis on needs entailing individualisation is 
contrasted to the then extant (i.e. post 1944) system of large and 
impersonal categories. A table of treatment published in 1946 (8), 
suggested to Warnock set forms of teaching, with as it were, 'one 
handicap, one solution1. Children who did not fit into a category 
were excluded from the system. The concept of needs acknowledges both 
the shortcomings and the strengths both of this approach, and of the 
individual. Individual programmes can be devised for the individuals, 
rather than individuals being expected to fit into existing schema. 
This criticism of the then existing educational provision is, however, 
simplistic. Most schools for handicapped children, with classes, and 
indeed catchment populations much smaller than those of the mainstream 
have endeavoured to allow for individual differences between their 
pupils' development to be accounted for by a balance of group and solo 
work. However, there have been borderline cases for admissions, when 
children have been refused places because they could not fit into the 
school regime. Thus allowance for need is in relation to particular 
situations, and often hinged on the availabilty of particular 
facilities. A school for the deaf, would not for example, have, a 
hydro-therapy swimming pool, or the staff necessary for a physically 
handicapped non-ambulant child, and vice versa.
The term treatment, with its medical overtones is, like remedial, 
banished by the Warnock Report. Both terms are seen therein as 
emotive, and negatively critical, terms which suggest that there is 
something wrong with the child. In many cases, there is indeed 
something wrong. In others, it is the school or home which is wrong, 
but the term is to be replaced in every case. The approach of the 
individual's needs is intended to be positive, although, it is hard to 
see how much more positive it may be than remedial, a term which does 
suggest that despite deficiencies, there may exist some remedy.
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9.3.1 Educational Needs and Special Needs.
It is clear that some 'needs’ are educational, and some are not, being 
emotional needs or financial needs, psychological needs or nutritional 
needs. Indeed, by attempting to assess which needs are educational, 
and which are not, it might be possible to arrive at a definition of 
education. Difficulties with any of the non-educational needs may 
very well lead to an educational need, and because of this they need 
to be solved before education can take place. They have a moral 
priority. There might well be criticism of a developing country that 
boasted a heavily-funded educational system, whilst allowing its 
people to starve. Furthermore, in addition to educational needs, 
there are educational needs which are special, and other special needs 
which are not educational. A pregnant woman, for example, is held to 
have a special need for a nutritionally balanced diet, beyond that 
needed by her non-pregnant sister. The distinction is important, 
since there are people who are handicapped in a conventional sense, 
but not in an educational sense, and others, not conventionally 
handicapped, who have an educational handicap. The former may have a 
special need for transport or domestic help in order to permit them to 
function outside an institution, but not for any educational 
assistance. For the latter, for example, those previously categorised 
as educationaly sub-normal, the need existed purely in an educational 
sense, and yet there was a continuing struggle to ensure acceptance of 
this by the public, who tended to regard the handicap as a global 
one.
Children with special, special educational needs, on the other hand 
may often have other special, special needs. That is their diets, 
play facilities, social acceptance, parents, and teachers may all need 
to be special. However, Warnock's emphasis, and that of this thesis, 
rests on the educational needs, to indicate that these are the proper 
areas for school wherein growth and development can be expected to 
occur, rather than the purely 'care' approach of hospitals, where a 
child in the past could have lain in bed all day.
Special educational needs are those which in themselves are extra or 
different, or need a special type of teaching for their solution.
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Thus it is logical to argue that a gifted child has a need tor music 
lessons to develop his special talents, as much as a handicapped child 
has a need for a wheel chair. Both needs are different from those of 
the children’s peers.
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9.4 Special needs - a wider approach.
The discussion of needs and special educational needs evokes a 
particular view of education and the part schooling should play in an 
individual's life. It implies that education is a matter of 
upbringing, described in terms of the development of the individual, 
and of growth towards his full potential. However, the terms 'growth' 
and 'potential' have their own difficulties, and furthermore, not all 
needs are for things that society is ready to grant; not all growth is 
to be encouraged. A tree or bush can grow wild; it can be stunted; or 
it can be trained, and grow well. Growth metaphors of education 
ignore the pruning, transplanting, uprooting, and cutting down that 
happens in most gardens; such metaphors also frequently ignore the 
role of the gardener.
However, given that the concept of special educational needs should be 
adopted, even if only because it represents an approach which 
emphasises the care of the individual, it is odd that the Warnock 
Report ignored two groups of children whose potential is evidently not 
being tapped, or fulfilled, in our society. One group, that of gifted 
children, is mentioned, but dismissed as 'not in our remit' (9). The 
other group, that is women and girls, is not even mentioned. Yet both 
fulfil all the Report's criteria for inclusion. Both have special, 
and in some cases, special, special needs in terms of completely 
separate placement from the norm of a co-educational, mixed-ability 
classroom.
Here it is argued that many gifted children, and many girls have 
special needs, in that they are unlikely to achieve as much as they 
are capable of unless given special help. Of Warnock's three forms of 
provision for special need (10), gifted children are likely to require 
the second, 'a special or modified curriculum', and girls the third, 
'particular attention to the social structure'. Either group may need 
'specialist teaching techniques’. They would do better given such 
special provision, and at least some gifted children and girls do have 
a need for special, special education.
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9.4.1 The Special Needs of gifted children.
To be clever may appear an advantage rather than a handicap. That 
unrecognised giftedness, however, can lead to maladjustment is 
acknowledged by the Warnock Report, and thus it is in terms of 
maladjustment that such children are discussed. Furthermore, special 
provision will now only be made for a gifted child by the Local 
Education Authority, that is by the state, if he is maladjusted. The 
special provision, whether in a state school or a private one, is made 
because of the maladjustment as a ’special need’, rather than because 
of the frustrated intelligence that has been wrongly treated. Those 
working with either gifted or maladjusted children would concur that 
it is too late to wait until maladjustment has occurred. A positive 
effort is required to spot and provide for such children before the 
harm has been done.
Many studies also consider gifted children in terms of maladjustment, 
since these cases are interesting (11), and there is the potential for 
a solution. The gifted child can indeed be defined as handicapped if 
by this it is meant that he is unable to fulfill his full potential. 
His schooling may handicap him by provoking boredom, leading to a lack 
of interest, and frustration, and hence to behaviour problems such as 
attention seeking or tantrums in the younger child.
It is however, quite possible to discuss the needs of gifted children
without mentioning maladjustment. Many gifted children have rewarding 
hobbies and interests outside school, are perfectly happy and 
well-behaved, yet are capable of much more. It is still possible to
indicate the educational need in terms of an unfulfilled academic or
musical potential.
One of the major difficulties in discussing gifted children is the 
classification of ’a gifted child'. In some studies the 
classification seems to include the fairly large number that would 
previously have attended a grammar school, yet gifted cannot mean very 
much if all academically inclined children are included. A more 
rigorous definition restricts the classification to those with 
’genius’ levels of intelligence, although it is widely recognised that
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IQ scores cannot be taken as reliable guides of this threshold. The 
recognition is easier amongst musically gifted children, some of whom 
reach very high grades in music examinations at an extremely young 
age, which provides an external check on their ability. Those gifted 
in mathematics and science will be regarded as more useful in a 
pragmatically oriented society, despite the possibility that such 
children may well develop into pure, rather than applied, researchers. 
However, it is the musical children, and dancers, who have been given 
special recognition, even at a time when the comprehensive ideal held 
almost unquestioned sway. This is presumably because it is easier to 
judge musical and dance potential at an early age, and because not to 
differentiate on these grounds still brings a charge of philistinism.
The assisted places scheme provides special placement for older able, 
though not necessarily gifted, children, in the same way that there 
has been the special placement for handicapped children, albeit in 
this case with no age limits. The scheme is criticised on a number of 
grounds, very few of which can be called educational. Of the 
criticisms, the most important is that the scheme provides a very high 
level of financial aid to a small number of children at a time when 
the level of finance available for education is declining. It is also 
criticised because the beneficiaries are believed to be 
’middle-class’, who already possess advantages over their peers, 
particularly that of parents who believe in the value of academic 
education. It is suggested that many such children would go to the 
schools whether or not the scheme existed. Furthermore, critics of 
the scheme hold that it opposes the comprehensive ideal and makes the 
system of mixed ability teaching inoperable by ’creaming off’ the most 
able, thus depriving the less able of contact with the more able and 
vice-versa. A final criticism is that the beneficiaries, unlike the 
handicapped children, for whom all the above criticisms are also true, 
are sent to prestigious private schools, which will not only provide a 
better education, but also a type of social upbringing and status 
which is deprecated by the critics.
A brief study of education systems in other countries soon makes it 
necessary to face the question of which special needs must be catered 
for, and which gifted children must be encouraged. In the Soviet 
Union, for example, children who are gifted gymnasts or potentially so 
attend, from a very early age, special schools. Here, a large part of
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the time is spent in gymnastic training. Being gifted as a gymnast is 
seen as an educational difference and as a special need, because the 
U.S.S.R. wants to produce highly skilled gymnasts who will enhance the 
nation’s prestige. In this country, would-be gymnasts have to 
complete their training in voluntary clubs, out of school hours, with 
but limited financial support in terms of central or local government 
grants. Much of the coaches’ time, and that of the parents, is spent 
on fund-raising rather than training. Much of the child’s time is 
spent practising in the early morning or late at night. The same is 
true for skaters and athletes or footballers. By contrast, if the 
same children wished to become ballet dancers, or have a musical gift, 
a number of limited opportunities for special treatment are available. 
In such schools, the need for musical practice, for example, is 
balanced against the needs of the wider curriculum and the examination 
system, which is not a feature of the Soviet system. Although in 
Britain these specialist schools are private, state scholarships do 
exist, and they thus correspond to the assisted places scheme. The 
schools are, however, like those in the assisted places scheme, only 
at secondary level, and even if younger children can have their needs 
served by, for example, a choir school, there is no local or national 
governmental assistance.
This points to another contrast between Britain and countries with 
centrally-planned economies in their approach to educational needs. 
This is emphasised in the English language by the classification of 
ballet and music as ’arts', while skating, athletics, or football are 
’sports'. One 'trains’ for football, athletics, or skating, but one 
'practises' or 'learns' ballet and music. This is despite the fact 
that present-day ballet and gymnastics have few differences in either 
training or performance, and the same child will probably achieve as 
well in either. Can it still be supported as a logical proposition 
that a child choosing ballet has a special educational need, while one 
choosing gymnastics does not ?
In the examples given above, it is tempting to say that the decision 
to differentiate is made because of the state's needs rather than for 
the child's. Whichever is the morally correct approach must also be 
applied to the academically gifted child. That is, should 
differentiation occur for the child's own sake, or because of the 
state's need to avoid the expenses of maladjustment ? Or should
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utilitarian considerations of the country's needs take precedence ?
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9.4.2 The special needs of women and girls.
It has been suggested that post-war developments in women's education, 
employment opportunities and social expectations has led not to an 
improvement of relationships between men and women, but to an increase 
in divorce rates. One reason for this, it is suggested, is that men, 
and particularly husbands, are made to feel inadequate, threatened, or 
insecure by the success of, and demands made by, their womenfolk.
This brings out the possibility of another moral dilemma, which is 
found at the point where different needs coincide, and may not be 
reconcileable. Both men and women may need to change. Here again, 
discussion centres on roles, relationships, and the relevance of 
certain differences. Which differences are the relevant ones is open 
to argument, as Lucas has shown (12).
It can reasonably be argued that in an educational sense, sex is a 
relevant difference. It was once believed that girls were less 
rational than their brothers, and hence could not cope with an 
academic curriculum; art, music and embroidery being their proper 
concern. Those few girls who managed to obtain an academic education 
disproved this notion, but while it was considered unladylike to want 
to learn academic matters, this attitude, with the lack of 
opportunity, rather than the inability of girls to learn, ensured that 
the numbers of girls taking advantage of an educational opportunity 
remained small.
More recent arguments for differentiation by sex suggest that the 
attitude that educational success is unfeminine still has some 
influence among girls. To counteract this, the federation of schools 
run under the Girl's Public Day School Trust, epitomises the emphasis 
on a single sex environment. The schools give their pupils the 
opportunity of seeing women in all the positions of authority, 
responsibility, trust, and achievement. The girls are also freed from 
the need to 'fight' boys for their teacher's attention - a fight they 
would be bound to loose if they were not prepared to become extremely 
aggressive. This last problem has become noticeable in mixed schools, 
and in some of these, classes in certain subjects like computing or 
mathematics, where the girls lack the confidence of their boisterous
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male peers, are now taught in sex-segregated groups.
The arguments for a special, that is a single-sex, education for girls 
imply that boys also receive a special, single-sex, education. Yet if 
boys were found to benefit in both their attitude to work, and their 
social behaviour, from co-education, this would be a further 
coincidence of opposing needs.
It is important not to confuse these arguments with those which 
advocate parental choice, or those of religious beliefs. However, 
girls from ethnic minorities may have a particularly strong need for 
single-sex schooling, since their early upbringing is likely to have 
left them not only lacking confidence when faced by the male, but also 
a wholly subservient approach to the male. At the same time, the 
ethos of the successful girl is so completely alien to their parents' 
culture, that the education may cause considerable family conflict.
Whether the schools are independent, as are those of the Girls' Public 
Day School Trust, or are funded by the local authority, as single-sex 
comprehensive schools, the question of differentiation to provide for 
a need has obvious moral, as well as practical, implications. If 
resources are limited, should they be devoted to duplicating 
facilities for sex-segregation, or on special music schemes and 
periapatetic teachers, or on special education for the more able, or 
on special equipment and training for teachers of the handicapped, or 
should they be devoted to improving the comprehensive school ?
In our society, we have decided that the child who is blind, musical, 
female, or mathematically gifted, has a special educational need. The 
gymnast or the footballer has a need, but his is not educational.
Which of these gifts we regard as special enough to demand special 
treatment in terms of allowing them additional resources depends on 
our own moral and political ideals.
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10.1 Development of integration.
"We have...judged it more fruitful to concentrate on the 
practical requirements for the future than to continue to 
debate the advantages and disadvantages of integration." (1)
In 1976, an Education Act was passed by Parliament, although it was 
never implemented (2). Amongst sections to end selection for 
different kinds of education, was Section 10 which stated that 
handicapped children should be taught in maintained (i.e. Local 
Authority) mainstream schools 'in preference to' special schools. As
the Warnock Committee had been sitting since 1974, it was decided not
to implement the Act until their Report had been received and debated. 
The Report followed the arguments of this Section of the 1976 Act with 
some amendments, but regarded the provisions for integration as 
immutable.
The enactment of the subsequent 1981 Education Act brought both 
Section 10 of the 1976 Act, and most of the proposals of the Warnock 
Report, to the Statute Book (3). Consequently, it has influenced the 
education of children with special needs. However, the view of 
integration which has become commonly accepted represents a 
simplification of the provisions of both the Acts and the Report.
Following the historical development, it may be said that what was 
previously the story of selection for different types of schooling has 
become the story of integration. In the process of this change, the 
word selection has changed its meaning from the making of choices 
about a normal child's eductaion taking place in one of a range of 
placements, from technical school, through secondary modern school to 
grammar school. 'Selection' now means the making of choices about 
different aspects of integration within the preferred setting of the 
comprehensive school. The picture is complicated by the existence of 
independent schools on the one hand and of children too handicapped 
for the mainstream on the other. In particular, for those who support 
the notion of a unitary state education system, it is proving as 
difficult to destroy the former as to ignore the latter.
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Originally, the arguments about selection were concerned only with the 
secondary age range. However, they have come to permeate the whole 
system. Thus the primary schools, or first and middle schools 
depending on the arrangements of the Local Education Authority, are to 
be as comprehensive as the secondary schools. Warnock pinpoints the 
change of emphasis from selection to integration :
"In particular, completion of the re-organisation of all-age 
schools in the 1960s, and the progressive ending of selection 
for secondary education which followed the issue of Circular 
10/65 enabled ordinary primary and secondary schools to broaden 
their educational programmes and to take greater account of 
individual children's needs." (4).
However, Circular 10/65 represented a position which would have seemed 
very alien to the educationalists of the earlier decades of the 
century. The 'right1 to secondary education for all children was 
first mooted in the Hadow Report (5). Before this, secondary 
education meant education in grammar and public schools, most children 
leaving their elementary schools at 13. In 1901, free places had been 
made available at grammar schools, and when the state secondary 
schools were established after 1904, these were modelled on 
traditional grammar and public school lines. The developing 'top 
level' of the elementary school was not considered as secondary 
education at all, although catering for the older children. Even in 
the 1918 Act, with its abortive plan for 'continuation schools', there 
was no suggestion of a different pattern for secondary schooling.
Official arguments changed with the Hadow Report, and according to 
Maclure
"Reorganisation of schools on what became known as Hadow lines 
began in the 1930s, and the 1944 Act formalized the changes." 
(6).
The Hadow Report represents a step towards the comprehensive school in 
advocating a new form of secondary school for all. The choice of 
three quite different types of institution, Grammar School, Technical 
School, and the new Secondary Modern School demonstrates a belief in 
the necessity of educational selection of quite different groups of
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pupils suited to different strata in life. This belief continued to 
be the received opinion until well after the passing of the 1944 Act.
The Spens Report of 1938 (7) draws surprisingly close to the concept 
of the comprehensive school in its advocacy of a ’multilateral1 
system, in which all types of school should have 'parity'. The Report 
develops advice on the achievement of this parity, studying the 
feasibility of multilateral schools, which sound very like the 
streamed comprehensive schools which developed after 1965. Such 
schools were rejected in 1938 because of their inevitably large size, 
and the difficulty of finding a head teacher sufficiently 
knowledgeable over the whole range of pupil ability. Ironically, the 
large size of the proposed comprehensive schools was held to be an 
argument in their favour a quarter of a century later, since it 
allowed an adequate sixth form.
Of further interest in the Spens Report is the emphasis on 
intelligence testing, with no doubts being expressed as to the 
accuracy of such tests, or their appropriateness for placing children 
in the developing multilateral system of grammar, technical and 
secondary modern school. As in Hadow, selection is the aim, 
integration not being considered as the groups appeared all the time 
to be quite separate, and easily delineated.
The subsequent Norwood Report (1943), continues this theme :
"The evolution of education has in fact thrown up certain 
groups, each of which can and must be treated in a way 
appropriate to itself" (8),
and goes on to detail different approaches to life and learning for 
these types of pupil. The first is 'interested in learning for its 
own sake'; the second has 'interests and abilities markedly in the 
field of applied science and applied art'; and the third deals 'more 
easily with concrete things and ideas'.
The Norwood Report shows a lessening of confidence in the accuracy of 
intelligence testing :
"However carefully devised and sympathetically carried out,
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differentiation at 10 or 11+ cannot be considered as final. 
Opportunity must be given for the rectifying of mistakes or for 
dealing with cases of late development or failure to fulfill 
promise." (9).
A Lower School is suggested, with 13+ as the final age for definite 
placement; free movement of pupils between different types of school 
was envisaged. The confidence evinced earlier in the automatic 
’parity' between schools is demonstrated to be over optimistic :
"Parity of esteem, in our view, cannot be conferred by 
administrative decree nor by equality of cost per pupil. It 
can only be one by the school itself." (10)
The 1943 White Paper on Educational Reconstruction has three main 
features : firstly, it rec^omended a form of classification for 
children (the 11+ test); secondly, it recognised that the grammar 
school still held the most prestige; and thirdly, it acknowledged that 
the three-fold form of educational provision, which was still adhered 
to, could be provided in one building, or on one site (11).
The early aspirations for what became the 11+ test bore very little 
relation to the system that actually developed. It was hoped that 
selection could occur :
"...not on the result of a competitive test, but in an 
assessment of their individual aptitudes largely by such means 
as school records, implemented, if necessary, by intelligence 
tests, due regard being had to their parents’ wishes and the 
careers they had in mind." (12)
It was obviously not envisaged that, as in fact happened, these 
intelligence tests themselves could become a competitive examination, 
for which pupils were coached, and which had 'an effect on the 
curriculum'.
Although revolutionary in officially offering 'efficient full time 
education’ rather than 'elementary instruction', the 1944 Act, with 
its emphasis on different types of school and education being offered
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’according to age, ability, and aptitude’ of the pupil, encapsulates 
the beliefs about psychology and learning held over the previous 
twenty years. Despite the fact that it can be seen as leading to the 
development of poor secondary modern schools and the problems of the 
11+, the Act is still another step towards comprehensive schools and 
the rejection of selection on educational grounds. This is because 
during the period from Hadow to 1944, selection on the basis of 
parents’ financial standing was rejected in favour of selection on 
educational grounds. The grammar school remained the desired place 
for those who could benefit from it. Furthermore, as Warnock 
explains, the 1944 Act declared that :
"...special educational treatment would be required for up to 
17% of the school population...(and)...ordinary schools would 
have the major share in providing it." (13)
The next twenty years, leading to Circular 10/65 on comprehensive 
re-organisation, saw a complete change of ideas, comparable to that 
marked by the Hadow Report in 1926. It was gradually realised that 
the secondary modern schools were not achieving ’parity of esteem'. 
Reports suggested that selection at 11+ seemed to be picking the wrong 
pupils. This led to the more radical consideration that selection in 
any form was inadvisable.
The 1954 Report 'Early Leaving' (14) first introduced the possibility 
of social factors complicating the 11+ selection procedure. This was 
in response to the finding that numbers of pupils left the grammar 
schools early with no examination passes. The 1959 Crowther (15), and 
1963 Newsom Reports (16), respectively on the more and less able 
pupils, followed the same ground. The latter was particularly 
critical of the physical conditions and staffing problems of the 
Secondary Modern Schools, and showed how these factors, combined with 
residence 'in the slums', held back the education of many children 
(17). The term 'priority' is introduced by the Newsom Committee, and 
there is a statement very reminiscent of the Warnock Committee's views
"...the idea of 'below average ability' easily suggests 'below 
average pupils' as though the boys and girls so described were
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being regarded as generally inferior and in some way less worth 
educating...” (18).
The Newsom Report can be seen as leading to a backwater, since it made 
no assessment of the best form of organisation for secondary 
schooling, being concerned to make improvements in one limited area, 
and by no means to change the status quo. The change of Government in 
1964 led to the decision that comprehensive schools be adopted as the 
best means of assuring adequate secondary schooling for all pupils. 
Local authorities were asked to submit plans for their areas with the 
understanding that
"It is the Government’s declared objective to end selection at 
11+ and to eliminate separatism in secondary education." (19)
Six main forms of comprehensive organisation were outlined, but no 
guidance was given on the streaming or setting which could lead to 
separatism within a school. It was the separation of children into 
different schools that was seen as socially divisive.
"...the separation of children of differing aims and aptitudes 
in to different schools at the age of 13 or 14 ... is 
acceptable ... only as an interim stage." (20)
It is accepted in the Circular that children do vary.
"The more able children must not be held back or denied the 
range of subjects and qualities of teaching which they would 
have enjoyed in a grammar school. Equally, their needs must 
not be met at the expense of other children." (21)
The Circular advises the need to balance 'educational disadvantages’ 
against the 'benefits that will flow from the adoption of 
comprehensive schooling'.
The change of Government in 1970 prevented the passing of the 
Education Bill formalising the changes of the late 1960s. However, 
the reorganisation was well under way in most local authority areas, 
and the comprehensive school became the norm for state secondary 
education in England and Wales. The comprehensive ethos has changed,
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however, from the early slogan ’grammar schools for all’ to a form of 
mixed ability teaching, especially in the lower part of the schools.
Under the Labour Government of 1974-9, the next step was to examine 
the relationship between the state and the private sector. The Newsom 
Report (1968) had deprecated the existence of the private sector as a 
more radical form of separatism (22), and for the 'socially divisive 
effect’, which produced
"...an arbitrarily selected membership which already starts 
with an advantageous position in life.” (23)
The aim was to integrate such schools into the comprehensive system, 
and although this continues to be the aim of some political factions, 
it remains remote, as both legal problems, and the prevailing 
political realities are at present overwhelming. The Conservative 
Government, indeed, introduced the Assisted Places Scheme to widen the 
availability of private schooling.
After the failure of the 'anti-selection lobby' in the case of 
independent schools, the attack was turned to other selective schools 
with the 1970 Report on the Direct Grant Schools. Following another 
change of Government (back to Labour), the Secretary of State 
announced in 1975 that financial support would be withdrawn from any 
such schools which refused to join the maintained sector. By the due 
date, some 35 schools had agreed to join, while many more 'went 
independent'. Paradoxically, therefore, the attempt at ending 
selection resulted in selectivity on a much wider scale, with greater 
educational distinctiveness and a greater emphasis on parents' 
financial capability as an entrance requirement, although it must be 
noted that many schools offer bursaries, for example
"...(to) enable financial assistance to be available for girls 
who qualify on merit for entry but whose parents could not 
afford full fees". (24)
Thus these schools, many of which were previously regarded as, and 
often founded specifically for, poorer children to obtain an 
'academic' education, have had to become more 'elitist'. Not only is 
it harder to get in on academic grounds, but also the financial
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consideration nas Decome ail important. This last consideration now 
also has become important for children with special needs. There have 
always been those parents who have been prepared to pay fees so that 
their child should not be in a 'special school', thus acknowledging 
the stigma that that term was intended to circumvent, but this 
willingness has increased as the private sector has risen to meet the 
need for the education of dyslexic children, a condition only recently 
recognised by the local education authorities.
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10.2 Integration now.
To some people, the integration of all handicapped children into the 
'ordinary schools' of their neighbourhood has been an important aim of 
intrinsic value to the extent that it has become the aim, paramount 
above all other considerations. Integration was not held by either 
the Warnock Report or Section 10 of the 1976 Education Act to be 
possible for all children, and nor, therefore, subject to certain 
provisos, as the only aim. These provisos were that integration was 
preferable if certain conditions could also obtain, namely that the 
integrated provision must be 'practicable', 'compatible with the 
provision of efficient instruction', and ensured 'the avoidance of 
unreasonable expenditure' (25). This difference makes it necessary to 
examine the concept further.
As has been stated (26), the Warnock Report was hailed as
revolutionary on the grounds of its espousal of the integration
principle, although the Report did not argue the case. It merely 
followed the 1976 Act, in which the proposal was stated, and then 
elaborated ways of reconciling the overall recommendations with the 
necessary provisos mentioned above. In particular, nowhere does the 
Report state that all handicapped children should be in ordinary 
schools, sitting alonside their able-bodied peers. On the contrary, 
detailed explanations are given of the type of special school 
provision needed by the minority. Most children with Warnock's 
widened kind of special need are integrated already, or at least 
attend their local school. This is why
"...the well-worn arguments for and against integration, being 
framed in terms of the 2% of children at present ascertained as
having special education, do not fit our wider concept of
special education." (27)
A typical 'revolutionary' comment on the 1981 Act and the Warnock 
Report is provided by the 'ACE Special Education Handbook'. This 
states
"For many people, the most exciting and significant duties in
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the Act are those which promote (for the first time in 
implemented legislation) the education of children with special 
needs in ordinary schools alongside children without such 
needs, rather than in separate and segregated special schools 
and units. The duties to integrate into ordinary schools and, 
once in the school, within its normal activities, apply to ALL 
children, whatever their disability and however severe it may 
be." (28)
The conditions which might make this impossible are outlined in the 
Handbook, and are shown to be in accord with previous legislation, but 
they are then largely ignored in the discussion, although they are 
written in to the 1981 Act. The latter states that integration is 
'preferable1 if the child can still receive the relevant special 
educational provision, and if this provision is compatible with the 
'efficient education' of his classmates, and with an 'efficient use of 
resources (29).
The Warnock Report had examined what these provisos might mean in 
practical terms, and , while acknowledging that the views of parents 
were important, came to the conclusion that not all children could 
learn with their peers (30). The ACE Handbook emphasises the duty of 
the Local Education Authority to take parents' views into 
consideration, and shows how parents can take legal proceedings to 
assure this 'right' (31). It does not, however, acknowledge, as does 
Warnock, that there are occasions where the child's need may be for 
separate education, even if the parents disagree, although it does 
perceive that some parents may claim a special need for which the 
Local Education Authority will not make provision.
From the Warnock Report it can be seen that there are a few children 
for whom integration, meaning sitting next to their able-bodied 
neighbour in the local school, is neither practicable nor desirable, 
either because of the handicapped child's own needs being 
unfulfillable in this situation, or because of the effect his presence 
might have on the education of others.. Thus the teacher might be 
insufficiently equipped, in time, in training, in ability, or in 
resources, to attend to the needs of all her pupils. However, the 
Warnock Report also demonstrates that 'integration' can mean more than 
'sitting next to their able-bodied neighbour in the local school',
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that it can indeed mean many things, almost to the point where it 
begins to mean almost nothing at all. Integration is yet another 
emotive concept.
The American term ’mainstreaming', preferred by many, misses this 
strong emotive connotation of ’integration'. Furthermore, the latter 
term, with two possible antonyms in 'segregation' and 
'differentiation', allows for too wide a variety of actual meanings. 
Thus most proponents of integration are against the segregation of 
handicapped chidren in special schools, whilst wishing to retain a 
form of differentiation of treatment, and greater financial 
commitment, better pupil-teacher ratios, and special equipment, all 
seen as the 'advantages of special education'. A prescient few fear 
that emphasis on integration as an intrinsic good will mean loss of 
special service and special expertise.
Discussion of integration or mainstreaming cannot, furthermore, refer 
to the school experience alone, any more than any educational system 
can afford to ignore the world in which pupils now live as children, 
and which they will inhabit as adults. Increased social interaction 
outside the school will not necessarily stem from closer educational 
contact, and even may itself be necessary before the latter is 
achieved. Furthermore, the nature of a meritocratic society is likely 
to affect the possible extent of integration (32).
Hegarty and Pocklington have a view of integration as the way an 
ordinary school and a special school can merge to form a new sort of 
educational body, in the way that salt mixed with water gives brine 
(33). Our physical environment has been gradually changed as ramps, 
wide lifts, and specially adapted toilet facilities become the norm. 
These changes, made for the physically handicapped, may also benefit 
the able-bodied, and it may be that similar changes need to occur in 
the social and educational environment. As Hegarty and Pocklington 
remind us, too often integration has been seen as a simple total 
assimilation of an alien group into an existing environment without 
any effect on that environment.
The similar problem of ethnic minorities is a useful example, since 
many handicapped people have compared their situation with the victims 
of apartheid. With a group of immigrants, the desire is rarely simply
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to melt into the background. West Indians would not deny that there 
are differences between themselves and others; it is just that skin 
colour and hair texture are not relevant differences for most 
purposes. This does not indicate a wish to forget customs, religions 
and dietary observances, for it is felt that there is room for 
differences within a community or society without stigma being 
attached. It is possible to wish for a society which is not
stratified by colour, without wishing for everyone to be the same
colour. If the British diet has been affected by the adoption of many
dishes, from curry to zabaglione, can not also the customs and way of
life be affected ?
Three main aspects of integration emerge. These are
a) social integration;
b) educational integration;
c) integration in employment.
The third is clearly dependent on the first two. These three aspects 
mirror three concerns of the parents of a handicapped child, social 
acceptability, schooling, and financial independence.
A difference needs to be made between the requirements of integration 
within the school, and those of integration as an adult. As noted 
above, the mere physical presence of a child in a classroom with his 
peers does not constitute integration, and cannot be taken as a good 
in itself. The extent of integration that is possible for any 
particular child depends not only on his handicap, the nature of his 
family life, and his determination, but also on the nature of the 
school, and the quality of the teachers. There is the danger of 
thinking of ’host1 school, and 'guest' pupil, rather than in the 
desired terms of a family with various members, each of whom has to 
accomodate the others.
Physical integration at too early an age might prevent special 
teaching, or might exacerbate the handicapping condition. For 
example, the noise of an ordinary classroom may make a language 
impaired child's position even worse. The child may be unable to 
develop his full potential to mix socially as an adult, through a lack 
of either social or educational development.
The social differentiation in our society is caused, it is argued, by
the differentiation in schooling, between independent and state 
school, or between grammar and secondary modern, and yet it is not 
immediately clear whether educational differences exacerbate social 
differences, or merely mirror them. These social distinctions might 
remain whatever happened to the educational system : even if all 
children were taken away from their parents and reared together, 
social distinctions might develop as the children grew older. The 
social differences between handicapped and able-bodied people might 
need another solution beyond common schooling.
If social aims are not held to be paramount, but educational aims are 
given precedence, the individual's personal development through 
education might gradually facilitate the social integration of the 
growing child. There is an obvious conflict here between the ideals 
of the teacher and of the parent. A prelingually deaf child will 
need, particularly in the early stages of his education, such an 
intense concentration on language development that education with his 
peers is precluded. The social losses of the present have to be 
balanced against the possible gains of the future.
A similar conflict occurs, as has been noted, in the debate over 
co-education. If it is true that abler girls do better educationally, 
measured by examination passes, in single sex schools, then we may 
better achieve an aim of full social integration, as measured by an 
equivalence of academic success, of male and female adults by 
separating them as children. If girls learn to underachieve whilst 
studying alongside boys, and so are conditioned to perpetuate the 
place of the female as a second class citizen, social integration on 
more equal terms might be achieved by an amount of educational 
differentation. The analogy with the handicapped is clear.
A representative problem occurs with the profoundly deaf. 
Traditionally, in this country, the social aim has been held 
paramount, and oralism has been the main focus of teaching to enable 
children to mix with their peers and to be understood by their own 
families. Yet now, as noted in Chapter 7, teachers and parents are 
tending to the view that too much concentration on articulation per se 
is causing too great a neglect of ordinary education. Use of some 
form of sign language or cued speech would enable more intellectual 
growth and development, and this would compensate for the social
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consequences of isolation in communication.
Integration, or mainstreaming, as the Warnock Report demonstrates, can 
be affected by a variety of methods of educational organization. The 
two ends of this spectrum are complete educational segregation in a 
special boarding school, followed by a training centre, work for 
Remploy, or the mental hospital, and placement in a neighbourhood 
school, with no allowances made for the handicap. The placement 
needed, and the alternatives available, will vary not only with the 
handicap, but also with the individual’s reaction to his handicap.
The isolation of the special boarding school is rarely necessary, 
although the alternatives may be a considerably greater drain on local 
authority resources, but there are children, mentally ill or violent, 
who do need isolation, just as there are adults who, despite all the 
claims for community health care for the mentally ill, do need to be 
kept apart to prevent them from harming themselves or other people. 
Discussion of integration frequently ignores the very severely 
handicapped, whose cases assert that there can be no single solution 
for the whole of the spectrum.
One of the alternatives given in the Warnock Report to true or 
’functional' integration is the special school sharing a campus with 
other schools, with joint sports and dining facilities (34). Such a 
school could be independent, or it could be no more than a unit of the 
ordinary school, where all the children are part of a year group, 
despite receiving their lessons in the special unit. A further 
restriction could be for the special unit being a 'resource unit', 
where certain children go for extra help. Other alternatives are for 
the handicapped child to be wholly within an ordinary class, with a 
visiting 'special' tutor giving occasional help, or having a 'special' 
programme of learning devised by the class teacher. While all these 
variations do exist, it is not clear at which point 'integration' is 
achieved, even though Warnock dignifies them all with this title 
(35).
TThe Warnock Report compares 'locational' integration, 'social' 
integration, and 'functional' integration. Many children in ordinary 
classrooms who are not handicapped are not integrated with their
peers, while many special units attached to ordinary schools function,
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in effect, as isolated special schools, with little social contact for 
either staff or pupils in the host school. They are indeed ’attached 
to1 rather than ’part of' the main school.
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10.2.1 The Comprehensive School.
Another way of viewing integration is to regard it as an extension of 
the comprehensive ideal.
"The comprehensive school must be seen as the place where 
integration is to take place". (36)
Although recent discussion about the comprehensive school has been 
largely concerned with the secondary age range, there has always also 
been selection in the primary age range also. Most obviously, 
different areas are chosen as places to live by different categories 
of parents, resulting in parental selection of schools by the 
operation of ’catchment areas', and thus restricting the social mix of 
the school. This trend is especially marked in local authority areas 
that include neighbourhoods of inner-city deprivation, and to overcome 
the educational imbalance thus caused, the policy of 'bussing' has 
been resorted to by some American states, and by some English local 
authorities. Additionally, parents may cite religious preferences, 
either from conviction, or from a desire for a particular form of 
schooling, for example, in a single-sex school for Muslims, or in one 
which is particularly formal for Anglicans or Roman Catholics.
Within the primary school there has also been selection in streams, 
although this has been less prevalent since the general abolition of 
the 11+ examination. However, there are likely to be more mildly 
handicapped children in primary schools, whose need for special 
education will manifest itself in the secondary school. Thus, 
although it might be argued that special primary schools could 
facilitate a child's entry into an integrated secondary school, in the 
present system, the younger the child, the less likely he is to be 
isolated educationally, despite the pressures noted above, which 
continue unabated at secondary level.
Indeed, it appears that comprehensive schools, which were designed to 
eliminate selection, have encouraged the increase of separatism on 
other than strictly academic grounds. It has proved impossible to
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achieve
"...schools...(that) are as socially and intellectually 
comprehensive as is practicable.” (37)
Yet it is into this, apparently flawed, system that the handicapped 
child is to be integrated.
The arguments now given in support of comprehensive schools are 
actually arguments against differentiation, and are quite different 
from those of the comprehensive schools' early proponents, who saw 
them as 'grammar schools for all'. The original proponents, seeing 
the faults of the secondary modern schools, were eager to extend to 
all the advantages of the grammar school, whereas the present 
proponents of 'comprehensivisation' are against the grammar school for 
being selective and divisive. Yet selection continues between 
different residential areas, continuing the distinction between the 
secondary modern and the grammar school in a different, and perhaps 
more arbitrary, guise. The panacaea, mixed ability teaching, is 
complicated by the demands of the examination system. Even the 
adoption of a common examination at 16+ will not dissolve the 
necessity for selection after that age, 01 those who should go on to 
sit A-levels at 18. This is followed by selection for College or 
University, for employment or unemployment.
The contemporary comprehensive school is likely to be organised in one 
of three ways. It may practise an internal selection, leading to a 
rigid distinction between streams, comparable to that between the 
secondary modern and the grammar schools. While ostensibly providing 
for all children, these schools give a very different educational and 
social experience to each stream. The second method of organisation 
is to practise not a global selectivity, but a more fluid system of 
'sets', where the child's teaching in each subject is with a group of 
children of similar ability in that subject. The third method, 
adopted in what might be termed 'true' comprehensive schools, is to 
practise mixed ability teaching throughout the whole age band. Even 
these latter schools have generally needed some form of remedial 
scheme, acknowledging that some children cannot 'cope', and have 
required other children to leave the school because the school cannot 
'cope* with them. The ability of the school to integrate children
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with special educational needs, or special, special educational needs 
will depend, in part, on its present organisation, as well as on the 
calibre of its staff.
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10.2.2 Integrating children with special needs.
Most of the children to be assessed as having a special educational 
need and whose education is to be integrated into the mainstream 
comprehensive school, are not those traditionally thought of as being 
handicapped. The Warnock Report challenges schools to provide more 
carefully for for such children, rather than advocating a more 
revolutionary approach. If schools are to practise mixed-ability 
teaching, in some, if not all, subjects, at the lower end of the 
school, the presence of these children may affect the quality of 
teaching that is possible. Because of this, the Report makes detailed 
recommendations on the training and support of staff (38).
A few children with special educational needs who find themselves 
integrated having previously been in special schools will need merely 
adaptations to the physical environment to make the integrated 
placement feasible.
For both these groups of children, there are possible drawbacks to 
being assessed as having special educational needs. For the former 
group, there is still the chance that they will be stigmatised, 
perhaps where they were formerly not, by association, in name at 
least, with the more severely handicapped children. Being singled out 
as different in a mixed ability class may be very little different 
from the miseries of the remedial scheme, and be without the 
compensation of hope that remedial implies. Moreover, individual 
difficulties may become more obvious by comparison with the abler 
children in such a mixed ability environment. If a core curriculum is 
adopted, this will exacerbate this problem, as there will be children 
who are unable to achieve the core.
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10,2.3 Integrating children with special, special needs.
Children with some types of severe handicap are easier to place than 
others. It is not mere expense that is the criterion, as is show^^n by 
the case of the profoundly deaf. Their educational needs go far 
beyond special microphones and other electronic equipment. Such aids 
are cheaper and easier to provide than the large-scale adaptations to 
a building needed for a child in a wheel-chair to be enabled to enter, 
yet the educational problems of the profoundly deaf child are far 
greater than those of the limbless child.
The delicate child has a different problem. A child who is frequently
ill from chest complaints, or who needs frequent surgery for a heart 
complaint, or who needs regular physiotherapy, may find it very hard 
to manage even any semblance of 'keeping up' with his peers, even when 
endowed with superior intelligence, or when working on an independent 
programme in the basic subjects of mathematics or English. Frequent 
absences, furthermore, may militate against the child being familiar 
enough with anyone to be truly part of the school.
The physically handicapped child of normal intelligence may be more 
easily integrated in the educational sense, yet he cannot join in
sports lessons. A very young spastic child may have problems with the
'learning by experience' method used for early mathematics. He cannot 
necessarily gain the concepts from sand and water play. Indeed, any 
two children will always be getting a completely different experience 
in the same class-room.
These examples show that integration, even if considered a good, in 
that it may lead to other desired aims, may in some cases be counter 
productive, and actually harmful to a particular child.
In the past, there have been many reasons why individual children have 
been placed in special schools. The Warnock Report claims to 
represent and advocate the 'good practise' already prevalent in the 
country, rather than suggesting a revolution of treatment. Some 
handicapped children have always been placed in ordinary schools if it 
has seemed appropriate and possible.
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However, what is accepted as appropriate and possible is now changing. 
As a result of the Warnock Report and the 1981 Act, Local Education 
Authorities are reconsidering the education of children with 
statements, to establish whether they can be 'mainstreamed*. Parents 
are now more concerned that the likely closure of special schools will 
lead to one of a number of possibilities not in the best interest of 
their children. The few remaining schools are likely to have to cater 
for a mixture of children with a wide range of incompatible serious 
problems. There will be no role models for the less able to copy, and 
the children will tend to 'pick up' the various less desirable 
manifestations from each other. Furthermore, the distances the 
parents and children will have to travel will increase. Thus for 
those children kept in special schools, educational and social 
isolation will only increase, as it lessens for their former peers who 
are now integrated. For these latter, however, there remains the 
concern that the education offered in the mainstream can neither be as 
individual nor specific in a mixed ability class of 25 children as it 
could have been in a special class of 10.
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10.3 Integration beyond school.
Integration beyond school can mean both the integration of an 
individual’s social life contemporaneously with his schooling, that is 
'out of hours' activities and hobbies, and also the integration in 
youth and adulthood after leaving school. This includes both further 
education and training, and subsequent employment and community life.
The kind of integration envisaged by Hegerty, which goes well beyond 
Warnock's functional integration, is associated with a certain sort of 
homogeneous society which is contrasted with the existing society, 
described as stratified and meritocratic. It is believed that the 
integration of handicapped children in school will lead towards this, 
and also that the existence of such a society would facilitate the 
same integration.
It is possible to regard the late twentieth century, and the 
'developed' world as an environment alien to handicapped people, even 
if only because of those things which are ostensibly valued and held 
up as role models for all. Beauty, health, sexual and financial 
success are explicitly the prime concern of many television 
programmes, films, and advertisements. Writers such as Germaine 
Greer (39), and Suzy Orbach (40), have shown how many women have been 
made to feel devalued by the media's emphasis on the rich, the 
beautiful, and the slim.
Whilst it is obvious that all pregnant women would wish their expected 
baby to be as healthy and perfect as possible, and that all parents 
would wish to keep their children that way, it could be argued that 
too great an emphasis on this produces feelings of guilt in those 
whose children fall short of this ideal, and of rejection of society 
by the children themselves. There is a clear paradox here for the 
medical profession, who must emphasise the importance of pre-natal 
care, and yet publicise the fact that handicap is not caused by 
neglect. Similarly, the teaching profession have to hold both that 
academic success is of importance, and that it is not.
Attempts at making a change in social views are inherently long-term,
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and prone to failure, although it is possible that there is now, 
for example, a better understanding of mental illness, or at least 
depression, than formerly. However, the same cannot be said of other 
forms of insanity. Depression is now regarded as common, unfortunate, 
and acceptable; insanity is not. In an attempt to change social views 
of racial integration, attempts are made to introduce people of other 
races into ordinary television programmes, primarily as news readers, 
and also special programmes are prepared in minority languages and 
with a special content. The disabled too, have special programmes, 
although none have achieved the widespread success or prime viewing 
time of ’Vision On' (41).
Even if this form of public integration is successful, it is sometimes 
held to be even more insulting than the previous neglect, either to 
the individual who is 1 integrated1, or to the group of handicapped 
people. As Munro says
"Just as a woman may well feel insulted at being given some 
position just because she is a woman, not because she is the 
particular woman she is, so a cripple might feel insulted at 
being treated merely as a cripple." (42)
The token 'black', 'woman', or 'person with special needs' begins to 
be treated as a case rather than as an individual. That which might 
have had the propaganda value of showing that disabled people can be, 
for example, good employees or reliable workmates may thereby be 
wasted.
Another aspect unfavourable to integration or acceptance is that 
selection is very much a part of adult life, which is neither 'fair' 
nor 'equal'. Thus, as Warnock acknowledges, a child who has been 
sympathetically treated as having special needs at school may find 
adult life, without comparable support, especially difficult. Indeed, 
it can be argued that it is impossible to end this selection in our 
complex society. Certainly, attempts to describe utopian societies, 
where everyone does the pleasant as well as the unpleasant tasks, for 
example, Skinner's Walden Two (43), based as the title shows, on 
Thoreau (44), all use small communities, where this might be 
possible. Furthemore, where revolutionary attempts have been made to 
change society, meritocracies or oligarchies have generally arisen.
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It can thus be argued that it is wrong not to prepare children for the 
selection they will face in adulthood. Warnock certainly acknowledges 
that some people will have to face an adulthood in an institution, and 
discusses how they may be helped to achieve Significant living 
without work* (45).
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10.3.1 Out of school activities.
"I just want to do what the other boys do." (46).
The Scout Movement is an example of a body which has, like many 
others, attempted to enhance the range of social activities provided 
for children with special needs, and even for children with special, 
special needs. In its recent publications, the Movement’s planners 
have acknowledged, and have tried to adapt to, the changes due to the 
new vocabulary and approach to the handicapped, even adopting a 
concept of the ’Scouting needs’ of the young person. Prior to the 
publication of the Warnock Report and the passage of the 1981 Act, 
much of the Scouting ’for and with’ the handicapped took place in 
Extension Groups, although there have always been a few handicapped 
children who have been members of local Scout Groups. The term 
’Extension’ was adopted in 1967, as part of a wide-ranging review of 
the Movement, and like the word ’special’ in the educational context 
was intended to emphasise that the Movement was an entity, but that 
the provision of Scouting, or education, has to be to some degree 
different for these children.
The basic requirement of membership of the Scout Movement is the 
ability to make and understand (47), in terms appropriate to the 
person’s age, the Scout Promise. The Extension Groups were enabled to 
modify this requirement, to some degree, and offer the fun and 
excitement of Scouting to disabled children in an amended form. This 
possibility remains, although the emphasis is now rather that the 
challenge and the out-door life envisaged by Lord Baden-Powell should 
be offered to many more, even those having severe handicaps, alongside 
their able-bodied contemporaries. This may happen either by an 
individual joining the local Group, or occasionally by putting a 
number of able-bodied and handicapped young people into a common 
situation, such as a camp, together. The rationale for this is
"Is it not bad enough to be born with no use in your legs, or 
blind, or deaf, or slow of mind ? Why should the handicapped 
have to suffer the additional disability of social activities 
apart from the rest of us ?" (48).
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Thus the emphasis is on social mixing, although the Scout Movement 
also considers itself to have an educational role, outside that of the 
schools. Indeed the Movement has existed, ever since the first 
experimental camp on Brownsea Island in 1907, as a place where young 
people of very different social backgrounds can meet on equal terms. 
The concern to involve the handicapped is but a re-affirmation of 
this rationale.
Emphasis is frequently laid on young people undertaking strenuous 
activities, despite physical or mental disability, and helping other 
people, in the role of ’giver’ when they perhaps are more normally 
'receivers'. Thus a description is given of a limbless Venture Scout 
who carried out a survey in rough country for the laying of a water 
pipe to a Kenyan village.
"When not otherwise occupied, he worked as a labourer 
transporting piles of bricks on the front of his wheelchair and 
pushing himself along with his crutches." (49)
Thus the Movement is challenging received ideas of what are 
practicable activities for handicapped people. However, it is also 
made clear that the question 'If I push him - will he break ?' needs 
careful thought and attention, since not all boys can join in all the 
activities offered.
The effect of the new approach is being felt by the whole Movement, as 
an increasing number of able-bodied young people are brought into 
contact with handicapped Scouts. The importance of being an equal 
member is emphasised. In this context, it can be seen that social 
integration does not require educational integration at school as a 
precondition.
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10.3.2 Further education and training.
"The transition from school to adult life can be difficult for 
many young people." (50)
Following its initial impact on schools, the Warnock Report is now 
having implications for further educational establishments. There is 
an increased need for provision for young people with special 
educational needs who have left school, especially in the 1 6 - 1 9  age 
range. There is also the need to integrate the provision to a greater 
extent than in the past.
To meet these demands, Colleges have devised special 'bridging' 
courses,.and have attempted to facilitate the entry of handicapped 
students into existing courses, both by the adaption of the physical 
environment, and by alterations to the curricula. The Warnock Report 
recommended an improvement in the accessibility of further education 
courses, citing the Open University as a model to be followed (51). 
However, it may be argued that this is merely a problem of 
environmental access, rather than of special educational provision. 
Adaption of the environment, or the provision of hearing aids does not 
affect the nature of the education itself, in the way that integration 
of students with the special educational need of having learning 
difficulties into a technical college course would surely do.
In fact, as in the schools, there have always been a few such 
students, although in the past, many may not have completed the course 
because an inability to cope with the academic demands. Courses in 
English have often been given to, for example, plumbing students, 
albeit disguised as Liberal and General Studies.
The Warnock Report emphasises the value of a continuation of education 
beyond school, particularly for children with severe learning 
difficulties, for whom a slow maturation means that they are just 
reaching their learning peak at the time they should leave school 
(52). Further education, for these students, has two advantages. 
Firstly, it provides the purely educational advantage of enabling them 
to use their abilities at the time they are ready to be used, and
239
secondly, it has the social advantage of enabling them to attend 
college as do their peers.(53)
The individuals’ educational needs may be lessened at this further 
educational stage, to the extent that the need has disappeared by the 
end of their course. However, others may have dropped further behind 
their peers, and have found that their needs are exacerbated. Indeed, 
some aspects of special educational need may not even be apparent 
until the young person has left school and even further education, and 
is attempting to find employment.
"It is not always recognised that even if a pupil with a 
disability or significant difficulty is successfully integrated 
into an ordinary school, he may still need special help with 
decisions about further or higher education, training and a 
career." (54)
It has been suggested that an integrated schooling, might not be the 
best preparation for an integrated adulthood, nor necessarily lead to 
it. The Warnock Committee considered, however, that not only the
educational system, but also the world of employment would need to
change.
"We recommend that the public service and nationalised 
industries should urgently review their policies with a view to 
opening their doors more widely to and providing more 
imaginative opportunities for work for people with 
disabilities." (55)
In specific jobs, for example the teaching profession, where certain 
forms of handicap have traditionally been a debarring condition, it is 
shown that handicapped people may not only work, but also provide 
their pupils with a broader view of life from their own experience and 
personal knowledge of a handicapping situation.
It may seem that the Warnock Report devotes more space than is 
necessary to the difficulties of handicapped people in employment. 
However, this is a highly pertinent matter for the handicapped person 
whose chances of employment and social life are at stake. This is
especially true for those whose social life and employment are
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combined in an institutional life. Education, for Warnock, is the 
preparation for adulthood in the realms of work, social life, and 
spare-time hobbies and interests. These three lead to personal 
fulfillment.
241
References to Chapter 10.
1 Warnock, H.M.,1978 : op.cit.,
2 Education Act, 1976.
3 Education Act, 1981.
4 Warnock, H.M.,1978 : op.cit.,
5 Maclure, J.S.,1965 : op.cit.,
6 ibid., p.180.
7 ibid., p.193.
8 ibid., p.201.
9 ibid., p.204.
10 ibid., p.203.
11 ibid., pp.206-9.
12 ibid., p.208.
13 Warnock, H.M.,1978 : op.cit.,
14 Maclure, J.S.,1965 : op.cit.,
15 ibid., p.245.
16 ibid., p.278.
17 ibid., p.281.
18 ibid., p.280.
19 ibid., p.301.
20 ibid., pp.302-3.
21 ibid., p.304.
22 ibid., p.332.
23 ibid., p.338.
24 Cohen, J.,(ed.),1984 
Herald, p.3.
: Sutton
25 Warnock, H.M.,1978 : op.cit.,
26 see ch.2.
27 Warnock, H.M.,1978 : op.cit.,
28 Newell, P.,1983 : ACE Special 
Advisory Centre for Education
29 ibid., p.3.
30 Warnock, H.M.,1978 : op.cit.,
31 Newell, P.,1983 : op.cit., p.i
32 Young, M.F.D.,1958 : The Rise 
Penguin.
33 Hegarty, S., and Pocklington, 
Hegarty, S., and Pocklington,
s.7.4, p.100. 
s.2.80, p.34.
p.181.
s.2.79, p.33. 
p.223.
High 1884-1984, Sutton, Sutton 
ss.7.44-7.55, pp.114-8. 
s.7.4, p.100.
education handbook, London, 
p.3.
ch. 8. 
i et seq.
of the meritocracy, Harmondsworth
H., with Lucas, D.,1981a : op.cit 
H., with Lucas, D.,1981b : op.cit
242
34 Warnock, H.M.1978 : op.cit., s.7.9, p.101.
35 ibid., s.7.13, p.102.
36 Hegerty, S.,1982 : Integration and the 'comprehensive school', 
Educational Review, Vol.34, No.2, p.99.
37 Maclure, J.S.,1965 : op.cit., p.306.
38 Warnock, H.M.,1978 : op.cit., ch.12.
39 Greer, G.,1971 : The Female eunuch, St.Albans, Granada.
40 Orbach, S.,1979 : Fat is a feminist issue, London, Hamlyn.
41 BBC I Television.
42 Munro, D.H.,1980 : Preferential treatment for the handicapped,
in : Laura, R.S.,(ed.), Problems of handicap, Melbourne, Macmillan 
(Australia), p.113.
43 Skinner, B.F.,1948 : Walden Two, London, Macmillan.
44 Stanley, J.D.,(ed.),1971 : Thoreau, H.D., Walden, Princeton, N.J., 
The University Press.
45 Warnock, H.M.,1978 : op.cit., s.10.27, p.202.
46 May. R.,1985 : op.cit., p.11.
47 Scout Association,1984 : Resource Centre Fact Sheet, No.l-HA-8-84B
48 May. R.,1985 : op.cit., p.11.
49 ibid.
50 Warnock, H.M.,1978 : op.cit., s.10.1, p.162.
51 ibid., s.10.48, p.177.
52 ibid., s.10.27, p.170.
53 Sugden, J.,1981 : Hereward : The First decade, NATFHE Journal,
No.8, p.28.
54 Warnock, H.M.,1978 : op.cit., s.10.1, p.162.
55 ibid., s.10.77, p.186.
243
PART IV
CONCLUSION
Chapter 11 
Principal philosophical issues
244
Chapter arrangement
11.1 Philosophy from special education
11.2 Philosophy in special education
11.2.1 Philosophy and intellectual handicaps
11.2.2 Philosophy and physical and sensory handicaps
11.2.3 Philosophy and socio-economic handicaps
245
11.1 Philosophy from special education
Throughout this thesis it has been presupposed, not only that 
philosophical analysis aids in the elucidation of conceptual problems 
in special education, but also that special education has a role to 
play in the wider consideration of philosophy per se. Thus it is 
possible to discuss the philosophy from, or in, special education, as 
well as that of, or for, special education, particularly as issues 
from special education can be used as examples in a whole network of 
traditional philosophical problems. With this presupposition as a 
basis, a detailed study of the Warnock Report, its^rationale and 
historical position within a constantly changing educational system, 
has been conducted with the aim of showing that the study of special 
education has a direct relationship with philosophy, as well as an 
indirect one through its obvious connection with the mainstream of 
philosophy of education. The study of special education also has 
practical and theoretical links with the study of education. These 
interrelationships can be depicted by Figure 10.
Education
Special
education
Philosophy 
of Special 
Education
Philosophy 
of Education
Handicap
Philosophy
Figure 10. The interrelationships of the subject.
The two main areas of pure philosophical interest, reached either 
directly, or as mediated through philosophy of education, are moral 
and social philosophy, and philosophy of mind (epistemology). The 
latter has not been extensively developed in this thesis, but is
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related to behaviour modification, which is discussed in Chapter 8, 
and the real meaning of mental handicap, a possible approach to which 
is outlined in Aspin's paper (1).
Aspects of moral and social philosophy as forms of ethics have here 
been taken as pre-eminently relevant. Students with the severe 
educational and personal problems that cause them to be termed 'with 
special, special needs' present to their teachers, as well as to 
educationalists and politicians, those borderline cases which cause 
moral dilemmas. These occur when there is a clash of principle as, 
for example, between the commitment to furthering a pupil's 
educational development as far as possible, and preserving, or even 
fostering, his freedom or autonomy. Such decisions are present in the 
mainstream, but are not so clear cut, since the methods of remediation 
are neither so extreme, nor so demonstrably efficient.
The concerns of groups of students in relation to other groups, are 
moreover also linked in the way that moral philosophy is linked to 
social philosophy, particularly as it can be debated whether there is 
such an entity as the group 'the handicapped'.
Dependent on this, certain themes have run through the thesis. 
Paramount among these has been an analysis of a group of concepts 
which, while being ostensibly factual, have been shown to carry a 
strong evaluative content. Since all of these are positive rather 
than negative, or derogatory, the concept of 'prestige terms' has been 
borrowed from the work of O'Connor (2). The positive normative 
concepts thus indicated, have been highlighted to show the real 
possibility of arguments arising which are totally dependent for their 
persuasiveness on an ambiguity which threatens to render them 
vacuous.
The third and fourth chapters of the thesis, together with the ninth 
and tenth, illustrate this point, as what have been called 'cloaked 
value judgements' (3) are brought to light in a way common to both 
contemporary and traditional philosophy.
Chapter four may be seen as one of the points where the argument 
culminates, bringing together the previous ideas. It shows finally 
the shortcomings of a widespread approach to philosophy and sociology
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known as relativism. This is conducted through an analysis of the 
prestige concept of normality, which is shown to have strong normative 
connotations, allied to at least three possible changing and 
quasi-factual practical meanings.
Chapter 10 shows how much recent discussion of educational integration
has been vitiated for the same reasons. So many different meanings of
the word integration have been used that it is never quite clear, in
Warnock, or in other writings, which is the one being discussed. This
argument is also relevant to mainstream education through the ngency 
of the comprehensive school, as it can be asked what the meaning of 
’comprehensive* is in any particular argument.
Chapter 5 is again a culminative, rather than an exploratory chapter, 
with its analysis of persons, dependant on the idea of normality. An 
attempt is made to show how the idea of a person is central to moral 
philosophy, as well as to epistemology. More specific current 
philosophical ideas, particularly those about animal rights are 
introduced to show how the existence of severely mentally impaired 
people is used by, for example, Singer to further the idea that a new 
definition of a person which may exclude many humans and include some 
animals is needed. Arguments criticising speciesism developed from 
this compare the claimed intelligence of animals such as pigs with 
that of many disable persons. Intellectually handicapped people are 
not the only individuals that can be used as an example. Midgley has 
shown that we should hesitate to call a ’morally defective’ person, or 
an insensitive person, totally human (4). However the existence of 
mentally-handicapped people does counter the ’animal rights' 
arguments, which are based on the similarity of animals with the 
rational part of man.
The study of 'persons' moreover, in the terms of the moral arguments 
over euthanasia or abortion, gives prominence to people handicapped 
either before birth, or through an accident or old age. Furthermore, 
social and political, as well as moral, arguments about the nature of 
society generally include discussion about the procedure for dealing 
with the weak, the ill, and the handicapped.
Chapters 6 and 7 elaborate the theme that the 1971 Education Act, 
designed to further the teaching of the severely mentally handicapped
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to the point when it could be called education, has affected the 
current view of education elaborated in the 1981 Act which followed 
the Warnock Report. The term education is analysed in these chapters 
as a further example of a prestige word.
Behaviour modification as developed from the work of Skinner has 
attracted wide interest, both for itself and for its relationships 
with other approaches to learning. In chapter eight, behaviour 
modification is shown to be relevant to epistemology, which itself has 
links with moral philosophy. Special education has an important place 
in this philosophical discussion, since as a purely practical 
consideration, it is most likely to be severely handicapped children 
who are taught in this specific way. Mainstream children receive this 
form of instruction only in the much modified sense of the use of 
reward and punishment. The associated moral arguments about autonomy, 
rationality, and freedom are also relevant here. If the concept of 
autonomy is seen as necessary to indicate the presence of a person, 
the existence of a mentally handicapped person causes a difficulty. 
Changes must be made, either to the idea of a person, or to the notion 
of autonomy, or to our behaviour.
Chapter nine considers another prestige word, needs, which has 
received very little attention outside the volume ’Perspectives on 
Plowden1, but which demands analysis, as it is currently used so 
extensively in persuasive debate. It has long been understood by 
parents that the boy who says 'I need a new cricket bat' really means 
*1 want a new cricket bat*. Such an analysis can be given to many 
other cases of so-called need. Although Warnock is shown to be 
innocent of this ambiguity, subsequent use of the term cannot be so 
easily vindicated. The Warnock Report gave the existing concept of 
needs respectability, but the concept can be used, or abused, in ways 
logically derived from, but alien to, the Warnock Report.
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11.2 Philosophy in special education
Another way of approaching the philosophical issues highlighted by the 
present analysis of the Warnock Report is to distinguish three very 
broad groups of handicap and to discuss the philosophical issues 
relevant to each group. These handicaps are considered mainly in 
relation to those with 'special, special needs', that is those with 
severe forms of the handicap that seem to demand the extra forms of 
remediation not currently available in the mainstream classes.
Although the very many forms of disability present widely different 
practical manifestations, three broad groups can logically be 
described. These are intellectual handicap, physical, including 
sensory, handicap, and socio-economic handicap. Although the use of 
such broad groups seems to be diametrically opposed to the greater 
specificity suggested in this thesis to be a mark of good educational 
practice, it is philosophically helpful for the following reason. In 
the consideration of the suitable educational placement of any 
individual, three questions need to be asked, in addition to the 
satisfaction of his general needs. These questions concern firstly 
his present intelligence, secondly the state of his body, which 
includes the sense organs the eyes and ears as well as the working of 
his limbs, and thirdly the socio-economic status of the child, of his 
family, and of his position in that family.
There are various other ways of considering an individual which this 
approach does not take into consideration, and also it must be 
admitted that in most meanings of the word, 'intelligence' is in part 
dependant on physical factors, the state of the brain as a bodily 
organ, and in part also on socio-economic factors, such as the child's 
general life-experience. Indeed, all three aspects of intellectual, 
physical, and socio-economic handicap in practice often occur 
together, overlapping and exacerbating, or sometimes ameliorating, 
each other.
The use of such broad groups also ignores the possibility of there 
being disagreement over the status of any particular handicap. Is 
'dyslexia', for example, to be understood as a socio-economic and 
hence relative handicap where a literate society makes extra demands
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on an individual, or is it, as it often appears to be, an 
intellectually specific handicap ?
However, in principle at least, the three groups are separable, and 
this has again to be shown to have a practical as well as a 
theoretical impact. For example, two young children, with the same 
type of hearing loss as measured by an audiogram, may have very 
different intellectual levels, as measured by performance, and 
different levels of support and understanding by their families, with 
the practical result that one speaks, and the other does not.
Given the overall value of this three-fold distinction, three 
logically separate, although overlapping, types of philosophical 
issue arise. Their own interrelationship is based as much on the 
interrelationship of moral concepts, as on the interrelationship of 
the different types of handicap. Thus ’equality’ is linked to 
’fairness’, ’deficit’ to 'normality*, and ’rights' to 'persons'.
The existence of people who can be called severely intellectually 
handicapped, who cannot speak, or even in some cases cannot act at all 
independently, brings into focus the conventional arguments about 
rights, as related to personhood, individuality and status. The real 
differences between such individuals and the non-handicapped have 
traditionally seemed relevant to both a different position and 
determined value in and for society, and also a segregated education 
and training. Modern arguments are generally in favour of eradicating 
such differences, which are now held to be irrelevant. Also to be 
considered at this point are the arguments for so-called animal 
rights, and accusations of forms of speciesism, both rampant and 
moderate (5). Links can further be drawn to the moral presuppositions 
of the members of the committee which produced the second Warnock 
Report looking at the research into artificial conception and 
embryology.
The related group of concepts of ’needs', 'equality', and 
’compensation’ come into focus with consideration of the status of 
students with physical and sensory handicaps. For, in many cases, it 
can be seen to make sense to talk in terms of financial input, either 
for specialised education or for special aids, which provide a basic 
level of compensation since some aspects of 'normal life’ can thereby
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be assured along the 'normal opportunity range’ (6). Thus a job can 
be kept if money is spent on adapting the office; independent living 
is also possible in a house that is similarly adapted, with lifts and 
hoists, for example; there are further possibilities for friendships, 
marriage, and hobbies. Total compensation can never be achieved, but 
on this basis, it is sensible to use the concept in terms of relevant 
need.
When turning to socio-economic handicaps, the relativistic arguments, 
which have been shown to have no role with other handicaps, come into 
play. It is here held that such arguments, and the sociological 
approach to disability are generally too facile and ignore real 
problems. Associated ideas of 'normality' as a normative concept are 
also relevant here, with the link back to conceptions of status and 
stigma that occur with intellectual handicap.
Each of the three approaches possesses its own moral justification for 
intervention or not, for preferential treatment, for acceptance, and 
for specialised education. Thus in the treatment of the severely 
intellectually handicapped, ideas of 'compassion' and 'altruism* are 
more common and relevant than those of 'rights' which generally appear 
unsustainable. For physically handicapped people, it is possible to 
argue sensibly in terms of 'justice', 'fairness', and 'equality'. For 
many people with socio-economic handicaps, the important moral issues 
are 'cultural integration' or 'cultural isolation'. Indeed it is as 
true for the philosophy of special education as it is for the 
philosophy of education that,
"... the problems of the philosophy of education, if pressed far 
enough, become the traditional problems of philosophy." (7).
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11.2.2 Philosophical issues and intellectual handicaps
As has been demonstrated earlier in this thesis, the position of 
handicapped people is relevant in a discussion of the topic of rights, 
both in respect of the claims for the extension of legal or civil 
rights, and in respect of the existence of moral or human rights.
For intellectually handicapped people, such arguments assume a major 
importance. Thus it can be argued that the moderately intellectually
handicapped are more like the rest of the community than is often
assumed. Although unable to perform many intellectual or academic 
tasks, in social tasks, for example, marrying or voting, their ability 
need not be impaired significantly. Thus, for this group, claims for
legal rights are not unreasonable. Indeed, even those who are so
intellectually retarded as not to be able to use legal rights in any 
way can be, and are, still claimed to possess moral rights to 
treatment and care.
In philosophy, the distinctions between moral and legal rights cannot 
be so easily justified, and indeed some philosophers, have denied the 
existence of the former. In recent philosophical literature, two 
approaches to rights can be distinguished. The first, represented by 
Frey, denies the existence of moral rights (8). The second, 
represented by Peter Singer, extends moral rights to previously 
unforeseen areas(9). Singer and Frey eventually reach very similar 
conclusions about the appropriate treatment of animals, but it is not 
certain whether this unanimity would extend to handicapped people.
The existence of severely intellectually handicapped people has been 
used in discussions about rights to illustrate this variety of 
philosophical arguments. In particular, as shown in Chapter 5, the 
proponents of animal rights, as represented by Singer, have argued 
that on a common definition of what it is to be a person, that is 
being in possession of a certain intelligence or rationality, some 
humans are not persons, and some non-humans are persons. Singer holds 
that since pigs, for example, are more intelligent than many 
intellectually handicapped humans and have a well developed social 
life, it is not only cruel to keep them as we do, but also an
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infringement of their rights, since they are treated as an ends to our
means, not as persons having their own ends.
The practice of culling provides a very different view of the status 
of the individual, and involves strong means and ends arguments.
Culling is advocated for the same reasons as thinning seedlings in the
garden. The weak or the excess are thinned out or culled for the good 
of the species as a whole. In this process, the individual animal is 
ignored, being the means to the end of the survival of the whole 
species, or certain individuals, that is those chosen to survive are 
the ends, and the others are the means. In either case, the cull is 
only to the good of those who survive, but in some cases, the good of 
another species is also considered, as when seals are culled to reduce 
their depredations on fish stocks.
The Nazis rationalised their 'cull' as the purification of the 
species, as well as the provision of 1lebensraum*. This is certainly 
an extreme form of treating people as means, not ends, and hence of 
denying the importance of individuals, which runs counter to the 
arguments for human rights. To animal rights proponents, the culling 
of humans is no worse than the culling of animals, and the culling of 
animals is as morally wrong as the culling of humans.
Singer concludes that we should definitely treat some animals better 
than we do, and possibly that we need not treat some humans as well as 
we do. However, many would dispute the latter part of the conclusion, 
believing that this showed something wrong with Singer’s argument 
rather than with our treatment of handicapped humans. It could even 
be argued that the treatment of other humans ought to be improved 
before discussing the treatment of non-humans.
Frey counters the approach of Singer by denying the existence of all 
forms of moral rights, whether for humans, animals, or non-sentient 
beings. He argues that moral rights which are debateable and can be 
shown to depend on equally debateable moral principles cannot have the 
same force as those rights which have a clear legal basis (legal 
rights).
Conventionally, moral rights have been restricted to those rights 
claimed for human beings as persons. As human rights, they have been
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contrasted with legal rights (which Frey terms civil rights), to 
emphasise a difference between particular existing or desired 
legislative provisions. Thus only humans could have moral rights, and 
arguments for moral, that is human, rights were designed to show that 
other humans in different countries, or with different coloured skins, 
or with different customs or religions, had certain entitlements. 
Proponents of human rights assume that there is one society, that of 
humans.
"What...is the legacy of the quarter century ? ...in one word, 
it is globalism. Forced into our unwilling minds has been a 
view that presents humanity as a single entity.” (10).
The conventional line of argument is used in Chapter 5 to show that 
handicapped people can be said to have rights, because they are 
members of the human race. While the differences between those with 
varying handicaps, and between all handicapped persons and those not 
so handicapped encourage the latter to discount the former, the 
’rights lobby' serves to redress the balance. However, this argument, 
based on the existence of a common humanity, despite appearing to be 
a moral advance, leads to accusations of speciesism.
Frey shows what happens when moral rights are extended from being the 
preserve of humans, to being claimed to be possessed by animals also. 
Thus animal rights and human rights are subsections of moral rights, 
and are equally valid on a utilitarian basis (see Figure 11). There 
may be other forms of moral rights. In some senses of the word, 
plants, especially trees and forests, and even listed buildings can be 
said to have moral rights. They have 'interests' as well as 'rights' 
consequent on the duty of humans towards them on utilitarian grounds.
Moral
Rights
Animal
Rights
Human
Rights
Figure 11 Sub-sets of moral rights
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Frey’s criticism is that these interests are based on beliefs, 
intellectual capacity, and language, which are not possessed by even 
the ’higher' animals. He then argues that there are no moral rights 
for any being, only ’civil’ (i.e. legal) rights, although there are 
other reasons for treating animals well and for accepting the 
practical consequences of the many other claims for ’rights*.
Singer's argument for the extension of moral rights to some 'higher' 
animals is on the grounds that they are persons, with intelligence, 
and are therefore properly treated as ends rather than means. He 
would presumably restrict this extension to the intelligent
individuals, for if a 'dim' pig were found it would presumably not be
categorised as a person because of its intellectual handicap.
Legal rights for handicapped people, and indeed for animals, can exist
without the interpolation of moral rights, as Frey argues. However, 
it may be more appropriate to refer to the legal protection afforded 
to the foetus, the child, or the handicapped person, and to the duty 
of others to ensure this protection, rather than to the possession of 
a right by these groups. This is because ’legal right* implies the 
bearer performing his actions for himself, while ’legal protection' 
acknowledges that some humans cannot do this, but that they should not 
be penalised, or harmed, because of this inability.
Both Frey and Singer can be accused of a new form of the old 
discrimination of *intellectualism’ or 'rationalism', as both value 
intelligence above everything else. This discrimination is not 
central to Frey’s argument, but it is to that of Singer. It gives 
rise to two criticisms of Singer’s work. Firstly, why should 
possession of intelligence be valued if being human is not. This is 
in direct contradiction to that current political argument which 
denigrates intellectual ability in favour of individual worth as a 
member of society. Especially in educational circles, meritocracy is 
not the fashion. The choice of intelligence level as being a relevant 
difference for treatment is as arbitrary as is the choice of species. 
Secondly, the result of adopting this intellectuallism is a clash 
with Singer's own utilitarianism. Singer holds that all suffering is 
wrong and human suffering should not be valued as worse than animal 
suffering; they are in principle of equal moral worth. However his 
argument about the quality and depth of the suffering of intelligent
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beings goes beyond basic utilitarianism. That is, when he discusses 
intelligent animals like pigs, he shows that they suffer not only 
physical pain, but also a form of mental or intellectual pain because 
of the mismatch between the rearing conditions imposed by modern 
farming methods, and the pigs' own social preferences for piglet 
rearing.
It is not certain whether he regards mental anguish as worse than 
physical anguish, or whether the two are equivalent, but the occurence 
of both together is worse than either on its own. Singer seems to 
have interposed qualitative arguments, as he needs to do, while his 
espousal of utilitarianism demands the use only of quantitative ones. 
If qualitative arguments are ever to be allowed, are not humanity or 
species relevant qualities ?
It is possible to question whether speciesism and a belief in animal 
rights are so opposed, or whether belief in animal rights is 
necessarily opposed to a belief in special treatment for handicapped 
people. It ought to be possible to decry sexism, racism, speciesism, 
and 'handicappism', as all equally involve baseless discrimination.
But the anti-speciesist proponents of animal rights can be accused of 
handicappism, that is taking mental handicap as relevant to a denial 
or an assertion of an individual being a person and hence having 
rights.
There are two irreconcileable viewpoints. Either being a human is 
highly relevant to all moral treatment and relationships, or it is 
not. This thesis is therefore open to the accusation of speciesism, 
because it adopts altruism and because it accepts Mary Warnock's 
argument that it is necessary to be humane towards those who are 
humans, and to ensure the best possible education and treatment for 
them, on the grounds of compassion (11). However, all moral arguments 
have ultimate and unprovable basic assumptions, whether these be 
utilitarian or principle-based. Such arguments need to be pressed far 
enough to reveal these assumptions. Thus it cannot be proved that 
being human is a crucial, morally-relevant factor. Equally, the 
absence of such proof does not deny the assertion. Similarly, while 
the 'anti-rights' proponents can argue that the term 'rights' is 
merely used to make respectable the argument in defence of a better 
treatment of animals, the 'pro-rights' proponents can only reiterate 
that rights they indeed are.
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11.2.3 Philosophy and physical and sensory handicaps
Much recent educational debate in the political sphere has centred on 
the ideas of ’equality' and 'compensation*. Although Mary Warnock has 
argued that these two concepts lose their meaning when applied to 
severely handicapped children (12), they are useful in analysing the 
rationale behind providing extra resources for the education of 
children with physical and sensory handicaps. However, in 
consideration of this group of children, the words equality and 
compensation are indeed pushed to the limits of their meanings.
'Equality', which was a concept of political philosophy, has become 
important for education since the politicising of the educational 
system, ostensibly from the 1944 Education Act, but actually traceable 
long before this (13). 'Philosophy of education*, as a subject, has 
developed during the period when discussion about comprehensive 
schools have been couched in terms of 'equality*. The contribution of 
philosophy of education has been to elucidate what might be the 
meaning of this word in any particular context or argument.
The meanings of 'equality', 'equals' and 'equivalence' are very 
different in social or political discourse from those in either 
mathematics or formal logic. In these latter disciplines,
'equivalence' involves the possibility of substitution. Thus in 
algebra, mathematical equivalence means that in *a = b', the figure 
from the left can be used to replace that from the right. Similarly, 
in formal logic,the idea of material equivalence is contained in
truth-tables. Thus p=q means that the truth values of p and q are the
same (14). This does not concern the meaning of the statements, only 
their form and truth values.
In respect of people however, it is not possible to say Peter = John
meaning that one can be substituted for the other. In this sense,
'All men are equal' can only mean that 'All men have a right to vote'
or 'All men have right to .... ' However, as can be seen, stated
equality for people must be in a particular respect. Substitution of 
roles replaces substitution of people. Equality can mean very little 
out of context.
258
As has been shown, equality has become a prestige word, and has a 
variety of possible meanings, many of which capitalise on the 
generally accepted understanding that what is equal is fair. An 
understanding of the term fairness, that is Aristotle’s ’equity*, is 
fundamental to the argument presented in this thesis concerning the 
position of handicapped school pupils. This might be called 
’equitarianism' as it subordinates equality to fairness.
Although Barrow states that
"Nobody in their right mind believes that everybody should be 
treated exactly the same in all circumstances without 
qualification" (15),
Cohen shows that there are those for whom equality is itself a basic 
principle (16). This type of strict egalitarianism can oppose 
arguments for justice or equity on the grounds that the proffered 
views for relevant differentiation of treatment are varied, 
contestable, and could in principle lead to paradoxically unjust 
outcomes, for example the treatment of the Jews by the Nazis.
However, strict egalitarian ideas themselves conflict with other 
important principles, those of liberty, worth, or just desserts.
In education, three aspects of equality are used in particular. In 
addition to these is ’equality of status’ which has been discussed in 
the previous section. The claims for human rights are claims that all 
humans have an equal status as people, and hence have certain rights, 
especially to be treated as means not ends. In educational terms, 
equality of status has been applied to the desired 'parity of esteem* 
between secondary modern and grammar schools. Special schools for 
handicapped children have frequently been assumed to have a lesser 
status than schools in the mainstream.
The remaining three aspects of equality are 'equality of treatment', 
'equal opportunity', and 'equality of outcome'. The former assumes a 
common ground for all children, and leads to the mixed ability 
comprehensive school. This route could lead to educational loss for 
handicapped children. The position of the handicapped child in such a 
system forces consideration of the question whether or not there can 
be equality of treatment, since the handicapped child, even if sitting
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next to his able-bodied peer, will receive an entirely different 
classroom experience. The deaf child, for example, will not hear the 
same details, nor gather the same information from the teacher’s 
speech, no matter how well amplified the latter is as he does not 
possess the same concepts of language as his hearing neighbour. 
Similarly, the severely physically handicapped child, or the spastic 
child, will have difficulty in manipulating the equipment with which 
his neighbour has no trouble.
Equality of opportunity appears to be very similar to equality of 
treatment. However the emphasis is now placed on what is available, 
rather than on what is provided. Thus all children have an equal 
opportunity to attend a comprehensive school, regardless of the 
financial or social status of their parents. However, since not all 
children, nor indeed all schools, are identical, the existence of the 
equality of opportunity predicates nothing of the outcome, although 
equality of outcome is taken to be the desired end of equality of 
opportunity. For this reason, in his discussion of equality of 
opportunity, Gribble, quoting Williams, distinguishes between 
'formal' and 'operative'or 'actual' equality of opportunity to show 
that differences between childrens' abilities, and the attitude of 
adults to these differences, are just as important as the attitude to 
equality per se (17).
The Equal Opportunities Commission attempts to limit discrimination on 
the grounds of sex or handicap. In the case of handicapped people, 
discrimination can be overcome by establishing that the handicapped 
person can perform the task as well as any other, even if to achieve 
this, special facilities or equipment must be installed.
Equality of outcome may well appear to be unobtainable in the face of 
serious handicaps. However, for special education it is the most 
relevant of the four, and arguably the most just. Even though most 
severely deaf children will not go to university, any more than will 
most children in a non-selective school, the ideal of achieving such 
an outcome can be present. As has been stated, Aristotle's idea is of 
equality, as valued because it is part of justice or fairness 
(equity). He claims that although like has to be treated as like, 
those who are different should be treated differently.
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Two difficulties arise from this argument. Firstly, a decision has to 
be made as to which are the relevant differences for planning the 
variety of treatment, and secondly, it has to be accepted that some 
differences cannot be overcome. Thus if one child has three sweets, 
and another one, a third person also having three sweets could give 
two and a half to the second child and a half to the first so that 
both had three and a half sweets. This would produce equality, 
although whether it was fair or not would be agued by the children. 
However, such a simplistic solution cannot be pursued in the case of 
ears, legs or healthy bodies. It is thus inappropriate to talk of 
equality of outcome as an aim, if mathematical equality is intended.
It does become possible to use the term if equality in principle is 
intended by the action being considered.
A similar argument can be made for 'compensation1. No child could 
have been fully compensated for the fact that he had no limbs because 
of thalidomide damage. Yet the damages awarded by the court would 
help to ameliorate some problems. Similarly, an ordinary child in 
good health can, for example, run about, play football, go for long 
walks; to achieve at least some suppleness in his limbs, a suppleness 
which will always be limited, the child with cerebral palsy needs 
physiotherapy, a special hydrotherapy pool, and possibly surgery. 
Special schools, physiotherapy pools, resource units, trained 
teachers, and other aids can compensate, to some extent, albeit at 
considerable expense, for the child’s handicap. Compensation, and 
hence equality of outcome is one of the rationales offered for this 
greater expenditure on handicapped children. The greater expenditure 
can help the children achieve an outcome which approaches, to a 
greater or lesser degree, the outcome that is desired from the 
education for all children. In this way, the idea of compensation is 
related to that of equality.
"... positive discrimination to remove and compensate for 
'natural' handicaps might be argued to be a matter of justice 
through its fostering equality." (18)
A second rationale is that of 'need'. The provision of extra 
resources helps the child achieve more, and he therefore'needs’ these 
extra resources to achieve more. Thus a deaf child needs extra help 
in speech, and language, and with a longer time allowed for the
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learning process, to achieve an 'O-level1 pass. In the longer term, 
the satisfaction of this need leads to an equality or near-equaltiy of 
outcome, that is, the posession of a pass in that particular 
examination.
Clearly, the two rationales are linked, since compensation has to be 
related to relevant need to have any educational value. Providing 
handicapped children with holidays abroad, or other 'treats' does not 
compensate for the child’s needs in the classroom. Indeed, it may be 
argued that an activity cannot be properly termed compensation if it 
is not consequent on the need. This then poses the question of what 
forms the relevant need, the answer to which depends on the desired 
outcome for education, and the answer to the continuing question in 
the philosophy of education, "What is education ?".
The political philosopher must address the moral dilemma, since the 
educational needs will differ depending on whether the desired outcome 
is a trained population, an educated population, a re-trainable 
population, or a population which is prepared to accept un- or under­
employment. The position of the child with physical or sensory 
handicaps helps clarify the issues in such a moral discussion.
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11.2.4 Philosophy and Socio-economic handicaps
"Special educational needs are an artefact of the expectation of 
a dominant culture." (19)
This quotation from Kyle indicates how the analysis of special 
education gives a new or further perspective to certain sociological 
arguments which have become philosophically and politically important. 
The sociological arguments are based on the ’Knowledge and Control1 
type of analysis, typified by the volume of that name (edited by 
M F D  Young)(20), and emphasise that knowledge is relative to society, 
and that there is no such thing as absolute knowledge; any view is as 
valid as any other. From this it follows that what is seen as 
knowledge, and hence important, in any society is relative to that 
society; possession of such knowledge brings possession of power and 
’social control'. Thus society is defined in terms of dominant and 
submissive (minority) cultures. Certain classes of society decide 
(define) what is knowledge, impose this decision on those less 
powerful, and hence define themselves as knowledgeable, while the 
other classes are 'deficient' or 'disadvantaged' because they cannot 
achieve the imposed standards of knowledge. The result in Western 
society is that those so-called disadvantaged children who do not do 
well in school in academic terms, are actually being made into 
failures by the school. The 'Knowledge and control' argument is that 
the schools fail their pupils rather than vice versa. There is 
nothing inherently 'wrong' with the children, only with the schools 
that fail them.
This argument is expanded in the work of Labov (21), who discusses the 
theory of 'verbal deficit' in children. He holds that an analysis 
such as that given by Bernstein in his work on elaborative and 
restrictive codes in language use (22), depends on a faulty view of 
language and gives class-biassed or racist, model. Labov is 
particularly critical of the Head-start programmes of education for 
disadvantaged children in the U.S.A., which he believed to be based on 
a mistaken idea of socio-linguistics. In Britain, the work of Swann 
and others (23), especially in the texts prepared for the Open 
University, have extended this analysis to the education and 
socialization of conventionally handicapped children.
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With the publication of the Warnock Report in 1978 and the subsequent 
Education Act of 1981, arguments about conventionally handicapped 
children have become confused with those about the new types of 
special educational need, some of which may well be socially 
conditioned. It is one of the points of this thesis to disentangle 
these strands of the argument, and also to question the relativism 
which, in some senses, poses a threat to special education. As 
explained in Chapter 4, the relativist approach is comparable to that 
outlined above, in that handicaps are held to be relative to the 
expectations of that society. Handicaps are not only caused by 
socio-economic factors, as was the blinding of people in Bhopal in 
1985 (where those handicapped were affected because their poverty 
necessitated their living close to the factory and because the 
economic conditions lead to insufficient safety controls), but also 
because the society defines what is meant by a handicap and what is 
meant by normality. Since this definition is sociologically relevant, 
no society should single out particular individuals as handicapped, 
but rather accept all as normal.
The first difficulty with this argument is that while it may be 
morally acceptable to accept handicapped people as normal as far as 
respect or esteem is concerned, it is probably not morally acceptable 
to many people that the handicapped should be prevented from receiving 
special care and attention, and it is entirely impracticable to accept 
the riposte to this that all should be treated with as much care and 
attention as each other.
In the article quoted at the head of this section, Kyle takes this 
relativist argument to its logical conclusion in the case of deaf 
children. He gives the methods of a psychologist involved in 
assessing the special needs of certain children, and he correctly 
demonstrates that this assessment is far more complicated than that 
formerly needed to assess handicap. This leads to a criticism of the 
Warnock Report, since he holds that deaf children are not really 
'communication handicapped', as they have traditionally been 
considered, but have only become so because of their treatment by 
parents and teachers. Specifically, deaf people have a perfectly 
'accredited language' in sign language (24), which is as effective, 
Kyle argues, as spoken English for communication (25). Deaf people 
thus represent a cultural minority who have been forced to learn a
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majority language. Since they are unlikely to learn it very well, 
they are bound to be failures, just as are Labov1s black children. 
Teachers are thus not only misguided in teaching oral speech in this 
context, they are also actually abusing deaf childrens* rights to the 
acceptance of their first language, that is sign language, as a proper
language. Like any other cultural or linguistic minority, they are
being oppressed, and should be permitted, or even encouraged, to use 
their language with dignity.
Apart from questioning whether sign language is 'as effective as 
spoken English’, Kyle's argument is open to much criticism. In this
thesis, it has been argued that the relativistic case only holds for a
few handicaps, of which maladjustment and possibly dyslexia are the 
principal examples, which have a demonstrable social or economic 
basis. The 1981 Act specifically omits children for whom English is a 
second language, yet paradoxically, these children would seem to have 
a prima facie case for according them 'special needs' status on a 
relativistic basis.
Kyle's attempt to prove that deafness is a social category, rather 
than a sensory handicap is interesting. What he actually proves is 
that some deaf children, namely those with deaf parents who use sign 
language and whose parents have taught them to use this sign language 
fluently before they go to school and are prepared to continue to do 
this, are in a similar position to those for whom English is a second 
language. It may be noted that the group for whom this is so is a 
very small proportion of even the deaf population. The import of this 
is that sign language, as such, should be respected, as should its 
users. However, Kyle does not answer the question of the content of 
the deaf child's teaching, any more than Labov does for his black 
children, and neither is the remainder of the deaf population affected 
by this argument.
It is true that the signing deaf child may be communication 
handicapped in the sense that there are few people who can understand 
them, (despite the project in Leeds to teach sign language to all 
children)(26), and they may be handicapped in the sense that access to 
the large body of books is denied them, and hence to a wider 
education. Neither BSL (British Sign Language), the system advocated 
by Kyle, nor ASL (American Sign Language), nor indeed NNE
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(Non-standard Negro English) used by Labov1s children, conform to 
written English or American structure, despite the fact that the basic 
vocabulary is the same as can be seen from this quotation from the 
play 1 Children of a lesser god*,
"Me have nothing. Me deafy. Speech inept. Intelligence - tiny 
blockhead. English - blow away. Left one you. Depend - no. 
Think myself enough." (American sign language)
"I have nothing; no hearing, no speech, no intelligence, no 
language. I have only you. I don't need you. I have me 
alone." (Standard English) (27).
A number of questions of definition need to be asked of Kyle, and of 
Labov. Firstly, what is to be understyood by the term 'a properly 
accredited language'? Labov defines a language as having a grammar 
that can be written down and explained. However, this implies that 
any statement can be grammatical if it, or its type, occurs more than 
once, and if this is so, can there be any criteria for correcting 
speech or language as ungrammatical ? Indeed, can there not be as 
many languages as there are speakers ? Or, put another way, this 
argument implies that everything spoken is a language in itself, and 
if this is so, can the term 'language* have any real meaning or 
value ?
Secondly, Labov and Kyle must define 'culture'. Kyle's discussion of 
minority and dominant cultures presupposes some generally accepted 
meaning for the term 'culture' or cultural group'. This notion is 
readily associated with, for example, the Jews, who have identifiably 
different religious and social practices, but is much less easily 
applied to deaf people, who tend to be part of the English, or the 
Jewish, or the American cultures, but also happen to be deaf.
One of the factors at stake here, in educational terms, is the nature 
of the curriculum. For black children, being taught in black language 
'ghettoese' or non-standard negro English, may be restricted in their 
access to material not in 'ghettoese*. Similarly, a concentration on 
black literature or black history, restricts their wider education to 
an unnecessarily narrow spectrum, to an even greater extent than the 
restriction on English speakers who do not learn French or German.
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In the case of deaf children, while it may be easier to learn in sign 
language, and more can be learnt in the time that would otherwise have 
to be spent on the tedious acquisition of a probably not very high 
standard of speech, there are very severe limitations. In particular, 
there is the limitation imposed by the small size of the deaf 
population, and the smaller size of the signing deaf population, which 
makes it uneconomical to produce textbooks. This limits the 
curriculum. Furthermore, the available linguistic structures are 
themselves limited, or at least different, as the quotation above 
demonstrates.
Furthermore, ninety per cent of deaf children come from homes where 
the parents are not themselves deaf or signing, a point which Kyle 
admits but glosses over (28). In such families, speech is the 
normal method of communication, and an early decision has to be made 
as to which shall be the deaf child’s first language, since small deaf 
children have, in effect, no language. Speech can best be learnt at an 
early age, and possession of speech is the key to integration, but the 
success of the instruction cannot be measured until later in life.
This must always pose a moral dilemma for parents and teachers, but it 
is not a dilemma which can be resolved by philosophical discourse.
The conclusion reached by the 'Knowledge and control' school, and by 
Labov and Kyle, is that there is no such thing as being deficient, but 
that this is an artificial description. However, even in a 
multi-cultural society, the different groups have an ideal to which 
they aspire, albeit an ideal which differs from one culture to 
another. To discount this is to attempt to change society in a 
fundamental and draconian way. The education of handicapped children 
thus illustrates the core of the arguments for and against integration 
of cultures into a society, an integration which can be held to be an 
ironing out of differences, or an accepting and valuing of these 
differences. As can be seen in many parts of the world, for example 
Sri Lanka, or Canada, on the national scale this can lead to 
separatist movements, of Tamils, or Quebecois. On a smaller scale, 
promotion of cultural identity leads to the cultural isolation of the 
ghetto.
It must be wondered whether even the most ardent proponent of sign 
language and deaf rights would really endorse this prospect,
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study can understand and use standard American speech as well as NNE, 
such are the common features of the two, this ability is not available 
to those 'signing' deaf children who can only understand BSL. Thus 
their isolation is the greater.
In response to the question heading this section, it must be admitted 
that Kyle is partially correct,for some special needs are indeed 
'artefacts* of a certain culture. However, it makes little sense to 
say that all are. Kyle has not sufficiently seperated three aspects.
Firstly, it is not very important whether or not BSL is an
'accredited' language. It is important that decisions need to be
taken about second language learners, and even which language should 
be the first language. Secondly, having or lacking respect for the
language or its speakers may put them in an invidious position of 
outsiders vis a vis their status as citizens and employees. Thirdly, 
there is an alternative sign language, 'signed English', which does 
attempt to follow the structure of English. This does not have the 
appeal of the second language arguments, and has not been developed by 
deaf adults, but it was developed by hearing teachers from BSL, 
attempting to modify the signs into the standard English structure. 
This allows the deaf their normal means of communication, but also 
permits them access to reading material in standard English.
Adoption of sign language for deaf children, as Kyle suggests, would 
make the special education of deaf children more special, and more 
different. Similarly, education in black studies and in black 
language following Labov, makes this education more different. The 
desire for the acceptance of different cultures must be balanced 
against the desire for their integration.
The large group of children for whom English is a second language 
would, as noted above, seem to have a very good case for special needs 
designation. Paradoxically, they are not included by either the 
Warnock Report nor the 1981 Education Act. Given the emphasis on 
integration, and hence the omission of the gifted child or girls from 
its brief of the former, this is surprising. Conversely, Kyle, in 
emphasising the special linguistic needs of the deaf, and by 
association other children for whom English is a second language, 
strengthens the case of the gifted child and of girls to be allowed
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special needs treatment. This argument follows the spirit of the 
Warnock Report, but is ontrary to the apparently general 
interpretation of it both by the 1981 Act, and by the Local Education 
Authorities and educationalists.
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12.1 Warnock : Vision to reality.
"To those whose expectations were roused by the deliberations of 
the Warnock Committee and its generally welcome report, the 
1981 Education Act and subsequent regulations have produced 
dismay and disappointment." (1)
When looking at the practical results in Special Education consequent 
upon the Warnock Report, it is necessary to distinguish between 
, several different publications. Thus the 1978 Report was followed by 
the 1981 Act, and by Circular 1/83, which gave Local Education 
Authorities guidance on the fulfillment of the requirements of the 
Act, and also by those Authorities own subsequent interpretation and 
use of the Act since it became fully in operation in April 1984. 
Between Report and Act, there were consultation documents, a special 
standing committee, a White Paper (2), and an educational debate. 
Indeed, it is no wonder that some aspects of the Report were altered 
or lost.
Whether the final results in classroom practice do produce ’dismay and 
disappointment1 depends partly on attitude, and partly on personal 
interpretation of the Report. The Report has certainly been diluted 
by all the subsequent writings as it passed through the consultative 
stages. This is as a result of the wording of the Report itself, 
which has as we have seen can be given at least two differences in 
interpretation.
Thus some are ’disappointed' because they regard Warnock as 
propounding integration for the severely handicapped; an integration 
which has not occured widely. Some are ’dismayed’ because their 
interpretation of the Warnock Report pointed to a better quality of 
education for all children with learning difficulties, and a possible 
change in the teaching of all children, which again does not seem to 
have happened generally. The practical reason for as piecemeal and 
varied interpretation of the both the Warnock Report and the 1981 Act 
is the nature of the education system, and in particular, the power of 
the educational authorities in a scheme where, until sufficient 
case-law has been established, there is only guidance and advice
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guidance and advice rather than reinforcement.
Furthermore, the existing Local Authority provision (i.e. pre-1981) 
was already very varied. Not only were some more open to the 
suggestion, or the need, for integration, but also their social and 
physical environments, and their budgetary constraints varied 
enormously. These differences, coupled with the discretion given to 
Local Education Authorities has produced a situation which ranges 
between two extremes :
"...there is disquieting evidence that some Local Education 
Authorities have seized upon the integration principle to make 
placements in ordinary schools without due regard to their 
preparedness." (3)
"...slowness on the part of many Local Education Authorities to 
accept the integration principle..." (4)
Two examples of the changes between the Warnock Report and the present 
situation can be given here. Firstly, the Report gave prominence to 
the concept of the 1 Named Person*,
"...who will provide a single point of professional contact..." 
(5)
and
"...to whom the parents of children with disability or special 
needs can turn for advice on the different services available 
to meet their child’s needs." (6)
This provision has been seen as lasting up to and beyond school 
leaving age for the severely handicapped person, for whom it could 
have been connected with an organisation like ’Advocacy Alliance' (7). 
This suggestion has entirely disappeared from the subsequent 
legislation.
Secondly, a change of nomenclature has meant that those children whom 
the Warnock Report recommended should be
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"...recorded...as in need of special educational provision..." 
(9),
are now given
"...statements of special educational need." (9).
As Philips suggests, it is not always clear whether frecorded' and 
'not recorded' are to
"...correspond to the categories of special school and ordinary 
school." (10)
In Warnock's terms, it appears that the two terms are the same, as 
recording is for children who require
"...special educational provision not generally available in 
ordinary schools." (11)
Philips' argument is that there are children, for example, those who 
are dyslexic or have special learning difficulties, who do not need 
special school placement, but who should have the advantages of a 
statement, since this protects their right to be accorded a special 
educational need even if they move to a Local Education Authority 
where the nature of the need is not recognised to the same degree.
This position was maintained by the White Paper (12), but is now less 
clear.
A current extension of this discussion is caused by unease over the 
nature and quality of the statements themselves. Statements have been 
made for all children in special schools, including recommendations on 
the proper placement in the future for each individual. At least some 
parents are indeed filled with 'dismay' at the thought of their child 
being transferred to an ordinary classroom, since they are convinced 
they will not receive the specialist and individual help currently 
given in the special school. Indeed, the local education authority, 
the teacher, the parents, the child, and ultimately the lawyers may 
each have a different view of what is the proper, or the appropriate 
placement for the individual.
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The very statement that the Warnock Report may herald the end of 
special education can be greeted with dismay or enthusiasm. Such a 
statement arises from the central paradoxes of the Warnock Report. 
These are, as noted above, that
"...they have recourse to such a wide ranging definition of 
special educational need that it can readily be seen to refer 
to the whole school population," (13)
and secondly, that the Warnock Report has had to try to preserve the 
advantages of ’being special’ and those of being treated as the same. 
From these two stems the third, that an adequate special educational 
system could lead, on some interpretations, to an end of special 
education.
This statement clearly depends on two meanings of special education. 
Special Education^ is that which is given to children with special 
educational needs in Warnock’s terminology. Special Education^ is 
the individuated education given to every child according to his 
needs. One ’end’ for Special Education^ could be for there to be no 
more handicapped children. This apparent precondition of the ’Good 
Life’, that all children should be healthy, intelligent, and 
well-cared for, loses some of its appeal if it is taken to mean ’no 
handicapped child is to be born’ rather than ’no child is to be born 
handicapped*, or if it is to mean that children who become handicapped 
during childhood are to be eliminated. The most that it can mean is 
that the utmost should be done to prevent disability, although this 
cannot, by itself, mean the ’end’ of special educational need. By 
contrast, adoption of Special Education^ would lead to no child 
being classified as handicapped as far as their education was 
concerned, since all would be provided for as normal, and hence none 
would be special.
The Warnock Report has been criticised for adhering to Special 
Education^-, and not pursuing the argument to its conclusion, that is 
to say, Special Education^ a criticism which the extensions of the 
Report’s arguments to cover gifted children and girls (see Chapter 9) 
illustrates.
In one sense, all education is special education. It has a special
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importance to the individual who has only one childhood and youth, and 
it is increasingly individuated in the way that the Special 
Education^ approach recommends. However, some needs are always 
going to be greater and more complex than others, and the scale of 
this variety requires that such greater, or more complex, needs be 
differentiated. The extent to which society can cater for such 
greater needs depends on its resources, and the priorities it places 
upon these resources as much as on interpretations of Acts and 
Reports.
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12.2 Warnock - emotion and philosophy
"It is not mere superstition and prejudice to suppose that the 
crippled and the blind are to some extent set apart from the 
rest of us : there are real and important differences here 
which it is just as cruel to ignore altogether as to 
exaggerate." (14)
This thesis has sought to establish that there are considerable 
differences between individuals, some of which are relevant to 
education, whatever is considered to be educational. An Aristotelian 
approach, that the acknowledgement of relevant differences leads to 
equity and fairness has been propounded in the face of sociological 
arguments. This emphasises the contention of the Warnock Report that 
some children will continue to need special school placement, despite 
current interpretations of the Report which press for total 
integration.
Munro states that it is ’cruel’ to ignore the differences, as he 
is arguing, in the quotation given at the head of this page, on 
humanitarian grounds. It can also be said that on rational grounds it 
is ’illogical’ to deny the differences, which are, in some cases, so 
externally evident. It may also be ’injudicious’, on utilitarian 
grounds, if such people are said to have rights. The arguments for 
retaining some form of special treatment can thus be held together, 
with none taking priority, save in cases of very severe handicap, 
where notions of compassion and altruism must necessarily 
predominate.
The types of difference in the educational sphere, offered by Warnock, 
refer to the content, approach, and atmosphere of the learning. A 
sociological approach to educational differences suggests that it is 
just as cruel to exaggerate the wrong difference. The Warnock Report 
itself is a long, detailed, and well-written document, which might 
have been more coherent if it had concentrated on its specific task of 
being ’An enquiry into the education of handicapped children and young 
people'. Widening the category by redefining handicap in terms of 
special educational need has provided the arguments for this thesis,
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but it has made the concept itself unsustainable. For, as has been 
demonstrated in this thesis, there is a family of emotive concepts, 
which are drawn upon in most educational contexts. The use of this 
family of concepts involves what might be called ’the three ’P’s’ - 
paradox, prestige, and pejorative. These concepts are ’education’ 
itself, ’normal’ and its compounds, ’needs', ’handicapped', and 
’special’, and many more. A reader might be warned
"...note first of all the deceptive combination of factual data 
and appreciation. Because one cannot dispute the information, 
one may be lead to think that one cannot disagree with the 
value-judgement." (15)
The Warnock Report itself, cannot, at first sight, be accused of 
hiding value-judgements in this way, since it defines what it means by 
’education’ and 'special needs’, though not by ’needs’. By contrast, 
the criticism of hiding value-judgements can be levelled at the many 
critics whose arguments are less clear, or who use the concepts of the
Warnock Report in a way alien to it. However, because special,
special needs are subsumed in special needs by the Report, arguments 
are given, which although they may hold for one, may not be relevant 
for the other.
The attempt to adopt prestige, or even non-emotive, terms to replace 
pejorative ones can lead to the paradox that the intended non-emotive 
or prestige term itself becomes pejorative, in the way that
educationally subnormal has done. The greater paradox is that it
appears impossible to combine the two main aims of the Warnock Report. 
Thes aims, which have been maintained by most special educationalists, 
whatever their philosophy, are :
a) to enable the children to be as normal as possible with their 
peers and without stigma;
b) and to offer them the best possible and most appropriate 
teaching.
The need to be considered to be the same may not be compatible with 
the need to be treated differently. Equity, as fairness, not 
equality, is the proper social aim of education.
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Relativistic arguments, whilst providing a timely reminder that some 
handicaps are purely educational, and are both socially created and 
maintained, do not adequately explain the position of severe, and 
profoundly debilitating, conditions, which may be rare, but whose 
rarity makes them even more difficult to deal with. One result of the 
developments following the submission of the Warnock Report is that 
the few special boarding schools that do remain are likely to be even 
more isolated, in terms of distance from their pupils' homes than 
before, although it is to be hoped that the Report will encourage some 
forms of integration locally to the school for the children. At the 
secondary level, boarding schools may well be an advantage for many 
children, as they provide them with an increasing independence from 
their parents, which is a normal development of adolescence, and which 
is not always allowed to the severely handicapped. In some cases, 
such separation may provide a better academic and specific education 
than could be available in the bigger, and less specialised, classes 
of the comprehensive school, and, furthermore may encourage the 
individual who may be better able to have some success in a small way 
rather than be a failure in a large institution.
It is never easy to change attitudes, or teaching methods, by statute. 
Indeed the criticisms that the Warnock Committee should have been more 
far-reaching in its recommendations could not hope to be met, for it 
already had too great a task. The Committee hoped to remove stigma in 
favour of a proper educational distinction of difference made on 
grounds relevant to both the teaching and placement of children, and 
the expectations from them. However, this cannot be achieved merely 
by renaming of groups, syndromes, or individuals.
An almost total integration of handicapped children and adults may 
indeed be the eventual result of the Warnock Committee's 
deliberations, but it was not a feature of their Report. If it does 
occur, in the long term, it will be costly in terms of time, 
resources, and personal commitment of all those involved in the 
education of children, both with and without 'special educational 
needs'.
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